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My dissertation investigates different aspects of transfer programs in the United
States, contributes to our understanding of interactions between safety-net pro-
grams, and improves the data available to measure recipiency of these programs
historically.
In my first chapter I investigate how gaining eligibility for Medicaid affects
the way families interact with other parts of the safety net and the labor market.
The U.S. has many of programs with different eligibility criteria and substantial
overlap on a family’s budget constraint. I use large expansions of Medicaid el-
igibility to instrument for the effect of Medicaid on take-up, participation, and
eligibility for other programs including cash welfare, food stamps, housing sub-
sidies, and wage subsidies. Combining Current Population Survey data with a
difference-in-differences framework, I find that expansions targeting the lowest-
income families increased participation in other major programs including food
stamps, cash welfare, and rental subsidies. However, effects on program par-
ticipation obscure larger, offsetting increases in program take-up (participation
among eligibles) and reductions in program eligibility. I find that Medicaid ex-
pansions increased family labor supply, consistent with the reduction in pro-
gram eligibility. These spillovers imply that Medicaid expansions for children
had two substantial, unintended benefits: more eligible children received safety
net benefits and fewer children were eligible due to increased family incomes.
The second chapter, coauthored with Professor Richard V. Burkhauser, in-
vestigates how the creation of major safety net programs affected trends in
income and is distribution. We extend Census Bureau estimates of the mar-
ket value of in-kind transfers including Medicare and Medicaid as well as
employer-provided health insurance from 1979 back to 1967 using Current Pop-
ulation Survey data and couple it with decennial Census data for 1959. Using
these data, we provide a fresh look at the twenty-year period 1959 to 1979 that
encompasses the start of New Frontier and Great Society programs. We show
that conventional measures of median income and income inequality that ex-
clude the market value of in-kind transfers, including Medicare and Medicaid,
will substantially understate the success of government policies in offsetting
the stagnation of median market income growth and the rise in market income
inequality since 1969.
In the third chapter, I explore the relationship between income and out-of-
pocket health care expenditures among the elderly. Health care expenditures
have risen rapidly in the United States over the last 50 years, and rising incomes
are one potential contributor to this increase. Using an instrument for Social Se-
curity income to capture variation exogenously introduced by Congress during
the 1970s, I show that less-educated households have a large income-elasticity
of demand for health care, as well as additional health insurance coverage and
increased health care utilization. The elasticities are sufficiently large to indicate
that rising incomes are an important contributor to rising expenditures, at least
among the less-educated elderly.
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CHAPTER 1
THE EFFECTS OF EXPANSIONS OF CHILDREN’S MEDICAID
ELIGIBILITY ON PROGRAM PARTICIPATION AND LABOR SUPPLY
1.1 Introduction
Reforms to government programs or policies may affect the behavior of fami-
lies towards other programs. Even if programs are not directly linked, cross-
program spillovers might occur indirectly if reforms to one program affect ele-
ments of behavior that are pertinent to another. Safety net programs in particu-
lar have potential for unintended spillovers. The U.S. has many safety net pro-
grams that use similar criteria to determine eligibility but often assign different
thresholds to overlapping criteria. These programs are administered by sepa-
rate agencies that do not coordinate implementation. Moreover, the program
benefits themselves create highly non-linear budget constraints for low-income
families. The combination of overlapping eligibility criteria, uncoordinated im-
plementation, and non-linear budget constraints creates many potential mech-
anisms operating between programs. For example, if one program is expanded
a newly eligible applicant may gain information about eligibility for other pro-
grams through a caseworker. Alternatively, changes to a program’s eligibility
rules may affect families’ labor supply decisions, which may affect eligibility
for other programs. Understanding these spillovers is critical for policy makers
since unintended consequences of changes to program rules may work against
the intended goals.
Spillovers affecting program participation fall broadly into two categories:
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mechanisms affecting take-up rates and mechanisms affecting eligibility rates.1
“Participation rate” refers to the fraction of the overall population participating
in a given program, and “take-up rate” measures the fraction of individuals who
are eligible for a given program and choose to enroll. Existing research has not
determined which factors are most important for program take-up in isolation
(Currie, 2006), but even less is known about interactions between participation,
eligibility, and take-up across various programs. However, understanding in-
teractions between safety net programs is particularly important because these
programs are large, may interact through many channels, and potentially af-
fect developmental outcomes of children. In addition, the interactions between
safety net programs are presently salient due to recent policy proposals to re-
form specific programs. For example, efforts to repeal the Affordable Care Act
(ACA) included cuts to Medicaid budgets, while proposed rule changes would
include implementing work requirements for Medicaid and other programs.
There are several major obstacles to evaluating these spillovers, including a lack
of exogenous variation in eligibility, concurrent policy changes to major safety
net programs, and a lack of data that allow the separation of specific mecha-
nisms.
In this paper, I study how expansions of Medicaid eligibility for children af-
fect participation and take-up of the four major safety net programs targeting
families with children: the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP,
known as food stamps until 2008), cash welfare (Aid for Families with Depen-
dent Children or AFDC until 1996, and Temporary Assistance for Needy Fami-
lies or TANF thereafter), the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), and low-income
1Note that these effects may work in opposite directions; e.g., a Medicaid expansion could
increase take-up but cause an offsetting reduction in eligibility for other safety net programs if
Medicaid increases labor supply.
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rent subsidies.2 Specifically, I estimate the change in the fraction of children
participating in or taking-up a safety net program in response to a change in
the fraction of children eligible for Medicaid. I estimate this effect by parame-
terizing large expansions of Medicaid and the creation of the Children’s Health
Insurance Program (CHIP) that occurred in the late 1980s and 1990s. To isolate
plausibly exogenous variation from these expansions, I construct a simulated
instrument for Medicaid eligibility (Currie and Gruber, 1996a,b; Cutler and Gru-
ber, 1996). This instrument captures variation due only to changes in Medicaid
eligibility rules at the state or federal level.
Changes to rules for any program may affect participation in other pro-
grams, but the effects of changes to Medicaid eligibility are of particular in-
terest for several reasons. First, Medicaid is by far the largest transfer program
targeting low-income families in the United States, with spending of $553 bil-
lion in fiscal year 2016 and nearly 74 million enrollees (Rudowitz and Valentine,
2017).3 Second, in contrast to other safety net programs that phase out with
family income, Medicaid recipiency is discrete and creates a large discontinu-
ity in families’ budget constraints. By virtue of being the largest program and
creating the largest non-linearity in families’ budget constraints, Medicaid has
more potential to cause unintended spillovers than other safety net programs.
Finally, Medicaid has been shown to affect a variety of developmental out-
comes of children including health and health care utilization, fertility, ed-
2Program participation or take-up always refers to the participation or take-up outcome of a
child’s family in other, non-Medicaid, safety net programs. Medicaid participation and take-up
are never outcomes I consider. I briefly discuss the effects of Medicaid expansions on additional
programs in Appendix Section A.5.
3For comparison, the next largest safety net program targeting low-income families is SNAP,
with expenditures of $64 billion and 42 million enrollees (USDA, 2018). In 2017, 27 million tax
filers claimed $63 billion from the EITC. The number of filers is not comparable to enrollees,
however, because it is the number of tax units receiving the EITC and not the number of indi-
viduals.
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ucation, and long-term labor market outcomes (Currie and Gruber, 1996a,b;
DeLeire, 2018; East et al., 2017; DeLeire et al., 2011; Cohodes et al., 2016;
Goodman-Bacon, 2016; Brown et al., 2018). These outcomes have important
implications for productivity growth, federal budgets, and a whole range of
measures of social well-being. However, the effects found in previous studies
may be due in part to spillovers to other safety net programs that are also impor-
tant for developmental outcomes. Estimates of these interactions are important
for policy makers considering changes to Medicaid to anticipate the effects of
reforms and to understand which mechanisms contribute to overall outcomes.
To estimate the effects of Medicaid expansions, I construct the simulated in-
strument for eligibility by children’s age, race, state of residence, and year using
the March Current Population Survey (CPS) for the years 1980-2010. Similar
to Cohodes et al. (2016) I estimate both overall Medicaid eligibility, including
state-optional rules, and eligibility under only federal rules that are unlikely to
be endogenously related to local state characteristics. I account for potential
concurrent policy changes to the other major safety net programs by similarly
simulating eligibility for those programs. Controlling for these simulated mea-
sures of eligibility ensures that my estimates of the effects of Medicaid expan-
sions are not confounded by contemporaneous changes to eligibility of the out-
come programs. I then use these simulated eligibility measures to decompose
changes in a program’s participation rate into changes in take-up and changes
in eligibility. Labor supply is an important mechanism driving changes in eligi-
bility. I therefore also estimate the effect of children’s Medicaid eligibility on the
labor supply of families.
I find that overall Medicaid expansions did not significantly affect partici-
4
pation in major safety net programs but that federal Medicaid expansions did.
A 10 percentage point expansion in children’s eligibility under federal rules in-
creases the participation rate in SNAP, cash welfare, and rental subsidies by
0.3, 0.5, and 0.2 percentage points, or 2.3, 4.6, and 3.0 percent relative to mean
participation rates, respectively.4 However, the estimated effects on participa-
tion rates cover up larger, offsetting effects on program take-up and eligibility.
Overall and federal Medicaid expansions both increase take-up of SNAP and
cash welfare. For both expansion types, the increase in take-up is offset by a re-
duction in eligibility. The eligibility reductions are larger for overall expansions
leading to no significant effect on program participation, while a smaller effect
on participation remains for federal expansions. Overall expansions also reduce
eligibility for the EITC.5
Of the major potential mechanisms affecting eligibility and take-up, I only
observe labor supply directly. I estimate that overall Medicaid expansions
significantly increased labor supply when measured as average weekly hours
worked by families or by family labor income. A positive effect on labor supply
could result from families reducing labor supply to maintain coverage when
facing strict eligibility criteria prior to an expansion but increasing labor sup-
ply when the strict threshold is relaxed. A 10 percentage point expansion in
overall Medicaid eligibility increases weekly hours worked by 0.75 and aver-
4Throughout, I interpret estimates in terms of a 10 percentage point expansion of eligibility.
This is similar to previous work (Cohodes et al., 2016; Dave et al., 2015), but is also a relevant
scale given the magnitudes of actual expansions. The standard deviations for fraction of chil-
dren eligible under federal and overall Medicaid expansions are 0.08 and 0.13, respectively.
From 1980 to 2010 federal Medicaid eligibility increased by 15.1 percentage points, and overall
eligibility by 38.4 percentage points.
5I estimate effects on participation, take-up, and eligibility for SNAP and cash welfare. For
the EITC, the CPS contains imputed, not actual, receipt. Thus, I can only estimate effects on
EITC eligibility, not actual participation or take-up. Conversely, the CPS contains insufficient
information to estimate eligibility for rental assistance, and so I am only able to estimate effects
on participation for rental subsidies, not effects on eligibility or take-up.
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age annual income by more than $2,000, or 1.3 percent and 3.6 percent relative
to means, respectively. Federal Medicaid expansions do not significantly affect
the labor supply of families, although the point estimates are consistent with a
small increase in family labor supply. Similar to prior work on labor supply,
I find no significant effects of Medicaid expansions on the labor supply of sin-
gle mothers. Instead, labor supply estimates are driven by teens, other adult
family members, and families with two parents. The positive effect of Medicaid
expansions on labor supply is consistent with the reductions in eligibility for
safety net programs.
This paper makes several contributions to the literature on Medicaid eligi-
bility, program participation and take-up, and labor supply. First, I estimate the
effects of expansions of Medicaid eligibility on participation in the major safety
net programs targeting low-income families with children while controlling for
the simulated eligibility for those programs. Prior work has investigated partic-
ipation in some of these programs, no work has controlled for contemporane-
ous changes to program rules that are a potential threat to identification (Blank,
1989; Winkler, 1991; Moffitt and Wolfe, 1992; Yelowitz, 1995; Ham and Shore-
Sheppard, 2005; Shore-Sheppard, 2008; Decker and Selck, 2012; Corson and Mc-
Connell, 1990; McConnell, 1991; Yelowitz, 1996). Second, I decompose the ef-
fects of Medicaid expansions on program participation into changes in take-up
of other safety net programs and changes in eligibility for those programs. This
decomposition is important because I show modest changes in program partici-
pation mask larger but offsetting effects of Medicaid expansions on take-up and
eligibility.
Third, I estimate the effects of Medicaid expansions for children on family
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labor supply, accounting for spillovers within families. There is a large prior lit-
erature on the effects of Medicaid expansions on labor supply, but this research
only considers the labor supply of single mothers (Winkler, 1991; Moffitt and
Wolfe, 1992; Yelowitz, 1995; Montgomery and Navin, 2000; Meyer and Rosen-
baum, 2001; Ham and Shore-Sheppard, 2005; Pohl, 2018). However, other adults
in single mother families, such as older siblings, and the members of two-parent
families may have more elastic labor supply if single mothers provide their own
child care. Prior research has found that single women have relatively inelastic
labor supply (McClelland and Mok, 2012). I provide evidence that other adults
and teens do adjust their labor supply more flexibly. Additionally, by consid-
ering families with alternative parental structures, I estimate the effect of Med-
icaid expansions on a much larger sample of treated families. After the imple-
mentation of the CHIP expansions nearly all states covered children in families
with incomes below 200 percent of the federal poverty line (FPL). In 2017, there
were 17 million children in families with single mothers in the U.S., fewer than
10 million of which lived in poverty (U.S. Census Bureau, 2017, 2018b). How-
ever, 28 million children lived in families with incomes below 200 percent of the
FPL (Fontenot et al., 2018). Thus, previous research has missed two important
margins on which labor supply may be affected by Medicaid expansions.
Finally, I build on previous work by explicitly testing the exogeneity of state-
optional Medicaid expansions. State expansions may be related to local de-
mographic trends or economic shocks. Cohodes et al. (2016) evaluate these
state-level expansions by developing a measure of Medicaid eligibility that uses
only changes to federal Medicaid rules, which are unlikely to be related to the
characteristics of specific states. They find similar results from estimates us-
ing the overall and federal measures of eligibility, providing informal evidence
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supporting the exogeneity of state-level expansions. However, the federal and
state-optional expansions also differ by where in the income distribution these
expansions are concentrated. Figure 1.1 shows the fraction of children eligible
for federal and state-optional expansions by their families’ income percentile.
Federal expansions tend to cover children in very low-income families, while
state-optional expansions cover children in relatively higher income families,
a result also shown by Goldsmith-Pinkham et al. (2018). Cohodes et al. (2016)
study educational attainment, and it is unsurprising that Medicaid expansions
would increase educational attainment for children in both low- and relatively
high-income families.
It is theoretically ambiguous whether Medicaid expansions would affect
safety net program participation of low- and higher-income families in the same
direction, however. For example, higher income families are more likely to have
two parents, and thus more flexibility to modify their labor supply. As a result
their program participation behavior may be more sensitive to eligibility mech-
anisms than low-income families. I extend the informal test conducted by Co-
hodes et al. (2016) and contribute to the literature by estimating an explicit test
of the relative exogeneity of the state-optional expansions. I select a subsam-
ple of children covered by state-optional expansions whose families’ incomes
are similar to those covered under federal expansions and show that the effects
for these families are broadly similar. The similarity of these results corrobo-
rates the exogeneity of state-optional Medicaid expansions with respect to local
demographic and economic characteristics.
Overall, my results indicate that Medicaid expansions targeted towards low-
income and single-parent families increased program participation, while over-
8
Figure 1.1: The figure shows the fraction of children age 0-17 eligible for
federal and state-optional Medicaid expansions by the income
percentile of the children’s families in the year 2000. Federal el-
igibility uses only federal Medicaid rules holding AFDC rules
fixed to 1980. State-optional expansions include all state ex-
pansions to Medicaid and CHIP. Income percentiles are deter-
mined using families’ gross income.
all expansions did not. This finding is unsurprising as the relatively higher-
income families affected by overall and state-optional expansions are less likely
to be eligible for the major safety net programs. The modest effects of Medi-
caid expansions on program participation obscure offsetting, relatively larger
effects of expansions on program take-up and eligibility. Medicaid expansions
increased program take-up, consistent with an increase in information regard-
ing other safety net programs or a reduction in the transaction costs of applying,
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but caused an offsetting reduction in eligibility for other safety net programs,
corroborated by an increase in labor supply. These estimates suggest that mov-
ing from relatively strict to relatively generous eligibility thresholds for Med-
icaid did not adversely affect labor supply. Additionally, my results provide
evidence of significant spillovers between safety net programs. These results
inform the interpretation of prior work on the effects of Medicaid expansions,
as estimates of the short- and long-term effects of Medicaid expansions combine
the effects of Medicaid eligibility itself with the benefits of increased take-up of
other safety net programs.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 describes
the institutional background and theoretical intuition of the effects of Medicaid
expansions. Section 1.3 provides a brief overview of the most relevant literature.
Section 2.3 describes my data and construction of my outcomes and simulated
instrument. Section 2.4 presents my empirical model and discusses identifica-
tion. Section 2.5 presents my primary results, and Sections 1.7 and 1.8 present
evidence on instrument exogeneity and robustness checks, respectively. Section
2.6 concludes.
1.2 Medicaid Institutional Background
1.2.1 The Medicaid Program
Medicaid was created in 1965 to provide health insurance to low-income fam-
ilies. Each state implements its own Medicaid program, with some flexibility
in determining program parameters, but each state’s program must follow ba-
10
sic coverage rules and minimum eligibility thresholds set by the federal gov-
ernment. States may optionally expand Medicaid programs beyond federal
minimum eligibility thresholds, and the federal government provides matching
funds for program costs up to a maximum eligibility threshold. The coverage
rules set by the federal government have gone through several periods of expan-
sion since the program’s inception. These expansions, combined with the joint
state-federal program structure, create substantial variation in eligibility within
and across states that I use to estimate the effects of Medicaid expansions on
program participation.
Low-income families with children originally gained Medicaid eligibility
through enrolling in AFDC (cash welfare). AFDC eligibility levels were set by
states and were generally well below the federal poverty line. This created sub-
stantial cross-state variation in eligibility for Medicaid, as some states set more
generous AFDC eligibility levels. Beginning in the mid-1980s, a series of fed-
eral laws gradually decoupled Medicaid eligibility for families with children
from AFDC by establishing a separate pathway to eligibility. This alternative
pathway used substantially higher, and nationally uniform, income eligibility
thresholds for children and pregnant women. In addition, these changes relaxed
constraints related to the structure of the family and determined eligibility for
individuals within the family rather than the family as a whole, as under AFDC.
By 1990, states were required to cover children under age six in families with
incomes below 133 percent of the FPL, and older children in families with in-
comes under 100 percent of the FPL. An important feature of these expansions is
that they applied only to children born after September, 1983. This sharp birth-
date cutoff led to large within-age increases in eligibility as children aged into
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the expansions and a gradual increase in overall coverage throughout the 1990s.
Many states optionally extended even more generous coverage. CHIP was cre-
ated in 1997 to further expand health insurance coverage for children, and by
July 2000 all 50 states and Washington D.C. had implemented CHIP programs.
While all states created CHIP programs, the timing and eligibility thresholds
were largely left to the discretion of the states. CHIP programs expanded eligi-
bility further up the income distribution to families with incomes up to 200 or
300 percent of the FPL, and in many states expanded coverage levels for older
children. I provide more detail on specific Medicaid and CHIP expansions in
Appendix Section A.1. I use the variation in Medicaid eligibility across states,
over time, and within ages induced by these expansions to separately estimate
the effects of overall and federal Medicaid eligibility on participation in other
(non-Medicaid) safety net programs and labor supply.
1.2.2 Theoretical Motivation
There are several mechanisms through which Medicaid eligibility and program
participation may interact, which fall into two categories. The first category is
take-up mechanisms. These mechanisms directly affect the decisions of already-
eligible families of whether to enroll in other safety net programs. There are
three main take-up mechanisms. First, through enrolling in Medicaid families
may learn about their eligibility for other programs. For instance, this informa-
tion may be provided to them by a caseworker when enrolling, and in some
cases they may be actively encouraged to apply to other programs.6 The in-
formation channel should unambiguously increase participation rates in other
6This was the case for the Oregon Health Insurance Experiment (OHIE) (Baicker et al., 2014).
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programs.
Second, Medicaid eligibility may affect program participation through
stigma (Moffitt, 1983). If enrolling in transfer programs is stigmatizing, families
may not participate. Newly eligible Medicaid applicants may accept the stigma
for Medicaid if it is more valuable or less stigmatizing than other programs, but
may then choose to enroll in other safety net programs as well. Alternatively, if
a family is already enrolled in other transfer programs but Medicaid is less stig-
matizing, then an expansion may allow them to enroll in Medicaid and unenroll
from other programs if Medicaid sufficiently relaxes their resource constraints.
It is also possible that Medicaid expansions reduce overall stigma for all safety
net programs. Thus, the effect of stigma on program participation is ex-ante am-
biguous. Third, there are transaction costs for applying to safety net programs.
Changing eligibility for Medicaid may affect the transaction costs of applying
to other programs. To the extent that applications require similar information
Medicaid expansions would increase program take-up, but expansions would
decrease take-up to the extent that applications are time consuming and apply-
ing for Medicaid crowds out applying to additional programs. Like stigma, the
effect of transaction costs on program participation is ambiguous.
The second category of mechanisms through which programs may interact
are eligibility mechanisms. These mechanisms indirectly affect program partici-
pation rates by changing the eligibility status of families. The primary eligibility
mechanism is labor supply.7 Medicaid expansions may increase labor supply
7Other potential eligibility mechanisms include, for instance, decisions regarding fertility or
marital behavior of families, which could theoretically be affected by eligibility for Medicaid and
would affect eligibility for other programs. DeLeire et al. (2011) estimate the effects of Medicaid
expansions on fertility and do not find robust evidence of any relationship. Substantial work
has looked at the relationship between Medicaid or other safety net programs and marriage,
and has found at most small effects. See Gruber (2003a).
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through improving the health of covered pregnant women or working teens.
Additionally, Medicaid expansions may change incentives to work by modify-
ing non-linearities in a family’s budget constraint. In a simple static model of
labor supply, increasing eligibility thresholds for Medicaid shifts the income-
level at which a family experiences a large, discontinuous reduction in income
due to the loss of Medicaid eligibility because of Medicaid’s discrete eligibil-
ity feature, or the “Medicaid Notch.” If families modify their labor supply in
response to their new budget constraint, their eligibility for other transfer pro-
grams may also be affected. Unlike improvements in health, changes in bud-
get constraints faced by families could affect program participation and labor
supply in either the positive or negative direction, and in general the direction
will depend on a family’s income relative to pre- and post-expansion eligibility
thresholds. Therefore, the net effect of changes in labor supply also is ex-ante
ambiguous.
To clarify the intuition and theoretical predictions of a simple static model,
Figure 1.2 shows a simplified budget constraint for a single mother with a sin-
gle child under age six in 1989, prior to the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
(OBRA) of 1989 expansion. The black line (alternating short and long dash) is
the labor-leisure trade-off for a family that does not participate in any transfer
programs. The blue (short dash) and red (long dash) lines add the AFDC/SNAP
benefits and EITC, respectively. The green (solid) line shows the budget con-
straint including the value of Medicaid coverage for the child. Once the fam-
ily’s AFDC benefit is phased out, the child loses Medicaid eligibility and there
is a large, discontinuous drop in family income including Medicaid. Consider a
family with potential income equal to point A. With a conventional utility func-
tion, this family will choose to reduce its labor supply to gain Medicaid eligibil-
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ity. In this example, such a shift in income would make this family also eligible
for SNAP and AFDC but would not affect EITC participation. If the mother
cannot adjust labor supply continuously but instead must choose to work full-
time, part-time, or exit the labor force, the family’s reduction in labor supply
and resulting change in program participation may be large.
Figure 1.2: Budget constraint for a single mother with one non-disabled
child under six in 1989, pre-expansion. Black (alternating short
and long dash) lines show earned income. The blue (short
dash) and red (long dash) lines add AFDC/SNAP and EITC,
respectively. The green (solid) line adds Medicaid income for
one eligible child. Mother’s own eligibility is not included. Fig-
ure is drawn to scale assuming mother earns twice the federal
minimum wage of $3.35 and that the family values the child’s
Medicaid coverage at its market value.
Figure 1.3 shows the same family’s budget constraint after OBRA 1989 went
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into effect. States are now required to cover children under age six until family
income reaches 133 percent of the FPL. The effect of the expansion on a family’s
program participation and labor supply depends on their position in the income
distribution. Families with potential income equal to point A no longer face an
incentive to reduce labor supply to gain Medicaid eligibility. These families may
increase their labor supply following the expansion. Families with potential in-
come at point B pre-expansion had incomes sufficiently high that Medicaid did
not distort their labor supply decisions. Post-expansion, they now face an anal-
ogous situation as families at point A did pre-expansion, and may reduce their
labor supply.8 In this example, the expansion would reduce AFDC/SNAP re-
ceipt for families with incomes near point A but would not affect program par-
ticipation of families with incomes near point B. The value of Medicaid is shown
to be constant, but this is not necessarily the case. Health is inversely correlated
with income, and poorer families may place a higher value on Medicaid if they
are more likely to use its services. Conversely, higher income families may place
a lower value on Medicaid if they are more likely to have alternative options for
health insurance, such as private coverage through an employer.
In reality, the family’s labor supply will depend on additional factors. This
simple model presents only a subset of safety net programs at a single point in
time, although rules for these programs also vary over time and across states.
There may be heterogeneity in the ability of families to modify their labor sup-
ply or their knowledge of program eligibility rules. Families with multiple po-
tential workers may be more responsive to expansions because additional po-
tential earners may have more flexibility to choose their hours, whereas a family
8Note that I do not discuss all the possible changes to labor supply implied by even this
simple static model, and families located at other points on the income distribution also face
changes to their incentives. I focus on the two cases for which the intuition is most important
for this context. See Blank (1989) and Bitler et al. (2006) for additional discussion.
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Figure 1.3: Budget constraint for a single mother with one non-disabled
child under six in 1989, post-expansion. Black (alternating
short and long dash) lines show earned income. The blue (short
dash) and red (long dash) lines add AFDC/SNAP and EITC,
respectively. The green (solid) line adds Medicaid income for
one eligible child. Mother’s own eligibility is not included. Fig-
ure is drawn to scale assuming mother earns twice the federal
minimum wage of $3.35 and that the family values the child’s
Medicaid coverage at its market value.
with one earner such as a single mother with children may have less flexibility
due to being constrained to provide her own child care. Similarly, two-parent
families may have more flexibility to pay the transaction costs of enrolling in
multiple programs, but single-parent families may have a better understanding
of program eligibility rules as safety net programs in the U.S. have historically
explicitly targeted families with children and single mothers.
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These different mechanisms may operate simultaneously and in opposing
directions. The CPS data do not contain sufficient information to distinguish
between the alternative potential mechanisms within the take-up and eligibil-
ity categories. As a result of data constraints, most prior literature (discussed
below) has estimated the net effect of Medicaid expansions on program partic-
ipation only, and has not separated the mechanisms driving these effects nor
distinguished between the eligibility and take-up mechanisms.9 By simulating
eligibility for some safety net programs I am able to separate the net effects of the
take-up and eligibility mechanisms. However, I cannot disentangle the effects
of mechanisms within these categories. Distinguishing between these categories
is particularly important if, for example, Medicaid expansions increased take-
up of other safety net programs directly through the information mechanism
but reduced eligibility for other safety net programs through the labor supply
mechanism. In this case, these mechanisms would partially or completely off-
set, and estimates of the effects of Medicaid expansions on program participa-
tion rates may find no overall effect that covers up substantial offsetting take-up
and eligibility effects.
1.3 Literature Review
There is a large literature studying the effects of Medicaid coverage on a vari-
ety of outcomes including health and health care utilization, inter-generational
health, mortality, crowd-out of private health insurance, fertility, bankruptcy,
education, and long-term labor market outcomes (Currie and Gruber, 1996a,b,
9Yelowitz (1996) is an exception, I discuss his method for separating the labor supply and
information mechanisms in the next section.
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2001; Boudreaux et al., 2016; DeLeire, 2018; East et al., 2017; Goodman-
Bacon, 2018; Cutler and Gruber, 1996; Card and Shore-Sheppard, 2004; Shore-
Sheppard, 2008; Gruber and Simon, 2008; DeLeire et al., 2011; Gross and No-
towidigdo, 2011; Cohodes et al., 2016; Goodman-Bacon, 2016; Brown et al.,
2018). Within the larger literature on Medicaid, I contribute directly to the liter-
ature on program participation and take-up, and the literature on labor supply.
However, my results are also relevant to the broader literature. Many out-
comes affected by Medicaid eligibility are also affected by other safety net pro-
grams. For example, SNAP participation has been found to improve a variety
of outcomes including health and educational attainment (Almond et al., 2011;
Council of Economic Advisers, 2015; Hoynes et al., 2016). Because Medicaid ex-
pansions increase SNAP take-up, the overall effect of Medicaid expansions on
outcomes such as health and educational attainment is due to the direct effect
of expanded Medicaid coverage and the indirect effect of increased SNAP take-
up. The cross-program spillovers do not change the overall effects estimated by
prior research, but do indicate that these spillovers are important for researchers
and policy makers to understand mechanisms driving overall outcomes.
1.3.1 Medicaid, Program Participation, and Program Take-up
The first literature I contribute to investigates the effects of Medicaid cover-
age for children on program participation and take-up.10 A large set of studies
10A related literature examines expansions of Medicaid eligibility for childless adults, but
I consider only expansions affecting children’s eligibility. Moreover, expansions for childless
adults may have different effects on program participation as safety net programs in the U.S.
provide little or no benefits to childless adults. Therefore, I summarize this literature briefly.
Baicker et al. (2014) and Agirdas (2016) study state-optional expansions for childless adults and
find that these Medicaid expansions increased SNAP participation. Baicker et al. (2014) find
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have investigated the effects of Medicaid expansions on program participation
in several safety net programs, particularly AFDC. Decker and Selck (2012),
Blank (1989), Winkler (1991), Moffitt and Wolfe (1992), Yelowitz (1995), Ham
and Shore-Sheppard (2005), and Shore-Sheppard (2008) all examine AFDC par-
ticipation and do not reach a consensus as to the effects of Medicaid expansions.
Corson and McConnell (1990), McConnell (1991), Yelowitz (1996), and Shore-
Sheppard (2008) examine SNAP participation, and generally find that Medicaid
expansions increased SNAP participation. Two of these studies are closely re-
lated to mine. The first, Shore-Sheppard (2008), is the only other study to use a
simulated instrument for Medicaid eligibility. In addition to AFDC and SNAP
she also considers the effects of Medicaid expansions on rent assistance and SSI
participation. She finds that Medicaid eligibility increases participation in every
program except SSI, although these results were not robust to the inclusion of
age-year fixed effects.11
My study makes three primary contributions relative to Shore-Sheppard
(2008) and other studies on program participation. First, my study is the first to
estimate the effects of Medicaid expansions on two of the major components of
the safety net targeting low-income families with children: EITC and TANF.12
no effect on TANF, SSI, or SSDI. Yelowitz (1998, 2000) finds a positive relationship between
Medicaid and SSI participation.
11Shore-Sheppard investigates crowd-out of private health insurance, but as a robustness
check estimates the effect of Medicaid expansions on participation in the four safety net pro-
grams. She argues that the results being sensitive to the inclusion of age-year fixed effects is
evidence of underlying within-age trends that drive large estimates of crowd-out of private
health insurance in earlier work. Age-year trends may be problematic, but this specific test
relies on the claim that Medicaid expansions should have no direct effects on program partici-
pation. However, the mechanisms outlined in the previous section provide plausible pathways
for such direct effects. I further discuss age-year effects in Section 2.4 below.
12A single study, Brown et al. (2018), includes EITC receipts as an adult among their out-
comes when considering the long-term effects of Medicaid. They find that Medicaid eligibility
as a child reduces EITC receipt as an adult. This finding is complementary to mine, but I ex-
amine the effect of Medicaid eligibility on a child’s family contemporaneous receipt of EITC.
Many studies have considered TANF’s cash-welfare predecessor, AFDC, but the programs dif-
fer in many respects and while I consider them jointly in my primary results, I find they are
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Second, every prior study on Medicaid expansions and program participation
has implicitly assumed that the eligibility rules for other safety net programs are
not also being modified in ways that are correlated with Medicaid expansions.
However, many safety net programs were also modified during this period. By
simulating eligibility for a subset of outcome programs, my study is the first
to test and control for this potential threat to identification. Finally, I decom-
pose the effects on program participation into changes in take-up and changes
in eligibility, rather than focusing purely on participation rates that may obscure
larger, offsetting effects through take-up and eligibility.
The second study closely related to mine is Yelowitz (1996). Yelowitz esti-
mates the effects of Medicaid expansions on SNAP participation and attempts
to disentangle cross-program interactions due to the information and labor sup-
ply channels. He uses information in the Survey of Income and Program Par-
ticipation (SIPP) regarding families’ prior enrollment in safety net programs.
Yelowitz argues that families previously enrolled in a safety net program are
only affected through the labor supply channel and not the information chan-
nel, whereas families never enrolled in a safety net program are affected by both
channels. He finds that information increases SNAP participation, but does not
find any effect due to labor supply.
My method of decomposing take-up and eligibility mechanisms is distin-
guished from Yelowitz’s in several ways. First, Yelowitz uses actual Medicaid
eligibility, but actual eligibility is not exogenous with respect to demographic
trends or economic conditions that also affect program participation. Second,
Yelowitz’s model implicitly assumes that the effect of Medicaid on SNAP partic-
ipation due to labor supply is identical for families that previously participated
differentially affected by Medicaid expansions when considered separately.
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in SNAP and those who did not. However, the differences in SNAP participa-
tion history suggest that these families differ in other ways that may be related
to labor supply decisions. My method of separating the take-up and eligibility
channels does not require such an assumption because I estimate eligibility for
SNAP. Finally, Yelowitz may isolate the effect of information on SNAP partici-
pation, but the residual coefficient on Medicaid eligibility does not necessarily
estimate the effect due to labor supply. Effects due to other mechanisms, for
instance stigma or transaction costs, may also be subsumed into this result. By
estimating eligibility for SNAP and other safety net programs, I am able to ex-
plicitly separate changes in participation into changes in take-up and changes
in eligibility. To my knowledge, my study is the first to produce such estimates
of take-up and eligibility mechanisms.
1.3.2 Medicaid and Labor Supply
The second literature I contribute to studies the effects of Medicaid on labor
supply. While numerous papers have studied the effects of children’s Medicaid
eligibility on labor supply, these works focus exclusively on the labor supply of
single mothers. Strumpf (2011) and Decker and Selck (2012) exploit variation in
the timing of implementation of Medicaid programs and find no evidence of a
change in labor supply. Winkler (1991) and Moffitt and Wolfe (1992) study the
early 1980s using variation in the value of Medicaid benefits across states. Win-
kler (1991) finds no effect on labor supply, while Moffitt and Wolfe (1992) finds
a negative effect that is concentrated among families with high expected med-
ical expenditures. A more recent set of papers study the Medicaid expansions
that weakened the link to AFDC receipt. Montgomery and Navin (2000), Meyer
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and Rosenbaum (2001), and Ham and Shore-Sheppard (2005) find no effect of
Medicaid expansions on labor supply of single mothers. Yelowitz (1995) finds
a positive effect on labor supply, but the same critiques from Ham and Shore-
Sheppard (2005) mentioned in the discussion of AFDC participation apply here
as well. Pohl (2018) uses a structural model to estimate the effects of more re-
cent Medicaid expansions for children and forecast the effects of the ACA. He
finds an imprecisely estimated positive effect. Broadly, there is a consensus that
Medicaid expansions for children did not significantly affect the labor supply of
single mothers.13
Overall, the existing literature finds that Medicaid did not significantly af-
fect the labor supply of single mothers. I make two contributions relative to
this literature. First, I expand the sample of families treated by Medicaid expan-
sions from those headed by single mothers to all families with children. While
families headed by a single mother are important, they comprise less than a
third of the families with incomes in the range treated by Medicaid expansions
and prior work has missed this margin on which labor supply may react to ex-
pansions. Second, even within single-mother families the prior literature has
focused only on the labor supply of single mothers themselves. However, other
family members may also modify their labor supply in response to Medicaid
expansions, for instance older siblings still living at home. These family mem-
bers may be much more responsive to a Medicaid expansion if single mothers
13There is a large literature on the effects of state-optional expansions of Medicaid to childless
adults and the ACA on labor supply. Because they study a different set of expansions and focus
on childless adults, I mention them only briefly. Baicker et al. (2014) study an expansion in Ore-
gon and find no effect on labor supply. Garthwaite et al. (2014) find that a large disenrollment of
Medicaid enrollees in Tennessee increased labor supply. DeLeire (2018), Ham and Ueda (2017),
Agirdas (2016), and Dague et al. (2017) investigate other state-optional expansions and find
mixed results. Studies examining the ACA expansions generally do not find evidence of effects
on labor supply (Leung and Mas, 2016; Heim et al., 2017; Kaestner et al., 2017; Frisvold et al.,
2018). A single paper considers the effects of expansions in Medicaid eligibility for pregnant
women and finds a reduction in their labor supply (Dave et al., 2015).
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are the primary source of child care for young children. By accounting for the
labor supply of other family members, I am the first to allow for within-family
spillovers in the effects of Medicaid expansion on labor supply.
1.4 Data
This paper uses the March CPS from survey years 1980-2012. The CPS col-
lects information on program participation, income, and labor supply during
the year prior to the survey. Thus, my data cover outcomes from 1979-2011.
My sample encompasses the years right before the major expansions in Medi-
caid eligibility in the 1980s until just prior to the passage and implementation
of the ACA. In principal, I could estimate Medicaid eligibility for years prior to
1980. However, the CPS does not ask recipients about program participation in
surveys prior to 1980.
1.4.1 Program Participation Outcomes
I restrict my primary sample to families with children ages 0-17, although I use
families without children for robustness checks. I code a child as receiving a
program if any member of the child’s family reports receiving benefits from that
program because benefits are typically received and reported at the family level.
Similarly, when considering the value of benefits received from each program I
assign the total value of all benefits received by all family members to the child.
In my main analysis I consider the four programs that comprise the majority
of the safety net targeting low-income families with children. The Supplemen-
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tal Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, known as food stamps until 2008) pro-
vides in-kind nutritional assistance to low-income families. SNAP is the largest
of the four safety net programs with expenditures of $68 billion in 2017. The
Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) provides wage subsidies to low-income earn-
ers. The EITC is the second largest program, with 2017 expenditures of $63
billion.14 Cash welfare includes two programs. Aid for Families with Depen-
dent Children (AFDC) provided cash benefits to low-income, primarily single-
mother families with children until 1996. After 1996, AFDC was replaced by
a successor program, Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF). I con-
sider these two programs jointly as they provide the same transfer, namely cash.
However, they differ in important respects, and so I also estimate the effects of
Medicaid expansions on AFDC and TANF separately.15 TANF had total 2016
funding of $16.5 billion from the federal government and an additional $15 bil-
lion from states. Finally, rental subsidies covers a variety of programs that pro-
vide rent assistance to low-income families, the most important being programs
implemented by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)
with total 2017 funding of $38 billion. SNAP and housing subsidies are in-kind
rather than cash transfers. The CPS includes estimates of the value of these
transfers to families, and I treat this value as a cash value in my analysis. 16
14The CPS does not ask respondents about EITC benefits received, but rather imputes them.
As a result, regressions of EITC receipt on Medicaid eligibility estimate the effect on EITC eligi-
bility, not EITC participation.
15TANF is not an entitlement program, generally has more restrictive eligibility criteria, caps
the number of years for which an individual may be enrolled in the program, and is funded
through a block grant that is not adjusted for inflation. As a result, TANF benefits have eroded
nearly 40% since its creation (Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 2018).
16These estimates are the “face value” in the case of SNAP, treating the benefits as cash equiv-
alent. Schanzenbach (2002) finds that families value food stamps at slightly less than face value.
Hoynes and Schanzenbach (2009) find that households react similarly to a dollar in cash income
versus a dollar from food stamps. Similarly, other in-kind transfers are valued at their mar-
ket value, i.e. the total spending on recipients divided by the number of recipients. Using the
face or market value of in-kind transfers may overstate the effect of the transfers on a families
well-being, but more accurately reflects the change in program expenditures due to Medicaid
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1.4.2 Labor Supply Outcomes
My primary labor force outcomes are total usual weekly hours worked and an-
nual earned income. In my baseline analysis, I consider these outcomes for three
groups: the entire family, adults 18 and over, and working-age teens within the
family. Analyzing outcomes at the family level is important because families
share resources and most programs assign eligibility at the family level. If Med-
icaid expansions cause intra-family spillovers in labor supply decisions, those
spillovers would not be captured by analyzing individuals. The CPS asks labor
force and income questions of all individuals 15 and older, thus by necessity my
analysis of teen labor supply is constrained to the labor supply of children of
these ages. Because income is recalled from the year prior to the survey, indi-
viduals as young as 14 report labor force and income questions in my sample.
1.4.3 Medicaid Eligibility
I construct two measures of Medicaid eligibility by applying eligibility rules
for each state and year to the CPS sample. These rules cover income eligibility
thresholds, ages of children, family structure, and parent’s employment status.17
The first measure is actual Medicaid eligibility. In each CPS sample year I es-
timate the fraction of children eligible for Medicaid by state, child’s age (0-17),
and child’s race based on the Medicaid rules effective in that year. Through-
out, race is defined to be either non-Hispanic white (white) and all others (non-
expansionsWhile these four programs represent the largest safety net programs specifically tar-
geting low-income families with children, there are numerous other programs
17My eligibility calculations are based off code from Sarah Cohodes, Daniel Grossman,
Samuel Kleiner, and Michael Lovenheim (2016), and I am thankful to them for sharing their
code with me.
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white). This measure captures variation in the actual, average level of children’s
eligibility for Medicaid in each age-race-state-year cell. State, age, and year are
characteristics over which Medicaid eligibility varies explicitly. While Medicaid
eligibility does not vary across race explicitly, in practice actual eligibility levels
differ substantially between whites and non-whites due to differences in income
and demographics. To the extent that these factors trend differently across races,
failure to control for them will lead to biased estimates and recent literature us-
ing simulated Medicaid eligibility has found racial differences to be important
(Dave et al. 2015; Cohodes et al. 2016). The CPS has large sample sizes, but
when data are broken into age-state-race-year cells many cells are estimated off
of small sample sizes, particularly in small, homogenous states. Thus, I esti-
mate actual Medicaid eligibility as a three-year moving average of eligibility, as
has been done in other recent studies using simulated Medicaid eligibility (Gru-
ber and Simon 2008; Gross and Notowidigdo 2011; DeLeire, Lopoo, and Simon
2011; Cohodes et al. 2016).18
The actual Medicaid eligibility measure includes variation from confound-
ing sources such as changing demographics, economic shocks, and family-level
behavioral responses to changes in the policy environment, all of which may be
correlated with program participation and labor supply. I follow previous liter-
ature and instrument for eligibility using a second measure of “fixed simulated
eligibility” to retain only variation due to policy changes in Medicaid rules. To
construct this simulated measure, I use the national 1990 CPS sample and esti-
mate the fraction of this entire fixed sample that would be eligible for Medicaid
in each state and year, separately by race and age. Income variables in the fixed
sample are adjusted to each year using the CPI-U. In this way, the fixed sample
18My analysis covers the years 1980-2010, but I use data from 1979-2011 to compute the three-
year averages.
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does not vary across states or time, and all the variation in simulated Medicaid
eligibility comes from changes in Medicaid rules. Because the sample is fixed,
estimated eligibility cannot vary due to demographic trends, economic condi-
tions, or changes in family labor supply decisions. This method was first used
by Currie and Gruber (1996a,b) and Cutler and Gruber (1996), and has since
been used widely in the Medicaid literature. See Brown et al. (2018); Levere
et al. (2018); East et al. (2017) for recent examples and a brief review of litera-
ture using simulated Medicaid eligibility, and Paris (2018) for an example using
simulated SNAP eligibility.
Figure 1.4 shows the average actual and simulated Medicaid eligibility mea-
sures overall and separately by race. Most of the aggregate variation in actual
eligibility levels is explained by changes in Medicaid policy. All three pairs of
series follow similar trends in aggregate from 1980 through the mid-1990s, but
diverge between 1997-2000. Thereafter, the series follow nearly identical trends
but with a persistent average gap between actual and simulated eligibility of
about 6 percentage points, with the simulated eligibility measure being higher
in all three cases. The timing of this divergence is worrying given the passage of
the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act (PRWORA) in 1996 and
CHIP in 1997. However, I apply the same Medicaid rules to both the simulated
and actual samples, thus policy changes cannot account for the divergence be-
tween the two series. Instead, the late 1990s was a period of particularly strong
real income growth. This growth is captured in the sample used to estimate
actual Medicaid eligibility, but not by the fixed sample used for simulated eligi-
bility which is adjusted for inflation using the CPI-U and has zero real income
growth. After the strong real wage growth of the late 1990s families in the actual
sample have higher family incomes than those in the fixed, simulated sample,
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and thus a larger fraction of families exceeding eligibility thresholds in any year.
Figure 1.4: Author’s calculations using the 1979-2011 March CPS and
Medicaid eligibility rules for each state and year. Each line
shows average eligibility for children ages 0-17, by race. Sim-
ulated eligibility uses a fixed sample of the 1990 CPS. Incomes
for the fixed sample are adjusted to each year using the CPI-U.
In Appendix Section A.2 I show that nominal incomes in the actual and sim-
ulated samples trend similarly in all years except the latter half of the 1990s.
The different trends between the samples in the late 1990s reflects the strong
real wage growth during this period, a finding that has been previously found
in the literature on income inequality. I then show that if I adjust incomes in the
actual eligibility sample down by the ratio of average income in the simulated
and actual samples in every year, the post-1996 gap in aggregate average eli-
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gibility disappears entirely and the actual and simulated series trend similarly
in aggregate throughout the entire period. This divergence in eligibility should
not present an identification threat for my analysis as I include year fixed ef-
fects, and differences in eligibility due to different annual income growth rates
will be absorbed.
My primary measure of Medicaid eligibility uses all changes to Medicaid el-
igibility rules, including optional expansions by individual states. This measure
may not be exogenous if the timing of state-level Medicaid expansions is related
to local demographic trends or economic circumstances. To address this concern
I construct a second measure of Medicaid eligibility that uses only variation
due to changes in minimum Medicaid eligibility rules required by federal law.
Variation from federal rules comes from cross-state differences in pre-expansion
AFDC generosity. Following Cohodes et al. (2016), I fix AFDC rules in 1980 and
estimate the variation in eligibility that would have occurred if no states option-
ally expanded eligibility beyond federally required minimums. Policy changes
at the national level are unlikely to be related to trends in specific states, mak-
ing this federal expansion instrument more credibly exogenous. Figure 1.5 re-
peats Figure 1.4 for federal Medicaid eligibility.19 The federal eligibility measure
shows the same pattern of divergence between actual and simulated eligibility
in the late 1990s with parallel trends thereafter. As with overall eligibility, in
Appendix Section A.2 I show that adjusting actual incomes by the ratio of of
average simulated and actual incomes in each year eliminates this gap.
Table 1.1 presents summary statistics of my analysis sample overall and sep-
arately by race. If there were no empty cells, I would have 18×2×51 = 1, 836 ob-
servations per year for 31 years, for a total of 56,916 observations. However, due
19Appendix Figure A.4 constructs the same graph using only state-optional eligibility.
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Figure 1.5: Author’s calculations using the 1979-2011 March CPS, 1980
AFDC rules by state, and minimum federal Medicaid eligibility
requirements by year. Each line shows average eligibility for
children ages 0-17, by race. Simulated eligibility uses a fixed
sample of the 1990 CPS. Incomes for the fixed sample are ad-
justed to each year using the CPI-U.
to sparse data in the CPS some cells are empty for small states with homogenous
populations (e.g. there are very few non-white children in Vermont). As a result,
my final analysis sample has 53,098 observations.20 On average, families of non-
white children have higher actual and simulated Medicaid eligibility, higher
participation in other safety net programs, work less and have lower earned in-
come, and have more (and younger) children. This pattern is expected given
20When collapsing my analysis sample to cells, I use CPS person weights. The analysis sample
is then weighted by the number of observations used to estimate each cell.
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the strong correlation between race and income. These estimates do not com-
pare directly to administrative counts of participants because I estimate partici-
pation rates in families with children, and not the entire population. However,
they are similar to estimates from other sources. Shore-Sheppard (2008) finds
similar shares of overall participation in AFDC, SNAP, rental assistance, and
SSI. The difference in total family income across race is larger than measured in
conventional Census estimates, but this is sensible because I consider only labor
income which is skewed disproportionately toward white workers, while non-
white families tend to receive relatively more income from transfer programs
(Fontenot et al., 2018). My estimates of Medicaid eligibility are slightly higher
than Cohodes et al. (2016), but this is expected because I consider a longer time
period including more recent years when average eligibility levels were higher.
1.5 Methods
1.5.1 Empirical Methods
In an ideal setting with random assignment of Medicaid eligibility to children,
program participation could be compared across families. If the timing of ex-
pansions and pre-expansion eligibility levels across states are unrelated to pro-
gram participation outcomes, then variation in average eligibility from Medi-
caid expansions allows conditional random assignment. Thus, as an alternative
to estimating the effect of Medicaid eligibility on individual program participa-
tion and labor supply outcomes, I estimate the effect of an increase in the share
of children eligible for Medicaid on the share of children’s families participat-
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Table 1.1: Summary Statistics
(1) (2) (3)
All White Non-white
Age 8.95 9.03* 8.77*
(5.42) (5.42) (5.42)
White 0.70 1.00* 0.00*
(0.46) (0.00) (0.00)
# Children in HH 2.37 2.29* 2.55*
(0.40) (0.35) (0.45)
Family received any program 0.63 0.59* 0.73*
(0.19) (0.19) (0.16)
Total receipt, all programs 1,929.46 1,291.86* 3,451.90*
(1,788.47) (936.87) (2,334.96)
SNAP 0.14 0.08* 0.25*
(0.12) (0.06) (0.15)
Housing 0.06 0.03* 0.12*
(0.08) (0.03) (0.11)
Welfare 0.11 0.05* 0.16*
(0.10) (0.05) (0.15)
EITC 0.28 0.21* 0.41*
(0.15) (0.10) (0.16)
Total family labor income 71,781.82 83,675.18* 43,383.10*
(28,508.20) (23,861.68) (15,796.14)
Total family hours 52.80 57.36* 41.93*
(12.52) (9.53) (12.09)
Total family hours - adults 50.66 55.00* 40.31*
(11.20) (7.82) (11.26)
Total family hours - youths 2.14 2.36* 1.62*
(3.38) (3.53) (2.95)
All ages average eligibility 0.29 0.22* 0.48*
(0.21) (0.15) (0.21)
All ages simulated eligibility 0.32 0.25* 0.50*
(0.23) (0.19) (0.23)
N 52,183 27,626 24,557
Source: Author’s calculations using the 1979-2011 March CPS. Sample is split between non-Hispanic whites
and all others (non-white). Some statistics are estimated on a subset of the sample, for instance because
labor force questions are only asked of those 15+ in the CPS. * indicates white and non-white samples differ
at the p<0.05 level.
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ing in other safety net programs. Similarly for labor supply outcomes, I estimate
the effect of an increase in the share of children eligible for Medicaid on aver-
age hours worked by each family, or average family incomes. By construction,
variation in eligibility occurs the level for which Medicaid rules are simulated,
that is age, race, state, and year, rather than by individuals. For all program
participation and labor supply outcomes, I estimate models in the form of the
following difference-in-differences framework:
Yarst = β0 + β1 ∗ Eligarst + β2 ∗ Xarst + γrs + δrt + λar + θas + arst (1.1)
where Yarst is a family’s program participation or labor supply outcome for a
child of age a, race r (white or non-white), in state s, and year t. These outcomes
are either the fraction of children whose families participate in a safety net pro-
gram, their families average weekly hours worked, or average annual earned
income. Medicaid eligibility is measured by Eligarst, which estimates the frac-
tion of children within each age-race-state-year cell who are eligible for Medi-
caid. Ordinary least squares estimates use actual Medicaid eligibility, while my
primary estimates instrument for actual eligibility using simulated Medicaid el-
igibility to address the endogeneity concerns of actual eligibility. The coefficient
of interest is β1, which estimates the change in the fraction of families participat-
ing in a safety net program in response to an increase in the fraction of children
eligible for Medicaid. Xarst are additional controls, which in my baseline regres-
sions includes the state unemployment rate, number of children in the family,
and simulated eligibility for the outcome safety net program being considered.
All standard errors are clustered at the state level.
Before discussing identification, it is helpful to briefly discuss sources of vari-
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ation in Medicaid eligibility, and highlight which sources I allow. Figure 1.6
shows variation in actual Medicaid eligibility by age and race. Younger chil-
dren have higher levels of eligibility than older children, and non-white chil-
dren have higher levels of eligibility than white children. I include age and
race effects to remove these sources of variation. Trends across race also differ,
and non-white children have an approximately 20 percentage point higher el-
igibility rate in 1980 that grows to 30 percentage points by 2010. To the extent
that this growing gap is caused by differentially evolving income distributions
across race, this variation in eligibility is unlikely to be exogenous and I include
race-year fixed effects to remove it. Within age group, eligibility increases over
time with large increases in particular years. These large within-age increases
are a feature of the rules for Medicaid expansions. Earlier Medicaid expansions
applied to children born after September 1983, leading to large within-age in-
creases as these children aged. Similarly, CHIP expansions caused large within-
age increases in eligibility in the years CHIP was created. I allow within-age
variation in Medicaid eligibility in my estimation.
Figure 1.7 shows variation in Medicaid eligibility across the eight largest
states by population. There is substantial variation in 1980 across states in eli-
gibility levels due to differences in income distributions, demographic compo-
sitions, and levels of state AFDC generosity. In the late 1980s and early 1990s,
this dispersion is compressed due primarily to federally mandated Medicaid
expansions that forced relatively ungenerous AFDC states to raise their eligi-
bility levels for Medicaid. This is the primary source of variation exploited by
my federal measure of Medicaid eligibility. Because these expansions are due
to federal policy changes, they are unlikely to be related to the circumstances
of individual states. In 1997, CHIP is created and over the next several years
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Figure 1.6: Author’s calculations using the 1979-2011 March CPS and
Medicaid eligibility rules for each state and year. Each line
shows average actual eligibility for children of a specific age
and race.
states implement CHIP programs. The timing of CHIP implementation, as well
as the generosity of the CHIP programs, are both decided at the state level,
and so are more likely to be related to state level demographic trends or eco-
nomic characteristics. The variation due to these expansions will be included in
my state-optional and overall Medicaid eligibility measures, but not my federal
measure.
Because this is a difference-in-differences model, the two primary assump-
tions for identification are that Medicaid expansions are independent of any
secular state trends in program participation or labor supply, and that there are
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Figure 1.7: Author’s calculations using the 1979-2011 March CPS and
Medicaid eligibility rules for each state and year. Each line
shows average actual eligibility for children of a specific age.
Only eight states are graphed to reduce clutter, but the omit-
ted states follow broadly similar patterns. The eight states in-
cluded are the eight largest in terms of population.
no other contemporaneous policy changes that are correlated with Medicaid ex-
pansions and related to program participation or labor supply. Fixed effects are
critical for addressing the first assumption and the identification of β1. A natural
baseline model might include single fixed effects for the characteristics defining
cells: age, state, race, and year. However, this model imposes unappealing as-
sumptions, for instance that trends in Medicaid coverage were constant across
race at the national level, and that white and non-white families are not differ-
entially affected by economic shocks. These sources of variation are unlikely
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to be exogenous due to differences of levels and trends in income distributions
across race that are also related to participation in safety net programs.
These concerns motivate my inclusion of four of the six possible two-way in-
teracted fixed effects in Equation 1.1. These more flexible fixed effects are race-
state, race-year, age-race, and age-state fixed effects. Race-state effects allow for
fixed differences across state and race that are related to Medicaid expansions
and program participation. For instance, different income distributions, lev-
els of parental educational attainment, or industrial structures across states that
differentially affect white versus non-white families. Race-year effects allow dif-
ferent national-level trends by race such as differentially evolving income distri-
butions or differential effects of economic shocks, both of which will be related
to program participation and labor supply. Age-race effects allow for the cov-
erage gap between white and non-white children to vary by age, which would
be the case if younger children have younger parents, and white and non-white
parents have different career trajectories. Age-state effects allow children of the
same age but in different states to have fixed differences that are related to both
Medicaid eligibility and program participation, for instance different industrial
structures or labor markets.
This specification excludes age-year and state-year fixed effects. There may
be variation in Medicaid eligibility due to trends within age or states that are
related to Medicaid eligibility and program participation. However, my pri-
mary sources of identifying variation for overall Medicaid eligibility come from
within-age and within-state changes in eligibility, and including age-year and
state-year fixed effects excludes this variation. Card and Shore-Sheppard (2004)
and Shore-Sheppard (2008) discuss the inclusion of age-year and state-year
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fixed effects in models estimating the effects of Medicaid expansion so crowd-
out of private health insurance. They find that the age-year effects matter sub-
stantially, reducing estimates by around 50%, while the state-year effects make
little difference. In Appendix Tables A.2-A.7 I present results for a variety of
alternatives to my preferred specification, including the inclusion of age-year
and state-year effects. I find that in this context, the age-year effects in some
cases reduce the precision of my estimates, and somewhat reduce the estimated
magnitude of the effect of Medicaid expansions on labor supply (but not pro-
gram participation). However, the inclusion of age-year effects does not change
my qualitative results: federal Medicaid expansions increased participation in
major safety net programs, while overall Medicaid expansions increased labor
supply of families.
The second main assumption for identification is that there are no contempo-
raneous shocks or policy changes that are correlated with Medicaid expansions
that would also affect program participation. The largest concern for this as-
sumption is that eligibility rules for outcome safety net programs were changed
in ways that were related to Medicaid expansions. If policy changes for outcome
programs expanded (contracted) eligibility, and those changes were correlated
with Medicaid expansions, then those policy changes would bias me towards
finding a positive (negative) effect of the Medicaid expansions on program par-
ticipation rates. SNAP, cash welfare, and the EITC all had major policy changes
during this period that could potentially confound the effects of Medicaid ex-
pansions. To address this concern, I estimate fixed, simulated eligibility for the
major safety net programs in the same manner as for Medicaid: I estimate the
fraction of children in each age-race-state-year cell that were eligible for SNAP,
cash welfare, and the EITC using the national CPS sample from 1990. In do-
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ing so, I can explicitly test whether rules for outcome programs were modified
in ways correlated with Medicaid expansions by using simulated eligibility for
outcome programs as an outcome itself. In addition, I include simulated out-
come program eligibility as a control when estimating the effects of Medicaid
expansions on program participation. This ensures the estimated effects of Med-
icaid expansions are not due to contemporaneous changes to eligibility for the
outcome safety net programs.
As a second method to address potential contemporaneous shocks or policy
changes, I use only variation in Medicaid eligibility induced by changes in fed-
erally mandated rules, and exclude variation due to state-optional expansions.
The variation exploited by this eligibility measure is due only to states having
different pre-expansion AFDC policies. States are differentially treated to the
degree the generosity of the AFDC policies differs from the uniform national
coverage standards imposed by these federal expansions. As these expansions
occurred at the federal level, they are unlikely to be related to state-level poli-
cies regarding Medicaid eligibility or rules for other transfer programs, or in
response to local demographic or economic situations. Because the identify-
ing variation for this federal measure relies on cross-state differences in pre-
expansion AFDC generosity rather than within age or state increases in eligibil-
ity over time, the federal measure is also less likely to be susceptible to under-
lying trends mentioned for the first assumption, including underlying trends
within age and state. To the extent these federal expansions are related to rules
for other safety net programs administered at the federal level, the correlation
between those rules is controlled for by my simulated eligibility for the outcome
transfer programs.
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Finally, I conduct several robustness exercises. I estimate models allowing
for linear state time-trends, and find that these trends do not affect my esti-
mates. I implement falsification tests by randomly assigning children between
ages 0-17 to the subset of families in the CPS sample with no children. Because
the expansions I consider are specifically for families with children, childless
families should be unaffected, and I find no evidence of effects on the program
participation and labor supply behavior of childless families. Even federal Med-
icaid expansions may conceivably be related to national economic conditions
that differentially affect specific states, and I regress employment indicators on
various measures of Medicaid eligibility to provide evidence that this is not a
problem.
I also conduct, to my knowledge, the first explicit test of the exogeneity of
the state-optional Medicaid expansions. Cohodes et al. (2016) informally test
the exogeneity of state-optional expansions by comparing the effects of state-
optional and federal Medicaid expansions on educational attainment. This com-
parison works for outcomes where the effects of Medicaid expansions are not
heterogenous based on family income, or work in the same direction. However,
as shown in Figure 1.1 and by Goldsmith-Pinkham et al. (2018), federal Medi-
caid expansions are concentrated on low-income families, while state-optional
expansions affected relatively higher-income families. As discussed in Section
1.2.2 and Figures 1.2 and 1.3, in my setting the effects of Medicaid expansions
are potentially heterogenous based on family income. Therefore, I compare the
effects of federal Medicaid expansions to the effects of state-optional Medicaid
expansions using a subset of state-optional expansion eligible children with in-
comes similar to those covered by the federal expansions. Reassuringly, I find
similar results and largely unable to reject the null of equal effects for federal
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and state-optional Medicaid expansions on program participation and labor
supply. Overall, my results pass these robustness tests, giving credibility to
my identification strategy and also providing support for the use of simulated
Medicaid instruments in the literature more broadly, particularly instruments
using state-optional expansions.
1.6 Results
1.6.1 Effects of Medicaid Expansions on Program Participation
Table 1.2 reports the effects of Medicaid expansions on participation in the major
components of the safety net. Each cell is the estimate of a separate regression,
and all estimates use the preferred instrumental variable specification of Equa-
tion 1.1 including the set of four two-way fixed effects. Row 1 uses variation in
Medicaid eligibility from all expansions, including state-optional expansions,
while Row 2 uses only variation in Medicaid eligibility from federally required
expansions. Column 1 presents results from the first stage, which shows how
a change in either measure of simulated eligibility for Medicaid affects actual
eligibility. For overall Medicaid expansions, a 10 percentage point increase in
simulated eligibility translates to a significant 8.0 percentage point increase in
actual eligibility. An equivalently sized federal expansion is predicted to in-
crease actual eligibility even more, by 10.5 percentage points.21
Columns 2-5 show the effects of Medicaid expansions on SNAP, cash wel-
21Throughout all specifications and outcomes, simulated eligibility remains a strong instru-
ment for actual eligibility. My smallest F-statistics are around 30. In most specifications the
F-statistic is near or above 100.
42
Ta
bl
e
1.
2:
Th
e
Ef
fe
ct
s
of
A
ve
ra
ge
M
ed
ic
ai
d
El
ig
ib
ili
ty
on
In
di
vi
du
al
Pr
og
ra
m
R
ec
ei
pt
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
Fi
rs
t
SN
A
P
W
el
fa
re
H
ou
si
ng
EI
T
C
St
ag
e
Pa
rt
ic
ip
at
io
n
Pa
rt
ic
ip
at
io
n
Pa
rt
ic
ip
at
io
n
El
ig
ib
ili
ty
Pa
ne
lA
:P
ro
gr
am
Pa
rt
ic
ip
at
io
n
1.
O
ve
ra
ll
El
ig
ib
ili
ty
0.
80
0*
**
-0
.0
16
0.
02
8
0.
00
8
-0
.0
71
**
*
(0
.0
22
)
(0
.0
17
)
(0
.0
22
)
(0
.0
13
)
(0
.0
17
)
%
Ef
fe
ct
of
10
p.
p.
Ex
pa
ns
io
n
-
-1
.2
2.
5
1.
4
-2
.6
2.
Fe
de
ra
lE
lig
ib
ili
ty
1.
04
6*
**
0.
03
2*
**
0.
05
1*
**
0.
01
7*
**
-0
.0
02
(0
.0
52
)
(0
.0
08
)
(0
.0
10
)
(0
.0
06
)
(0
.0
09
)
%
Ef
fe
ct
of
10
p.
p.
Ex
pa
ns
io
n
-
2.
3
4.
6
3.
0
-0
.1
Pa
ne
lB
:T
ot
al
Pr
og
ra
m
R
ec
ei
pt
3.
O
ve
ra
ll
El
ig
ib
ili
ty
0.
80
0*
**
-6
9.
39
11
2.
07
3.
45
-1
69
.9
3
(0
.0
52
)
(9
1.
91
)
(1
72
.4
0)
(4
.1
1)
(1
19
.6
4)
%
Ef
fe
ct
of
10
p.
p.
Ex
pa
ns
io
n
-
-1
.0
1.
3
1.
4
-1
.1
4.
Fe
de
ra
lE
lig
ib
ili
ty
1.
04
6*
**
11
2.
60
**
*
21
1.
75
**
6.
33
**
*
-5
.3
7
(0
.0
22
)
(4
1.
86
)
(1
01
.1
2)
(2
.2
6)
(1
7.
88
)
%
Ef
fe
ct
of
10
p.
p.
Ex
pa
ns
io
n
-
1.
6
2.
5
2.
5
-0
.1
Ea
ch
ce
ll
is
a
re
gr
es
si
on
of
a
di
ff
er
en
to
ut
co
m
e
on
av
er
ag
e
M
ed
ic
ai
d
el
ig
ib
ili
ty
,w
he
re
ev
er
y
re
gr
es
si
on
us
es
th
e
pr
ef
er
re
d
IV
sp
ec
ifi
ca
ti
on
in
cl
ud
in
g
st
at
e-
ra
ce
,r
ac
e-
ye
ar
,a
ge
-r
ac
e,
an
d
ag
e-
st
at
e
fix
ed
ef
fe
ct
s.
Pa
ne
l
A
sh
ow
s
re
su
lt
s
fo
r
w
he
th
er
a
ch
ild
’s
fa
m
ily
re
po
rt
ed
re
ce
ip
to
f
ea
ch
tr
an
sf
er
pr
og
ra
m
.
Pa
ne
lB
sh
ow
s
re
su
lt
s
fo
r
th
e
to
ta
l
am
ou
nt
a
ch
ild
’s
fa
m
ily
re
ce
iv
ed
fr
om
ea
ch
pr
og
ra
m
.
Ea
ch
pa
ne
l
sp
lit
s
an
al
ys
is
by
bo
th
an
y
so
ur
ce
of
M
ed
ic
ai
d
el
ig
ib
ili
ty
an
d
on
ly
M
ed
ic
ai
d
el
ig
ib
ili
ty
fr
om
fe
de
ra
lly
m
an
da
te
d
ex
pa
ns
io
ns
.A
ll
re
gr
es
-
si
on
s
co
nt
ro
l
fo
r
st
at
e
un
em
pl
oy
m
en
t
ra
te
s,
nu
m
be
r
of
ch
ild
re
n
in
th
e
fa
m
ily
,a
nd
si
m
ul
at
ed
el
ig
ib
ili
ty
fo
r
th
e
re
le
va
nt
ou
tc
om
e
pr
og
ra
m
.
A
lt
er
na
ti
ve
fix
ed
ef
fe
ct
s
sp
ec
ifi
ca
ti
on
s
ar
e
av
ai
la
bl
e
in
th
e
A
pp
en
di
x.
Ea
ch
re
gr
es
si
on
ha
s
at
m
os
t5
3,
09
8
ob
se
rv
at
io
ns
.S
ta
nd
ar
d
er
ro
rs
ar
e
cl
us
te
re
d
at
th
e
le
ve
lo
ft
he
st
at
e.
*,
**
,a
nd
**
*
in
di
ca
te
si
gn
ifi
ca
nc
e
at
th
e
10
%
,5
%
,a
nd
1%
le
ve
ls
,r
es
pe
ct
iv
el
y
43
fare, rental assistance, and EITC. The first three outcomes estimate the effect of
Medicaid expansions on program participation, while the fourth estimates the
effect on EITC eligibility. Estimates in Row 1 show that overall Medicaid expan-
sions did not significantly affect participation in SNAP, cash welfare, or rental
assistance, but did reduce eligibility for the EITC. A 10 percentage point expan-
sion in overall Medicaid eligibility reduced EITC eligibility by 0.71 percentage
points, or 2.3 percent relative to mean participation.22 This pattern of effects for
overall expansions is unsurprising. A substantial amount of variation in overall
Medicaid eligibility is due to state-optional expansions that affected relatively
higher income families. For example, CHIP covers families with income up to
200 percent of the FPL in most states, and up to 300 percent in many states.
Eligibility thresholds for SNAP, cash welfare, and rental assistance are compar-
atively low. SNAP’s net income test is 100 percent of the FPL, while its gross
income test is 130 percent of the FPL.23 Prior to the major Medicaid expansions,
the average AFDC eligibility threshold was only 60 percent of the FPL (Cutler
and Gruber, 1996). TANF eligibility levels are less than 100 percent of the FPL in
all but one state, with a majority of states having thresholds below 50 percent of
the FPL (Falk, 2014). Housing programs have varied eligibility levels. Section
8 housing assistance requires families to have less than 50 percent of median
income in their local area. Median household income in the U.S. was $61,372 in
2017 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2018b). Using the national income distribution and a
poverty threshold of $25,100 for a family of four implies an eligibility threshold
of 122 percent of the FPL. For comparison, in 2018 the EITC benefit for a fam-
ily with two children phased out at $45,802, or 182 percent of the FPL. Because
22Appendix Table A.1 gives summary rates of participation, eligibility, and take-up for pro-
grams I consider.
23Many programs, including SNAP, cash welfare, and Medicaid, use multiple tests with dif-
ferent thresholds.
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low-income households tend to be geographically concentrated, actual eligibil-
ity thresholds for rent subsidies at the local level will be even lower in practice.
Row 2 shows the effects of federal expansions of Medicaid. A 10 percentage
point expansion in Medicaid eligibility increases participation in SNAP, cash
welfare and rental assistance, by 0.32, 0.51, and 0.17 percentage points respec-
tively, or 2.3 percent, 4.6 percent, and 3.0 percent. Unlike the overall Medicaid
expansions, the effects of federal Medicaid expansions are concentrated in low-
income and single-mother families that have higher rates of eligibility for other
safety net programs. Thus, it is similarly unsurprising that federal Medicaid
expansions have stronger effects on program participation. Over the period
1980-2010, overall Medicaid expansions increased eligibility by 38.4 percentage
points, and federal Medicaid eligibility increased 15.1 percentage points. This
indicates that over my period of study, the overall expansions reduced EITC el-
igibility by 2.7 percentage points, and the federal expansions increased partici-
pation in SNAP, cash welfare, and rental subsidies by 1.2, 1.8, and 0.7 percentage
points, respectively.
The pattern of results I find is consistent with several potential mechanisms.
In the next section, I decompose eligibility and take-up mechanisms, and show
that Medicaid expansions increased take-up for SNAP and cash welfare, but re-
duced eligibility. This indicates that the small, positive effects I find for program
participation result from an increase in take-up, for instance due to applicants
learning information about other safety net programs or facing lower stigma or
transaction costs, and a reduction in eligibility, for instance due to an increase
in labor supply. This explains why participation in SNAP, cash welfare, and
rental subsidies increases, but EITC eligibility decreases. Results using OLS or
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alternative specifications of controls may be found in Appendix Tables A.2 for
overall eligibility and A.3 for federal eligibility. Appendix Table A.4 using only
Medicaid variation for state-optional expansions. Note that federal and state-
optional expansions are not mutually exclusive, and as a result the effects of
federal and state-optional Medicaid expansions do not sum to the overall effect.
I control for simulated eligibility of outcome safety net programs to ensure
the estimated effects of Medicaid expansions are not biased by contemporane-
ous policy changes for other programs. Panel A of Appendix Table A.8 shows
the results of regressing simulated eligibility for outcome safety net programs
on Medicaid eligibility as a test for correlation of changes to rules for out-
come programs with Medicaid expansions. In general, I find that there is small
amount of correlation between eligibility for safety net programs and Medicaid,
and that it is generally not significant. Federal Medicaid expansions are not
significantly related to eligibility rules of any outcome programs. Overall Medi-
caid expansions are significantly related to SNAP eligibility and weakly related
to AFDC eligibility. Panel B of this table shows results for estimates of program
participation when these controls are not included.
Comparisons of these results to prior literature have the caveat that previous
literature on Medicaid expansions and program participation outcomes uses
shorter periods of study, mostly years between 1987-1995, and different sources
of variation in Medicaid eligibility. The largest federal expansions occur during
these years, but the federal expansions are not completely phased in by 1995
and there are state-optional expansions in this period as well. Estimates from
prior research are qualitatively similar to my estimates for federal expansions.
Ham and Shore-Sheppard (2005) find no effect on AFDC participation, while
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Shore-Sheppard (2008) find a statistically significant increase in the probabil-
ity of AFDC participation of 0.83 percent.24 Shore-Sheppard (2008) also finds
that Medicaid expansions increased the probability of SNAP participation by
0.84 percentage points, and Yelowitz (1996) finds that Medicaid expansions in-
creased SNAP participation by 0.22 percentage points. I find a somewhat larger
effect, the overall Medicaid expansions increased SNAP participation by 0.53
percentage points. Overall, my estimates for program participation are consis-
tent with the prior literature.
Panel B of Table 1.2 shows the effects of Medicaid expansions on the total
benefits received from a program. These results are consistent with the effects
on program participation. Overall Medicaid expansions do not significantly af-
fect benefits received from any program, nor do overall expansions affect the
benefits families are eligible to receive from the EITC. The estimated effect of
expansions on EITC benefits is negative, consistent with the effect on EITC eli-
gibility, but statistically insignificant. The effects of federal Medicaid expansions
on total benefits are also consistent with the results for program participation.
Federal Medicaid expansions increased average benefits for SNAP, cash wel-
fare, and rental assistance, but did not affect benefits families were eligible to
receive from the EITC. The 15.1 percentage point increase in federal Medicaid
eligibility over this period indicates that total average benefits received per fam-
ily increased by almost $50, or around 3.1% as a result of federal expansions of
Medicaid.
24Shore-Sheppard (2008) estimates linear probability models on unaggregated participation
outcomes rather than the aggregated fraction participating that I use, but the direction and
magnitude of the estimates are similar.
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1.6.2 Mechanisms: Take-up Versus Eligibility
Equation 1.1 measures the effect of Medicaid expansions on the fraction of the
entire population participating in other safety net programs. However, the par-
ticipation rate can be decomposed into program eligibility and program take-up
conditional on eligibility, as shown in Equation 1.2:
ProgPartarst = PEligarst ∗ Pr(Takeup|PElig)arst (1.2)
where ProgPartarst is the participation rate for a program, PEligarst is fraction of
the population eligible for that program (not to be confused with the fraction eli-
gible for Medicaid), and Pr(Takeup|PElig)arst is the take-up rate for the program,
conditional on eligibility. I estimate ProgPartarst directly from the CPS data. I
simulate eligibility for several major safety net programs to control for changes
to program rules that are correlated with Medicaid expansions, and can use
those same rules to estimate actual eligibility for outcome safety net programs
PEligarst, allowing me to back out the take-up rate Pr(Takeup|PElig)arst. Taking
the derivative of Equation 1.2 with respect to Medicaid eligibility gives:
dProgPart
dMElig
=
dPElig
dMElig
∗ Pr(Takeup|PElig) + dPr(Takeup|PElig)
dMElig
∗ PElig (1.3)
In Equation 1.3, dProgPartdMElig is estimated from Equation 1.1 using program par-
ticipation rates as an outcome, as reported in Table 1.2. Estimates of dPEligdMElig are
similarly obtained using simulated actual program eligibility as an outcome.
Thus, I can estimate dPr(Takeup|Elig)arstdElig , the effect of Medicaid eligibility on program
take-up, as it is the only unknown quantity in Equation 1.3. In Table 1.3, I report
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estimates of dPEligdMElig ∗ Pr(Takeup|PElig), the net effect of eligibility mechanisms on
program participation, and dPr(Takeup|PElig)dMElig ∗ PElig, the net effect of take-up mech-
anisms on program participation.25
Rows 1 and 4 repeat the program participation results from Table 1.2. I
replace housing subsidies and the EITC with AFDC and TANF separately, as
overall and federal expansions have different effects for the different cash wel-
fare programs. Rows 2 and 3 of Panel A report the net effects of the eligibility
and take-up mechanisms on participation rates, respectively, with the percent
effects of a 10 percentage point expansion of Medicaid eligibility reported be-
low. Overall Medicaid expansions reduced eligibility for SNAP, cash welfare,
and the NSLP. The reduction in participation due to changes in eligibility is
particularly strong for SNAP and TANF; reduced eligibility for these programs
decreased participation by 4.2 and 4.4 percent, respectively. In the case of TANF,
this is primarily the result of the programs much lower base-participation rate.
Only 4.5 percent of children live in families participating in TANF, compared to
almost 14 percent for SNAP and 45 percent for the NSLP. The 0.57 percentage
point reduction in SNAP eligibility (Row 2, Column 1) is larger than for cash
welfare, but similar to the reduction for the NSLP of 0.81 percentage points.
The larger eligibility effects for SNAP and NSLP are consistent with relatively
higher income families, which are more likely to have two parents, having more
flexibility in their labor supply. SNAP eligibility thresholds are substantially
higher than those for cash welfare, and children are eligible for the NSLP until
family income rises above 185 percent of the FPL. The percent change in NSLP
25These results can only be estimated for the programs for which the CPS has participation
data and for which I estimate eligibility using program rules. Of the primary safety net pro-
grams, this includes SNAP and cash welfare as the CPS does not contain data on EITC partic-
ipation, and has insufficient data to estimate actual eligibility for rental subsidies. Because I
cannot estimate take-up for the EITC and rental subsidies, I add the NSLP to Table 1.3.
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participation is smaller than for SNAP due to the NSLP having much higher
participation rates. The reductions in eligibility are offset by increased take-up.
SNAP and cash welfare take-up increase by 3.0 and 3.3 percent as a result of a 10
percentage point expansion in overall Medicaid eligibility. TANF increases by a
larger 5.6 percent, although this is again reflective TANF’s lower participation
rate.
Panel B shows a similar pattern for federal Medicaid expansions. Federal
expansions decreased eligibility for SNAP and cash welfare, although the re-
duction in cash welfare eligibility was driven by a reduction in AFDC eligibil-
ity. Both programs experience large increases in take-up than more than offset
the reduction in eligibility. A 10 percentage point expansion increases take-up
of SNAP and cash welfare by almost six percent each. Federal expansions lead
to large increases in both take-up and eligibility for TANF, the only case where
the effect of Medicaid expansions on program eligibility is positive. As a re-
sult, the overall effect on TANF participation is quite large, with a 10 percentage
point expansion in Medicaid eligibility increases TANF participation by over 16
percent.
This pattern is consistent with the results from Table 1.2. Overall expan-
sions had no significant effect on program participation because the eligibility
and take-up effects approximately offset each other. However, the federal ex-
pansions significantly increased participation because the take-up effects over-
whelmed the reductions in eligibility, which is unsurprising given that federal
expansions are concentrated on families more likely to be eligible for other
safety net programs. To put these estimates into perspective, between 1987 and
1995 total SNAP participation rose from 19 million to nearly 27 million, increas-
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ing the participation rate from 7.9 percent to 10 percent. Large Medicaid expan-
sions occurred during these years, and Yelowitz (1996) focused on this period to
estimate the effects of Medicaid expansions on SNAP participation. The levels
and change among participation rates of children in the CPS are larger as fami-
lies with children tend to have higher rates of eligibility. Over this period, SNAP
participation for children rose from 13.9 percent to 16.7 percent. The majority of
federal expansions are implemented during these years, with federal Medicaid
eligibility rising from around 10 percent to 21.2 percent.
The estimated effect of federal Medicaid expansions on participation of 0.032
implies that the rise in federal eligibility increased SNAP participation by 0.36
percentage points over this period, or 13 percent of the total increase in food
stamp participation for children. Had eligibility remained constant, the esti-
mated take-up effect implies that federal Medicaid expansions would have in-
creased participation by 0.9 percentage points, or 32 percent of the actual in-
crease in food stamp participation. Conversely, had take-up remained constant
the estimate for reduced eligibility would have decreased participation by over
0.5 percentage points, or reduced the actual rise in food stamps by 19 percent.
Thus, the estimated effects for take-up and eligibility have meaningfully large
impacts on actual participation rates.
1.6.3 Effects of Medicaid Expansions on Labor Supply
Table 1.3 showed that Medicaid expansions caused reductions in eligibility for
major welfare programs, particularly SNAP and cash welfare. Labor supply is
an important mechanisms that might cause this reduction in eligibility for safety
52
net programs. It is also a mechanism I can examine directly, as measures of la-
bor supply are captured in the CPS, unlike take-up mechanisms. As discussed
in Section 1.2.2, the ex-ante effect of Medicaid expansions on labor supply is
ambiguous but possibly positive. In Table 1.4, I estimate the effects of Medicaid
expansions on two measures of labor supply: usual weekly hours worked and
annual labor income. I estimate these two measures for families overall to ac-
count for potential within-family spillovers and separately by adults and teens
within the family.
Using eligibility variation from all Medicaid expansions, estimates in Row 1
show that Medicaid expansions increased labor supply. A 10 percentage point
increase in overall Medicaid eligibility increases usual weekly hours worked
by 0.75, or 1.3 percent, for families overall, which is roughly split by increases
for adults and teens of 0.38 and 0.37 hours, respectively. The effect on total
annual labor income is consistent, albeit larger. A 10 percentage point expansion
in Medicaid eligibility increases annual incomes for families by $2,123, or 3.6
percent, with most of this effect being driven by increases in adult incomes.
This effect is quite large. A potential explanation is that Medicaid expansions
not only increases income on the extensive margin by family members working
more hours, but also on the intensive margin if workers are able to switch to
higher paying jobs.
A less benign explanation may be that overall Medicaid expansions are cor-
related with real income growth. This possibility is particularly concerning
given that a large fraction of the increase in overall Medicaid eligibility occurs
during the late 1990s due to CHIP expansions. However, these are the only
years throughout the period 1980-2010 when real wages increased substantially
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in the population likely to be eligible for Medicaid, as discussed in Section 1.4.3.
If states with strong wage growth in this period are also the states with the
largest CHIP expansions, this would bias estimates of the effect on labor in-
come in the positive direction and may explain the large effects on family and
adult incomes. I return this issue in Section 1.8. However, note that if this were
the case, it would bias the effects in the negative direction for program partici-
pation. Stronger wage growth would increase annual earned income but would
also reduce eligibility for safety net programs and possibly reduce take-up for
families facing stigma or high transaction costs of program enrollment.
The effects of overall Medicaid expansions on labor supply are largely con-
sistent with the estimated effects on program participation and take-up from Ta-
bles 1.2 and 1.3. Overall Medicaid expansions reduced eligibility for the EITC,
SNAP, and cash welfare. This reduction in eligibility is driven by an increase in
labor supply. The increase in labor supply in response to Medicaid expansions
has not been previously found in the literature, but this literature has looked
almost exclusively at the labor supply of single mothers. In Table 1.5, I exam-
ine subsets of families treated by Medicaid expansions and similarly find no
effect of Medicaid expansions when considering only the labor supply of single
mothers. Additionally, these results for overall Medicaid expansions are robust
to specification, as can be seen in Appendix Tables A.5-A.7.
Row 2 uses only variation due to federal Medicaid expansions, and does
not find a significant effect of Medicaid expansions on labor supply. The es-
timates are precise enough to rule out more than a moderate effect on either
usual weekly hours or annual income. A 10 percentage point expansion in fed-
eral eligibility increases an average family’s usual hours worked and annual
55
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income by 0.04 and $88, or 0.1 percent for both outcomes, with similar scale es-
timates for both adults and teens. A 95 percent confidence intervals rules out
positive effects of more than 0.3 percent for hours and 0.5 percent for annual
income. The lack of an effect of federal Medicaid expansions on labor supply
is consistent with the results from Table 1.2, but is at odds with the reduction
in eligibility for SNAP and cash welfare found for federal expansions in Table
1.3. There are at least two explanations that may reconcile these results. First,
other mechanisms such as changes in marriage or fertility may affect eligibility,
although prior research has not evidence of large effects for these mechanisms.
Second, the effects of expansions may be heterogenous across family types. For
example, if the labor supply of single mothers, whose families comprise the ma-
jority of families covered by federal expansions, was relatively unresponsive to
Medicaid expansions, but the labor supply for families with different structures
was more responsive.
I provide some evidence for this second explanation in Table 1.5. Prior re-
search has estimated the effects of Medicaid expansions for children only on the
labor supply of single mothers, and broadly has found no significant effects. I
am the first to broaden the analysis to include both additional family members
beyond single mothers, and families with a structure other than a single mother.
In Table 1.5, I estimate the effects of Medicaid expansions separately for single
mothers, single parents, parents of two-parent families, and other adults living
with a child’s families that are not the child’s parents. Similar to prior research, I
find no significant effect of either overall or federal Medicaid expansions on the
labor supply of single mothers. However, both federal and overall Medicaid
expansions cause significant increases in labor supply for parents in two-parent
families and other adults within families. This is consistent with research on
57
labor supply elasticities, which finds low elasticities for single mothers and rel-
atively high elasticities for married women. Overall, Tables 1.4 and 1.5 provide
evidence that Medicaid expansions did increase labor supply, and that the ef-
fects of within-family spillovers are significant.
1.7 Exogeneity of Federal and State-Optional Expansion
A major concern for state-optional Medicaid expansions is that the timing of
implementation for these expansions may be related to state-level demographic
or economic characteristics. While federally mandated expansions of Medicaid
are unlikely to be related to state-level characteristics, the treatment intensity of
individual states is still a function of the generosity of pre-expansion state-level
AFDC policies. Thus, even federal Medicaid expansions might be indirectly re-
lated to state-level economic circumstances if local AFDC policies are related
to local economic conditions. I test the exogeneity of the measures of Medi-
caid eligibility by regressing local labor-market indicators on Medicaid eligibil-
ity, including the state labor force participation rate, unemployment rate, and
employment-population ratio. These results are shown in Table 1.6. For over-
all and federal expansions, I do not find any significant relationship between
expansions and contemporaneous labor force indicators, corroborating that ex-
pansions do not appear to be motivated by local economic circumstances.
As shown in Figure 1.1 and by Goldsmith-Pinkham et al. (2018), federal and
state-optional Medicaid expansions were concentrated in different parts of the
income distribution. The effects of the two types of expansions may differ be-
cause variation from state-optional expansions is not exogenous, but also due
58
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to heterogeneous effects based on incomes of affected families. Some state-
optional expansions extended coverage to children whose families’ incomes
were similar to children covered by federal expansions. Examples include state-
optional expansions that occurred prior to federal expansions, covered children
in low-income families with children too old to qualify for federal expansions,
or covered children whose family had a structure that qualified under a state-
optional expansion but not a federal expansion. To test whether the effects of
federal and state-optional expansions differ due to heterogenous incomes of
covered families, I select the subset of children covered by state-optional ex-
pansions who are ineligible for federal expansions but whose families’ incomes
meet at least one income test for federal eligibility. Figure 1.8 shows average
eligibility by the income percentile of children’s families for the federal expan-
sions and this low-income subset of state-optional expansions in the year 2000.
A much smaller fraction of children are eligible for the state-optional expansions
than the federal expansions, but the incomes of the state-optional eligible chil-
dren fall in a similar range to those eligible for federal expansions, indicating
that the two groups are more comparable with respect to family income.
In Table 1.7, I re-estimate the effects of Medicaid expansions on program par-
ticipation and labor supply outcomes using the low-income subset of children
eligible for state-optional expansions. The last row of each panel contains p-
values for a test of equality of the federal and state-optional coefficients. Only
for housing participation and teen labor supply outcomes do I reject the null of
equality between estimates. Due to the construction of the low-income state-
optional sample, the cross-sample comparison of effects on teen labor supply
is the most likely to be problematic. This is because a significant portion of
the children eligible for state-optional expansions whose families have low in-
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Figure 1.8: The figure shows the fraction of children age 0-17 eligible for
federal and state-optional Medicaid expansions by the income
percentile of the children’s families in the year 2000. The state-
optional eligible population is constrained to children whose
families meet at least one income test for federal Medicaid eli-
gibility to select a subsample with similar incomes. Federal el-
igibility uses only federal Medicaid rules holding AFDC rules
fixed to 1980. State-optional expansions include all state ex-
pansions to Medicaid and CHIP. Income percentiles are deter-
mined using families’ gross income.
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comes are those who pass federal Medicaid income tests, but were born before
September 1983. As a result, children in the state-optional sample are systemat-
ically older, and are necessarily from states that optionally provide more gener-
ous coverage to older children. While this low-income state-optional subsample
is more comparable the federal sample than the overall state-optional sample,
the significant difference of teen incomes reflects the fact that these samples are
not perfectly comparable. Because the major difference between the samples
is along the dimension of teens born before and after September 1983, it is not
surprising that direct comparisons on outcomes for this group find significant
differences. The systematic difference in teens between the samples also mat-
ters for program participation and family labor supply, but the effect is muted
because teens comprise a small fraction of families’ total incomes. Overall, these
results suggest that the exogeneity of state-optional Medicaid expansions is not
problematic for family-level outcomes.
1.8 Robustness
I conduct several robustness checks of my results, primarily focused on testing
the primary identification assumption that there are no secular trends related
to both Medicaid expansions and program participation that might drive my
results. In Table 1.8, I re-estimate the results from Tables 1.2 and 1.4 for program
participation and labor supply with a model that includes state-specific linear
trends as controls. If the effects of Medicaid expansions were driven by under-
lying trends related to program participation and Medicaid expansions, then
including state-specific linear time trends would substantially affect results. As
shown in Panel A, this is not the case. The inclusion of linear trends increases
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the magnitude and significance of the effect of overall Medicaid expansions on
cash welfare and slightly reduces the estimated effect on EITC eligibility. The
now statistically significant effect on cash welfare aside, the qualitative effects
of the overall expansions are unchanged. State linear time trends are even less
important for federal expansions, and the estimates are nearly unchanged. For
program participation, there is little evidence of problematic underlying trends.
Panel B shows results for labor supply outcomes with the inclusion for state
linear time trends. Results for hours, in Columns 1-3, are largely unaffected by
the inclusion of state trends. Row 3 shows that overall Medicaid expansions are
still estimated to have a positive effect on hours worked. Row 4 finds a statis-
tically insignificant but positive effect of federal expansions on hours worked.
However, state linear time trends are important for labor income outcomes. Fo-
cusing on the effect of overall expansions on family income (Row 3, Column 7),
a 10 percentage point increase in overall Medicaid eligibility increases total fam-
ily income by $778, or 1.3%. This is the same increase seen in total family hours
in Table 1.4, and much smaller than the estimated 3.6% increase in total fam-
ily income without state linear time trends. This suggests that there are secular
state-level trends positively related to Medicaid expansions and family labor in-
come, with a likely candidate being the substantial real wage growth during the
late 1990s. Despite the attenuated estimates for family income, including state
linear time trends corroborates the estimated positive effect of overall Medi-
caid expansions on family labor supply. Linear state trends do not qualitatively
change the estimated effect of federal Medicaid expansions on labor income.
As a falsification test, I use the subset of families in the CPS that are childless.
Because I consider only Medicaid expansions for children, the program partic-
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ipation and labor supply behavior of childless families should not be affected
by these expansions. Appendix Table A.9 shows these results for program par-
ticipation. The estimated effects of Medicaid expansions on these families are
nearly all precisely estimated zeros. The small coefficients partly reflect the gen-
eral lack of generosity of safety net programs towards childless families in the
U.S.; few of these families would be eligible to these programs to begin with.
However, even among the programs which these families are more likely to be
eligible for, SNAP and EITC, the effects are not statistically significant.
Table A.10 estimates an analogous test for labor supply outcomes, separately
by family structure as in Table 1.5. Unlike program participation, childless
adults participate in the same labor market as families with children, and so
if there were underlying labor market trends related to Medicaid expansions,
then the effects of Medicaid expansions for children should be significantly re-
lated to labor supply outcomes of childless families. I find little evidence that
this is the case. The estimated effects of Medicaid expansions are statistically in-
significant for nearly all outcomes, and the point estimates are generally small in
magnitude. Overall, these robustness checks provide evidence that my results
are driven by Medicaid expansions and not by any underlying trends related to
Medicaid expansions and program participation and labor supply.
1.9 Discussion
In this paper, I provide the first evidence on the overall effects of expansions
of public health insurance to families with children on program eligibility and
take-up. In addition, I provide the first estimates of the effects of these ex-
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pansions on family labor supply, rather than the labor supply of only single
mothers. Overall Medicaid expansions do not significantly affect program par-
ticipation, but a 10 percentage point federally mandated expansion increases
participation in SNAP, cash welfare, and rental assistance by 0.3, 0.5, and 0.2
percentage points, respectively. These modest effects on program participation
obscure larger but offsetting effects on program take-up and program eligibility.
Both overall and federal Medicaid expansions increase program take-up among
eligibles but reduce overall eligibility. I provide evidence that these reductions
in eligibility are driven by increases in labor supply in response to Medicaid ex-
pansions, particularly for the overall Medicaid expansions. Prior research has
not found evidence of these effects on labor supply, and I show that this is be-
cause this research has focused solely on single mothers for whom I also find
no significant labor supply responses. Instead, labor supply responds among
two-parent families and other working adults in all families.
I show that there is evidence of expansions to SNAP and AFDC that are cor-
related with Medicaid expansions by simulating eligibility for these programs.
Including a measure of simulated eligibility for these programs controls for con-
temporaneous changes to program rules that are a threat to identification. These
controls are relevant to the broader literature studying the effects of Medicaid
because many outcomes of interest will be affected by SNAP participation, in
addition to Medicaid. For instance, health or developmental outcomes are also
improved by SNAP. Papers studying these outcomes that do not control for
SNAP expansions may overestimate the effect of Medicaid itself on these out-
comes, as the overall effect of Medicaid expansions is also driven by increased
SNAP take-up. Finally, I provide evidence corroborating the credibility of esti-
mates produced using state-optional Medicaid expansions.
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My results have several important implications for policy discussions. First,
the lack of coordination between transfer programs reduces participation in-
sofar as families have incomplete knowledge of available programs and eligi-
bility requirements. Increasing coordination in program implementation could
increase program participation while simultaneously reducing administrative
costs. Second, to the extent that Medicaid expansions increase labor supply,
the costs are reduced by increased tax receipts. Overall Medicaid eligibility in-
creased by 38.4 percentage points from 1980 to 2010. The estimated effect of
this expansion on average family income when including state linear-trends as
a control is 0.384 * 7,775 = $2,986 (Table 1.8, Row 3, Column 7). There are cur-
rently 34 million families in the U.S. with children. Assuming they pay a 15
percent marginal rate, this implies overall Medicaid expansions increased tax
revenue by 2, 986 × 34, 000, 000 × 0.15 ≈ $15 billion. Finally, a caveat to Medi-
caid’s expansionary effects on labor supply is that the increase may be primarily
due to relaxing the distortions caused by the program’s own strict discrete eli-
gibility design rather than some inherently pro-labor effect of Medicaid. If so,
further expansions may not reproduce this increase in labor supply.
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CHAPTER 2
THE EFFECTS OF SOCIAL SECURITY INCOME ON HEALTH CARE
EXPENDITURES AMONG THE ELDERLY
2.1 Introduction
Between 1960 and 2017 health care expenditures in the United States rose as a
share of GDP from 5.0 to 17.9 percent (Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Ser-
vices, 2018). Major factors that contribute to the rapid increase in health care
expenditures include rising income, improving medical technology, worsening
health, demographic changes, and expanding health insurance coverage (Smith
et al., 2009). Understanding the mechanisms behind rising health care expen-
ditures is important for several reasons including forecasting future expendi-
tures, evaluating whether current expenditures are the result of welfare opti-
mizing decisions by consumers or caused by inefficiencies such as externalities
or monopoly providers, and understanding how changes in policy, income, and
health care technology affect individuals or households. Given that real GDP
per capita has more than tripled since 1960 (Federal Reserve Economic Data,
2018), it is possible the increase in expenditures was driven by rising incomes.
Thus, it is important to understand how income affects household consumption
of health care.
Estimating the effect of income on health care expenditures is difficult due
the endogenous relationship between household income and health. Income
may increase health care expenditures if consumers invest in their stock of
health (Grossman, 1972). However, a body of research has found that reduc-
tions in income due to recessions actually reduce mortality, although more re-
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cent work has found that this relationship has faded and that some forms of
mortality are counter-cyclical (Ruhm, 2000; Neumayer, 2004; Tapia Granados,
2005; Gerdtham and Ruhm, 2006; Buchmueller et al., 2007; Gonzalez and Quast,
2011; Ariizumi and Schirle, 2012; McInerney and Mellor, 2012; Ruhm, 2015; Van
Den Berg et al., 2017). Health can also directly affect income. For instance, be-
ing obese can reduce wages (Cawley, 2004). Chronic joint pain reduces labor
force participation and wages (Garthwaite, 2012). Other factors such as genet-
ics may affect both income and health (Smith, 1999). As a result, most research
on the link between income and health have used empirical methods that do
not estimate plausibly causal estimates that would be necessary to understand
household behavior.
In this paper, I study how exogenous variation in income affects expendi-
tures on health care among elderly households. The specific parameter this
paper estimates is the income-elasticity of total out-of-pocket health care ex-
penditures in elderly households in response to an increase in Social Security
income.1 I estimate this effect by exploiting variation in Social Security income
across birth cohorts unintentionally introduced by Congress in amendments to
the Social Security Act in 1972 and 1977 known as the Social Security benefits
“Notch.” Variation in Social Security benefits across birth cohorts was driven
by interactions between the amendments and high rates of inflation throughout
the 1970s, which created large and unanticipated differences in benefits across
otherwise similar birth cohorts. The Notch has been previously used to study
a variety of outcomes including elderly health care expenditures (Tsai, 2018),
prescription drug use (Moran and Simon, 2006), labor supply (Krueger and Pis-
1Throughout, Social Security refers specifically to Old Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI).
Benefits for recipients of Social Security Disability may have also been affected by the legislative
changes I study, but I do not consider those recipients.
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chke, 1992; Vere, 2011), elderly living arrangements (Engelhardt et al., 2005),
mortality (Snyder and Evans, 2006), obesity (Cawley et al., 2010), formal and in-
formal home care use (Shah Goda et al., 2011; Tsai, 2015), and cognitive function
(Ayyagari and Frisvold, 2016).
While studying the effects of income on health care spending is of general
interest, expenditures among the elderly is of particular interest. Medicare was
the single largest purchaser of personal health care in 2016, totaling 22 percent
of all expenditures. Because Medicare composes 65 percent of all elderly health
care expenditures this implies the elderly make up over a third of total health
care expenditures. Despite the recent slowdown in the growth of expenditures
from both public and private insurance, the rate of annual increase of Medicare
expenditures is expected to rise to six or seven percent. This expected increase
is due to per capita expenditures increasing by four percent annually combined
with demographic shifts due to retiring baby boomers (MedPAC, 2018; Board
of Trustees, 2018). As a result, Medicare expenditures will continue to rise as
a share of GDP. While overall health care spending has more than doubled
since the 1970s, Medicare expenditures have more than tripled (MedPAC, 2018).
Thus, rising expenditures among the elderly are an important factor in the rising
share of health care costs as a share of GDP overall.
Over the same period, real median household income in elderly house-
holds has increased around 130 percent (U.S. Census Bureau, 2018a). This sug-
gests that rising incomes among the elderly may potentially explain a signif-
icant share of the increase in expenditures. However, the prior literature on
the income-elasticity of health expenditures has tended to estimate national or
cross-national elasticities. The best-known estimates using individual data from
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the RAND health insurance experiment explicitly exclude anyone over 62 from
their sample (Manning et al., 1987), despite the relevancy of health care expen-
ditures among the elderly to public policy.
Finally, understanding income and health expenditures among the elderly
is important not only because of the growth in expenditures, but also because
the elderly are often exposed to high out-of-pocket expenditures and significant
financial risk, particularly among the poor. While the elderly receive significant
assistance through public insurance which covers around 65 percent of their to-
tal costs, nearly 20 percent of their expenditures are financed out-of-pocket (De
Nardi et al., 2016). These out-of-pocket expenditures expose the elderly to con-
siderable financial risk despite the availability of public health insurance (Gold-
man and Zissimopoulos, 2003; Marshall et al., 2010). Understanding the health
care purchasing behavior of elderly households is important to effectively de-
signing public policy to address this financial risk and to identify for which
services elderly households need additional support.
Using households where the primary Social Security beneficiary has a high
school education or less as a proxy for low-income households, I find that health
care expenditures among the low-income elderly are highly elastic. Income elas-
ticity estimates range from 0.98 to 3.76 depending on the subsample, with a
preferred estimate of 2.56. A $1, 000 increase in Social Security income, which
is equal to approximately half of the increase in benefits low-education house-
holds received as a result of the Notch, would increase out-of-pocket expendi-
tures on health care by $200 in the average household. Elderly households that
retired at a younger age have more elastic demand for health care than older re-
tirees, suggesting poor health may play a role in their retirement. In addition, I
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find evidence that larger Social Security benefits increased the amount of health
insurance held by low-income households, although these results are less ro-
bust. The income-elasticity of health insurance is 0.94, and a $1, 000 increase in
benefits increases the number of insurance policies held by the average house-
hold 0.08. Finally, increased utilization of health care is concentrated in health
care categories that are not covered by Medicare, corroborating the expenditure
and health insurance results.
My estimated elasticities are substantially larger than most of the existing
literature. Prior work on the effect of income on health care expenditures can
be divided into two categories. The first group of studies use aggregate or in-
ternational level expenditure data to produce national-level income elasticities.
The second group use individual or household data with most of them focusing
on non-elderly households. Macro estimates using international cross-sections
generally produce estimates of income-elasticities near or above one, suggesting
that health care is a luxury good at the national level. However, these studies
generally rely on simple correlations and lack exogenous variation in income.
Many factors that affect both growth in income and health expenditures across
countries are omitted in most of these analyses, making the estimates useful for
forecasting but unhelpful for identifying the drivers of expenditure growth or
understanding individual behavior. For reviews of this literature, see Gerdtham
and Jo¨nsson (2000), Getzen (2000), and OECD (2006). Acemoglu et al. (2013)
provide a causal estimate of the national income-elasticity of health care expen-
ditures in the United States by instrumenting for income using oil-price shocks.
They find a more moderate income-elasticity between 0.7 and 1.1.
Micro estimates of the income elasticities of health care expenditures typi-
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cally find elasticities between 0.2 and 0.4 (Newhouse, 1992; Smith et al., 2009),
much too small for income to account for a significant share of rising health
care expenditures. There are relatively few studies utilizing micro data for sev-
eral reasons, but most importantly the endogeneity of individual or household
income and the lack of data on health expenditures. I am aware of only two
studies that address the endogeneity of household income. The most famous,
the RAND Health Insurance Experiment (Manning et al., 1987), estimates that
the income-elasticity of health expenditures is at most 0.2, far too small to ex-
plain a significant share of rising expenditures either per capita or in aggregate.
However, the experiment explicitly excluded individuals over 62 years old but,
these individuals may have the most elastic consumption of health care.
Tsai (2018) is the only study looking specifically at income and health care
expenditures for elderly households. Tsai’s empirical strategy is similar to my
own. She utilizes the benefits Notch to estimate the responsiveness of health
care expenditures in the Consumer Expenditure Survey for 1986-1994. She finds
that health care expenditures among the elderly with less than a high school ed-
ucation are highly elastic, with estimates ranging between 1.4 and 3.5. This is in
contrast with prior studies that use micro data and generally find small income
elasticities, and in fact exceeds the estimated elasticities from many macro stud-
ies. Although health care consumption is not sufficiently elastic among younger
demographics to drive an increase in expenditures, these estimates suggest ris-
ing incomes may play a large roll in increasing per capita expenditures among
the elderly on health care. While they do not examine expenditures per se,
Moran and Simon (2006) is closely related as they use the Notch to study the
effects of income on prescription drug taking among the elderly. They find that
the number of prescriptions taken by elderly households is elastic with an elas-
74
ticity of 1.3 among low-education elderly Social Security recipients.
My findings make several contributions to the literature on the growth of
health care expenditures. First, I corroborate Tsai’s (2018) finding of highly elas-
tic health care demand among the low-educated elderly in a second dataset and
show that these results are robust to a variety of specifications. Second, I esti-
mate the first test for the elasticity of demand for health insurance itself in re-
sponse to exogenous variation in income and show that the low-income elderly
increase the amount of insurance they hold as well as their total premiums paid
for health insurance. Prior research has found that the elderly still bear substan-
tial out-of-pocket costs and financial risk due to health expenditures (Goldman
and Zissimopoulos, 2003; Marshall et al., 2010). Combined with the large in-
come elasticities for the low-education elderly found by Tsai (2018) and myself,
this suggests that despite the availability of public health insurance coverage
among this population they remain exposed to substantial out-of-pocket costs
for some health care services and highly value additional health insurance. Fi-
nally, I examine health care utilization responses of low-education households
and show that the patterns of increased health care consumption in response
to increases in Social Security income are consistent with the categories of costs
generally not covered by Medicare, further corroborating the finding of elastic
health care expenditures.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 provides
institutional background on the Social Security benefits Notch. Section 2.3 de-
scribes the AHEAD/HRS data. Section 2.4 describes my empirical strategy and
identification. Section 2.5 presents my empirical results and robustness checks.
Section 2.6 concludes.
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2.2 Institutional Background: Social Security Benefits Notch
I exploit a natural experiment known as the Social Security benefits Notch,
henceforth the Notch, to isolate exogenous variation in Social Security income.
Here I provide a brief description of the institutional details for the Social Se-
curity formula and policy changes that led to the creation of the Notch drawn
primarily from U.S. General Accounting Office (1988). In addition, several ex-
isting papers that utilize variation due to the Notch provide further discussion
(Krueger and Pischke, 1992; Engelhardt et al., 2005; Snyder and Evans, 2006).
Before 1972 Social Security benefits were determined by nominal average
monthly earnings and were not indexed for inflation. Instead, Congress peri-
odically modified the benefits formula to change benefits or adjust for inflation.
The relatively high rates of inflation experienced by the US economy in the late
1960s and 1970s led to support for introducing automatic adjustments to Social
Security for price changes, as ad hoc adjustments were not sufficiently timely
to maintain the purchasing power of benefits. In 1972 Congress amended the
Social Security Act to automatically adjust for increases in cost-of-living in two
ways. First, benefits were indexed to increase automatically if the annual CPI
index rose by 3 percent or more. Second, the maximum taxable earnings ceiling
also automatically increased following increases in average covered wages.
However, the change inadvertently led benefits to increase more rapidly
than inflation, an error referred to as “double indexation”. The double index-
ation resulted because average lifetime earnings already increase with infla-
tion, which increases an individual’s future benefit while they are still working.
Thus, as the price level rose benefits increased due to increases in the replace-
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ment rates in the Social Security formula, but also due to nominal wages rising
with inflation which increased the base wage used to compute benefits. As a
result, individuals who had yet to retire effectively were compensated twice
for inflation. Not only did this flaw in the benefits formula lead to disparities
in real Social Security benefits across otherwise similar individuals in different
birth cohorts, but the rapid increase in benefits also posed a potential threat to
the solvency of the Social Security system.
In 1977 Congress amended the Social Security Act again to provide the in-
tended level of future benefits. However, the new Social Security rules applied
to individuals born in 1917 and after. Individuals born prior to 1917 received
benefits using the rules from the 1972 amendments and as a result received a
permanent increase in Social Security income relative to individuals with simi-
lar characteristics aside from being in a different birth cohort. Importantly, the
changes in benefits that resulted from the 1972 and 1977 amendments were both
large relative to total Social Security income, particularly for individuals with
relatively low lifetime incomes, and unanticipated.
In addition to creating variation in Social Security benefits across birth co-
horts for otherwise similar individuals, the Notch also creates variation in ben-
efits within cohort and year by retirement age. Individuals who retired before
age 65 benefited less from the 1972 amendments than those who retired at 65.
Those who retired after 65 benefited substantially more. Thus, the Notch cre-
ated variation in benefits not only across birth cohorts, but also within cohorts
based on retirement age.
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2.3 Data
To estimate the effect of Social Security income on health care expenditures I
use data from the AHEAD and HRS surveys. The AHEAD survey is a longitu-
dinal panel composed of individuals who were at least 70 years of age in 1993
and their spouses. The sample collected data in two waves, 1993 and 1995, af-
ter which AHEAD was integrated with the biennial HRS survey in 1998. The
HRS similarly follows a panel of individuals with an initial sample who were
at least 50 in 1992. In addition to the waves of the AHEAD survey, I include
data from the 1998 and 2000 waves of the HRS. The two studies collect a variety
of information regarding income, health care expenditures and insurance, and
demographics.
The AHEAD and HRS surveys have a total of 15,231 and 40,942 person ob-
servations, respectively, and 11,246 and 27,199 household observations, respec-
tively, for the survey years I use. The household is my primary unit of obser-
vation as this is the level at which health care expenditure decisions are likely
made, and I assign each household the birth year of its primary Social Security
recipient to determine treatment status. Never-married individuals and single
men are assigned their own birth year. Married couples are assigned the birth
year of the male spouse. The majority of married women in these cohorts re-
ceived Social Security benefits based on their husband’s earnings history (Sny-
der and Evans, 2006). Widowed and divorced women, however, pose a larger
issue as their Social Security payments are likely determined by their former
husband’s earnings. However, their husband’s birth date is not observable in
AHEAD/HRS, complicating assignment to treatment and control cohorts. In
my baseline estimates I follow prior work and assign widowed or divorced
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women to treatment and control groups by subtracting three from their birth
year (Moran and Simon, 2006; Cawley et al., 2010; Tsai, 2015, 2018). Three years
was found by Engelhardt et al. (2005) to be the median difference between di-
vorced and widowed women and their spouse. However, I additionally con-
sider the subsample excluding previously married women as the Notch is not a
strong instrument for them.
I constrain the analysis sample to households where the primary beneficiary
was born between 1905 and 1935 and assign households born between 1915-
1917 as the treatment group. Moran and Simon (2006), Cawley et al. (2010) and
Tsai (2018) all use cohorts born between 1900 and 1930. However, my preferred
estimation sample including low-education households and excluding previ-
ously married women has fewer than 25 observations per year for birth cohorts
before 1905, and thus I instead use the 1905-1935 birth cohorts. Additional ob-
servations are excluded for lacking data on Social Security income, health care
expenditures, or retirement year. Retirement age is not explicitly reported in
the AHEAD/HRS, but many respondents report the year in which they retire. I
calculate their retirement age as the difference between the reported year of re-
tirement and their birth year. Finally, I constrain the sample to households with
at least $100 of monthly Social Security income. After these restrictions and
dropping observations with missing data my final analysis sample has 16,518
household-year observations on 7,065 unique households. Most households en-
ter the sample in either the 1993 AHEAD wave or 1998 HRS wave and appear in
the sample either two or four times, although a smaller number of observations
are in the sample one or three times. All monetary variables are converted to
2017 dollars using the CPI-U-RS.
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Figure 2.1 shows annual Social Security income for the overall sample, the
low-education sample, the low-education sample excluding female widows and
divorcees, and the low-education sample of widows and divorcees only. For the
overall sample the 1915-1917 birth cohorts show a local peak in Social Security
income but no large increase in benefits, particularly compared with later birth
cohorts. Among the low-education sample the peak in Social Security income
for the 1915-1917 birth cohorts is more pronounced but still does not substan-
tially exceed Social Security benefits for households from birth cohorts in the
1920s. However, for the low-education sample excluding previously married
women the benefits Notch is more apparent. The peak benefits in the 1915-1917
birth cohorts are obviously significantly higher than for any other cohort even
with no other covariates conditioned out. In contrast, benefits for widows and
divorcees are approximately constant across all birth years with perhaps a small
local peak in 1915 that declines immediately in 1916 and 1917, which should be
the years most benefited by the Notch. This highlights the weakness of the
Notch as an instrument for previously married women.
The Notch also created variation in benefits within cohorts by retirement
age. Technically Social Security benefits are determined by the age a beneficiary
begins drawing them, which may not necessarily be when they retire. However,
I only know the date a household began drawing benefits for a small number
of households.2 Therefore, I assume individuals begin drawing benefits imme-
diately at their retirement date. This seems likely in most cases as there is sub-
stantial bunching at age 62, when individuals may first claim Social Security,
and at age 65, the “normal” retirement age, as shown in Figure 2.2. In addition,
2Households report the date they began drawing benefits if they began within two years of
the survey. By the first survey wave in 1993 the vast majority of respondents had already been
receiving benefits for years.
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Figure 2.1: Author’s calculations using the 1993, 1995, 1998, and 2000
AHEAD/HRS surveys. Each line shows average annual Social
Security income for a different sample. The blue line includes
all AHEAD/HRS respondents in my sample, the red line ex-
cluded those with more than a high school education, the green
line excludes previously married women, and the yellow line
includes only previously married women.
I assume individuals who retired between ages 55-61 begin receiving Social Se-
curity benefits at 62 and exclude individuals who retire before 55 or older than
75. Figure 2.3 shows monthly Social Security income for those who retire be-
fore age 65 and those retiring at age 65 or older in the low-education sample
excluding widows and divorcees.3 For most years, average Social Security ben-
3Benefits would also be higher for those retiring after age 65 as opposed at 65. However,
the AHEAD/HRS surveys do not have the retirement year for all respondents. As a result, my
analysis sample is too small to estimate Social Security income in smaller retirement age bins.
Appendix Figure B.1 (reprinted from Krueger and Pischke (1992)) shows benefits for workers
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efits are higher for those retiring at an older age. The largest differences occur
in the 1915-1917 birth cohorts for which older retirees benefited the most from
the 1972 amendments.
Figure 2.2: Author’s calculations using the 1993, 1995, 1998, and 2000
AHEAD/HRS surveys. Each bar shows the fraction of house-
holds for which the primary Social Security beneficiary retired
at that age. Retirement age is the difference between the re-
ported age of the respondent at retirement and their birth year.
Individuals whose calculated retirement age was less than 65
or greater than 75 are dropped.
The questions in the AHEAD and HRS surveys are not consistent across all
sample years, particularly concerning health care expenditures. For instance,
the 1993 survey uses a one-year recall period instead of the two years used in
with average lifetime wages retiring at ages 62, 65, and 68.
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later surveys and groups the various categories of expenditures into two ques-
tions rather than four as in later survey years. I convert the responses into an
annual overall measure by summing across all expenditure categories and di-
viding total expenditures in survey years after 1993 in half. In addition, there
is a high rate of non-response for many questions, including those pertaining
to health care expenditures. I assume that, if a respondent answered at least
one question regarding health care expenditures, then any missing answers for
other expenditure categories are zero. For more details on differences in survey
questions and construction of specific variables see Appendix B.
Table 2.1 presents summary statistics of the analysis sample. Column 1
shows statistics for the entire sample, Columns 2 and 3 show the high- and low-
education subsamples, respectively, where low-education is defined as house-
holds where the primary beneficiary has a high school education or less. Col-
umn 4 shows statistics for the low-education sample with female widows and
divorcees removed. Between 11 and 15 percent of the sample are born in the
1915-1917 cohorts. High-education households have substantially higher in-
come, health care expenditures and insurance premiums, and Social Security
benefits than low-education households. In addition, high-education house-
holds are more likely to be white non-Hispanic and to be married. Similarly,
low-education households excluding female widows and divorcees have higher
income, Social Security benefits, and health care expenditures than female wid-
ows and divorcees, which is unsurprising given that women from these birth
cohorts had relatively low labor force participation rates.
While my primary outcome of interest is the total expenditures on health
care by a household, I consider additional outcomes including the number of
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4)
High Low Excluding Widows
All Education Education and Divorcees
Annual Medical Expenditures (2017
dollars)
1,706.65 2,192.21 1,499.41 1,890.59
(4,642.55) (5,369.93) (4,278.27) (5,085.57)
Annual Medical Expenditures| > 0
(2017 dollars)
2,195.69 2,560.28 2,016.49 2,376.26
(5,162.94) (5,721.57) (4,855.28) (5,599.47)
# Insurance Policies 1.68 1.72 1.66 1.66
(0.65) (0.68) (0.64) (0.65)
# Insurance Policies| > 0 1.70 1.74 1.69 1.69
(0.62) (0.66) (0.60) (0.62)
Annual Insurance Premiums 1,031.91 1,345.76 897.95 1,195.10
(31,223.31) (31,994.11) (30,888.98) (41,690.51)
Annual Insurance Premiums| > 0 2,180.85 2,502.53 2,015.16 2,672.31
(45,365.31) (43,600.13) (46,251.90) (62,316.50)
Monthly SS Income (2017 dollars) 1,414.74 1,589.68 1,340.07 1,582.34
(728.04) (756.33) (702.52) (797.31)
Total Annual Income (2017 dollars) 42,936.93 63,839.03 34,688.65 43,263.86
(125,972.28) (92,648.87) (136,034.94) (183,314.85)
Treatment indicator (born
1915-1917)
0.14 0.11 0.15 0.14
(0.35) (0.31) (0.36) (0.34)
White, non-Hispanic 0.87 0.94 0.84 0.84
(0.34) (0.24) (0.37) (0.37)
Married couple 0.43 0.51 0.40 0.73
(0.50) (0.50) (0.49) (0.44)
Widow/Divorcee 0.42 0.35 0.45 0.00
(0.49) (0.48) (0.50) (0.00)
Never-married 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.06
(0.19) (0.20) (0.18) (0.24)
Age of head 76.18 75.37 76.53 75.27
(6.69) (6.59) (6.70) (6.46)
Less than high school 0.40 0.00 0.57 0.57
(0.49) (0.00) (0.50) (0.50)
High school 0.30 0.00 0.43 0.43
(0.46) (0.00) (0.50) (0.50)
More than high school 0.30 1.00 0.00 0.00
(0.46) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
N 16,518 4,637 11,881 6,528
Source: Author’s calculations using the 1993, 1995, 1998, and 2000 AHEAD/HRS surveys. Sam-
ple is split by education where high education are those households where the primary Social
Security beneficiary has more than a high school degree, and low education are those with a
high school degree or less. The final column excludes previously married women whose birth
cohort is imputed.
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Figure 2.3: Author’s calculations using the 1993, 1995, 1998, and 2000
AHEAD/HRS surveys. The blue line shows average annual
Social Security income for those retiring before age 65. The red
line shows average annual Social Security income for those re-
tiring 65 or older.
health insurance policies held by a household. It may be surprising that there is
substantial variation in the number and types of health insurance policies held
by the elderly, but Table 2.2 shows the number of households with insurance
coverage from various potential sources for the entire sample, the sample of
low-education households excluding previously-married women, and within
this low-education sample the households in the treatment (Notch) and con-
trol groups. Virtually all households report having coverage through Medicare.
Medicaid, employer-provided health insurance, and Medigap are also quite
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common. Other less frequent sources include CHAMPVA/CHAMPUS which
provides coverage for veterans, coverage through unions, self-employment,
Railroad Retirement, Mail Handlers insurance, insurance through federal, state,
or local government, and a large “other” category. These other sources are not
given explicitly by AHEAD/HRS, but could include sources such as the AARP,
professional organizations, and state or health alliances. As demonstrated by
Table 2.2 there is substantial variation in the amount and sources of health in-
surance held by households, which suggests insurance may also be a margin
through which households may modify their health consumption decisions.
Table 2.2 compares the number of households with different sources because
the questions regarding source of coverage are not consistent across survey
waves aside from Medicare and Medicaid. CHAMPVA, employer-provided
health insurance, Medigap, and “other” are included as categories in every
wave although the questions differ somewhat. Other sources are included in
only some or one wave, partly explaining the substantially lower frequency.
However, my analysis makes use of more comparable questions that are varia-
tions on “How many different policies do you have (in addition to Medicare)?”
or “How many different employer-provided health insurance plans are you
covered by?”. While these questions are not identical across survey waves the
AHEAD/HRS inquire about the number of policies in broad categories in ev-
ery survey wave, and questions about specific sources are follow-up questions
to those about the total number. To these totals I add questions about the spe-
cific and common sources of health insurance such as Medicare and Medicaid.
Thus, the inconsistencies across survey waves about specific sources should not
be problematic for my analysis, and the numbers provided in Table 2.2 are only
for descriptive purposes. In addition, I included fixed effects for survey wave
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Table 2.2: Sources of Insurance Coverage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Low Notch Control
Households Education Households Households
Medicare 15,586 6,085 779 5,306
Medicaid 1,849 629 62 567
CHAMPVA/CHAMPUS 379 227 29 198
Employer-provided health
insurance (EPHI)a
3,239 1,340 113 1,227
# of EPHI policiesb 2,229 971 62 909
Medigap 8,591 3,206 453 2,753
Other 6,797 2,580 429 2,151
Self-employment insurance 45 16 1 15
Unionb 102 74 11 63
Railroad Retirementc 73 28 7 21
Mail Handlers’ insuranced 20 9 1 8
Federal employees’ health
insuranced
13 1 0 1
Blue Cross/Blue Shieldd 15 3 2 1
State or local governmentd 7 2 0 2
Other government sourced 8 1 0 1
Source: Author’s calculations using the 1993, 1995, 1998, and 2000 AHEAD/HRS surveys. Each
column shows the number of insurance policies reported by households within that sample.
Columns 3 and 4 show health insurance coverage for the treatment and control groups within
the low education sample.
a - Covered in 1995, 1998, and 2000 surveys only.
b - Covered in 1998 and 2000 surveys only.
c - Covered in 1993 and 1995 surveys only.
d - Covered in 1995 surveys only.
in my empirical specification which should absorb any differences in insurance
coverage that are due to differences in survey questions.
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2.4 Methods
Most prior studies of the Notch use empirical strategies that fall into two cat-
egories. The first group of papers instrument for the Notch using predicted
Social Security income. The predictions of Social Security income are based on
the average lifetime earnings of retirees in different demographic cells defined
on characteristics such as education and race (Krueger and Pischke, 1992; En-
gelhardt et al., 2005; Shah Goda et al., 2011; Handerker, 2011; Vere, 2011). The
second group of papers instead instrument for Social Security income using
a binary indicator for being treated by the Notch. Most commonly these pa-
pers assign treatment to the 1915-1917 birth cohorts as these cohorts benefitted
most from the Notch (Moran and Simon, 2006; Cawley et al., 2010; Ayyagari and
Frisvold, 2016). However, the 1972 amendments that created the Notch applied
to the 1910-1916 birth cohorts, while the 1977 amendments applied to cohorts
born in 1917 or after. Tsai (2015, 2018) use an alternative indicator for member-
ship in these birth cohorts by instead defining treatment as those born between
1911-1917.4
I use the second empirical strategy and assign membership in the 1915-1917
birth cohorts as an instrument for Social Security income. In order to estimate
the effect of income on health care expenditures I estimate the following first-
stage to predict Social Security income:
4The latter strategy is clearly easier to implement. However, Vere (2011) points out that
while this strategy is valid the simplicity is a tradeoff with reduced efficiency for exploiting the
variation generated by the Notch. A final study falls outside of either strategy. By utilizing a
large dataset, Snyder and Evans (2006) are able to estimate a regression discontinuity design
on the last quarter of the 2016 birth cohort and the first cohort of the 2017 birth cohort, but the
AHEAD/HRS lack sufficient observations to implement such a design.
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S S Iht = γ + α ∗ Notchh + φ ∗ Xht + λa + κr + pim + µt + uht (2.1)
The subscript h denotes household and t denotes the year the household was
surveyed.5 Notchh is an indicator for the households’ primary Social Security
beneficiary being born between 1915-1917. Xht is a vector of control variables
including the race-ethnicity, years of education, and sex of the primary Social
Security beneficiary, and indicators for the type of household (married couple,
single man, divorced/widowed woman, or never-married woman). In addition
I include fixed effects for age, the region in which the household is located, and
the month and year in which the household was interviewed.
The second-stage equation is:
Yht = θ + β ∗ S S Iht + δ ∗ Xht + λa + κr + pim + µt + ht (2.2)
where S S Iht is Social Security income either as reported in the survey data
for OLS specifications or predicted by Equation 2.1 for instrumental variable
specifications. Yht is expenditures on health care in my primary specifications,
although I also consider related outcomes including health insurance policies,
insurance premiums, and health care utilization. Dollar values are converted
to 2017 dollars using the CPI-U-RS. All regressions are weighted using the
AHEAD/HRS household weights. Standard errors are clustered by cohort year.
The coefficient of interest β measures the dollar increase in health care expendi-
tures in response to a one dollar increase in Social Security income as a result of
5Within sample waves interviews may take place in different years. For instance, the
1993 and 1995 AHEAD surveys contain observations with interview dates in 1993/1994 and
1995/1996, respectively.
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the Notch.
For the Notch to be a valid instrument it must be relevant and exogenous.
The Notch is not a strong instrument in all of the samples I consider. It is a
weak instrument for households with high education and has an F-statistic only
of 14.73 for the overall sample, only slightly above the minimum standard of
10 (Staiger and Stock, 1997). However, it is a much stronger instrument in the
subsamples of low-education households with F-statistics of 38.7 and 41.8 when
previously married women are included and excluded, respectively.
The exclusion restriction is more difficult given that identification relies pri-
marily on variation in Social Security benefits across birth cohorts. For my em-
pirical model to be identified requires the assumption that the only difference
between otherwise similar cohorts that would affect health care expenditures is
differences Social Security benefits arising from the 1972 and 1977 amendments.
Thus, a primary concern for identification would be if there were policies or
events affecting entire cohorts and correlated with the Notch. This creates sev-
eral difficulties.
First, only three birth cohorts are included in the treatment group which lim-
its the flexibility to exclude specific cohorts to test whether estimates are driven
by particular treatment cohorts. Second, the treatment occurs at the birth-cohort
level as this is the level at which different Social Security changes and cost-of-
living adjustments are made. As a result, standard errors should be clustered by
birth cohort, but this requires a tradeoff between including a sufficient number
of birth cohorts to avoid having too few clusters and including control cohorts
that are increasingly dissimilar from the treatment cohorts. Similar to exclud-
ing treatment cohorts, the small number of clusters also exacerbates the issue of
90
excluding specific control cohorts to test for cohort effects.
Third, Handerker (2011) mentions several challenges in using the Notch as
exogenous variation in income. These include that the Notch could not affect in-
come until retirement, most datasets do not contain information on previously
married women’s husband’s birth year, the Notch did not apply to those on dis-
ability insurance or with declining incomes as they neared retirement, and the
cross-cohort variation in income was not particularly large. The first two issues
are not a problem in my setting. I examine health care expenditures among the
elderly specifically when they would be retired. I do not observe the birth year
of husbands of previously married women, so I exclude them from my estima-
tion in many specifications.
Handwerker’s latter two points are relevant for my context. The first of these
points is an issue of instrument strength and Handwerker finds lower reported
Social Security benefits in 1916 than in 1915 or 1917, even though 1916 should
be a peak year. Even among low-education households a regression of reported
benefits on predicted benefits has a t-statistic of only 3.23 which she attributes
to insufficient observations. However, Handwerker uses only the 1993 AHEAD
survey, whereas I utilize several additional survey waves. While I do not predict
Social Security income, I find that the Notch is a strong instrument in my analy-
sis sample, and similarly a weak instrument when using only the 1993 AHEAD
wave. In addition, as shown in Figure 2.1, while the Notch is not apparent in the
overall sample it is obvious in the sample of low-education households even in
the raw data.
Handwerker’s second point that the variation in income due to the Notch
is small relative to cross-cohort variation in outcomes, in particular labor sup-
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ply and mortality, is also relevant to my setting. Variation in income due to
the Notch is certainly small in the full analysis sample. Average household
income is nearly $43, 000 as shown in Table 2.1, whereas the 1915-1917 birth co-
horts are predicted to receive an extra $930 annually from Social Security, or just
over two percent of their total income. However, this includes better educated
households that have higher income and benefit less from the Notch. Looking
instead at the sample of low-education households excluding previously mar-
ried women, the 1915-1917 birth cohorts receive around $2, 000 in additional
Social Security benefits due to the Notch, or a nearly five percent increase in
total income. While this is a relatively small share of their total annual income,
it is a permanent increase and increases total Social Security benefits for these
households by around 11 percent.
I address these issues in several ways. First, I include an extensive set of con-
trol variables in order to account for as much dissimilarity across cohorts that is
not driven by Social Security as possible. One benefit of the Notch affecting in-
dividuals so late in life is that many characteristics such as an individual’s level
of educational attainment or labor force status have long since been determined
and are unlikely to be correlated with the treatment. In addition, my dataset
gives me an advantage over previous studies utilizing this identification strat-
egy that relied on either cross-sectional data or on panel data for which repeated
observations occurred within the same year. In both cases these data do not per-
mit the inclusion of age fixed effects which would be collinear with the Notch
when it is defined based on year of birth (Moran and Simon, 2006; Cawley et al.,
2010; Tsai, 2018). Age fixed effects important because many outcomes, including
health care expenditures, are likely related to age. Because my data are a panel
over survey waves multiple years apart, I am able to include age fixed effects to
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account for older households generally having higher health care expenditures.
Fixed effects for type of household allow for varying marriage patterns
across birth cohorts, as well as different time patterns if older households are
more likely to be widows or widowers. Region fixed effects account for ge-
ographic differences in health care expenditures or costs across nine different
regions. Fixed effects for the month and year of the survey allow households
to vary their responses due to receiving the survey at different times and thus
having different recall periods. In addition, each survey wave administered the
survey over one or two years that did not overlap with other survey waves.
Thus, survey year effects also control for differences in responses across survey
waves due to changing survey questions.
I directly and indirectly test for several potential culprits of cohort effects.
A common worry in the Notch literature is the 1918 influenza epidemic. Al-
mond (2006) found that exposure to the flu epidemic while in utero led to worse
academic and labor market outcomes, as well as worse health. The 1918-1919
birth cohorts were both potentially in utero during this epidemic but were also
both among the first cohorts for which Social Security benefits were determined
by the transitionary period between the rules under the 1972 and 1977 amend-
ments, during which real benefits fell rapidly. Thus, these cohorts were among
the first to face large reductions in Social Security income relative to previous
cohorts while simultaneously having higher expected health care costs. This
could potentially bias against finding an effect of the Notch as these cohorts
would have lower Social Security income but higher expected health care costs.
Another concern is that control cohorts born at the beginning or end of the sam-
ple period are separated from the treatment cohorts by a decade or more and
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may be systematically different from the treatment cohorts. I address these is-
sues by reestimating my empirical model excluding the 1918 and 1919 birth
cohorts and then constraining my analysis period to the cohorts born between
1910 and 1925.
The latter restriction in particular raises the issue of having few clusters
which can bias standard errors towards zero (Donald and Lang, 2007). Because
Social Security is a national-level policy identification relies on cross-cohort
comparisons clustered at the cohort level, and prior studies using this identi-
fication strategy for the Notch have used the 1900-1930 birth cohorts to ensure a
minimally sufficient number of clusters (Moran and Simon, 2006; Cawley et al.,
2010; Tsai, 2015, 2018). The restriction to the 1910-1925 cohorts leaves only 16
groups. To address having few clusters Cameron et al. (2008) suggest using
critical values from the tG−2 distribution which they find works well with fewer
clusters.
Some characteristics vary across cohorts that may be related to both Social
Security income and health care expenditures, but in ways that simply exclud-
ing particular birth cohorts will not control for. Cross-cohort variation in the
fraction of men that served in the military or average retirement age are both
likely related to health care expenditures. Bedard and Deschenes (2003) show
that there is a large increase in the fraction of veterans in each cohort from 1915
until the mid 1920s, and a falling fraction thereafter.6 Theoretically the Notch
itself could have incentivized differences in retirement behavior across cohorts,
although this is unlikely given that the effects of the Notch were unanticipated
and relied on high rates of inflation. Furthermore, prior research has found
that the Notch did not significantly affect labor supply or retirement behavior
6See Appendix Figure B.3.
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(Krueger and Pischke, 1992). In spite of this, I test whether veteran status or
retirement age are related to my specification of the Notch.7
Another concern is that estimates may be an artifact of the specification of
the Notch itself. Many papers selected the 1915-1917 birth cohorts because these
cohorts had the largest Social Security benefits. However, statutorily the 1972
amendments applied to the 1910-1916 cohorts and the 1977 amendments to the
cohorts born thereafter, and Tsai (2015, 2018) for instance use an alternative in-
strument using the 1911-1917 birth cohorts. I test the sensitivity of my results to
this alternative Notch definition. Finally, if the increases in health care expen-
ditures I find are in fact caused by Social Security income from the Notch then
there should be a corresponding increase in health care utilization. Moreover,
any changes in utilization are unlikely to be uniform across categories of ser-
vices. As virtually the entire population of my sample has Medicare coverage,
services covered by Medicare likely have low out-of-pocket costs and utilization
may be less responsive. However, some services such as dental care and pre-
scription drugs are not covered by Medicare.8 Because households face higher
out-of-pocket costs, utilization of these services should respond more elastically
among low-education (and thus low-income) households.
Robustness checks aside, using the Notch as an instrument for Social Secu-
rity income is a common identification strategy in the literature studying the
effects of income for the elderly. It has been invoked repeatedly both in the
7For cohort effects it is not always obvious which direction the bias would go. For instance,
the 1918 flu epidemic or rising fraction of veterans might suggest that cohorts with less Social
Security income had higher health care expenditures, which would bias estimates of the Notch
effect downward. However, particularly because I consider a sample of individuals late in life,
negative health shocks may lead these cohorts to select for healthier individuals remaining in
the sample, which would positively bias the estimated effect of the Notch.
8My analysis sample ends in 2000, before the creation of the Medicare Part D prescription
drug benefit.
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literature using the Notch as a binary instrument as in my setting (Moran and
Simon, 2006; Cawley et al., 2010; Shah Goda et al., 2011; Tsai, 2015; Ayyagari
and Frisvold, 2016; Tsai, 2018), as well as in the broader literature using pre-
dicted Social Security earnings (Krueger and Pischke, 1992; Engelhardt et al.,
2005; Handerker, 2011; Vere, 2011). These studies have also tested the Notch ex-
clusion restriction in a variety of ways and generally failed to produce evidence
that it fails.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 The Notch and Health Care Expenditures
Table 2.3 presents my main results for the effects of income on health care expen-
ditures. Each column shows results estimated using a different subsample. Col-
umn 1 uses the entire AHEAD/HRS sample, Column 2 uses households with a
primary beneficiary that has more than a high school education, and Columns
3-6 use households with a high school education or less, exclude previously
married women, and split the sample into households where the head retired
before age 65 and age 65 and older, respectively. The first row of Panel A shows
the first-stage coefficient from estimating Equation 2.1. The rows below show
the percent increase in total income Notch households receive from extra Social
Security benefits and the F-statistic for the indicator on Notch membership. A
coefficient in the first row is interpreted as the dollar increase in annual Social
Security income associated with membership in the 1915-1917 birth cohorts. For
the full sample, Notch membership increases household Social Security income
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by $929 per year, which increases total household income by 2.2 percent.
Notch membership has no effect on cohorts with more than a high school ed-
ucation, although the statistically insignificant point estimate is positive. This is
unsurprising, as the “double indexation” resulted from the combined effect of
both replacement rates and covered wages rising with inflation. However, peo-
ple with more education tend to have higher wages and are much more likely to
have wages above the Social Security maximum. In this case they do not benefit
from the indexing of covered wages and would not have significantly different
Social Security earnings than other similar birth cohorts. Notch membership is
also not a strong instrument in this sample with a F-statistic of just 0.15. For less
educated households the Notch has a larger effect, increasing Social Security
income by $1, 145, and is a much stronger instrument. The effect is even larger
when excluding previously married women who generally have much lower
incomes. In addition, as expected the Notch has a larger effect on those who
retire at age 65 or later than those retiring before 65. Those who retire at 65 or
older gain over $2, 800 in additional annual Social Security income, increasing
their total income by seven percent.
Panel B shows results of estimating the effect of Social Security income on
health care expenditures from Equation 2.2 using OLS in the first row and the
Notch as an instrument for Social Security income in the second row. Regardless
of the subsample being analyzed there is little relationship between reported So-
cial Security income and health care expenditures. In fact, most of the OLS es-
timates are precisely estimated zeros with implied income-elasticities of health
care expenditures between 0.2 to 0.4. However, the instrumental variable re-
sults indicate a much stronger effect of Social Security income on expenditures.
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The estimates are imprecisely estimated for the whole sample, as well as the
high- and low-education samples, but the point estimates suggest an income-
elasticity at or above one.
Using the low-education sample excluding previously married women I find
that a one-dollar increase in Social Security income increases health care expen-
ditures by 0.2 dollars, significant at the 0.05 level. This implies an elasticity of
2.56, indicating that health care expenditures among this group of the elderly
are highly elastic. Splitting the sample by retirement ages shows similar results.
Those who retire before age 65 and at age 65 or older have income elasticities
of 3.76 and 2.15, respectively. Despite the later retirees benefiting more from the
Notch they have a lower income-elasticity of health care expenditures. The dif-
ference in elasticities across retirement ages would be unsurprising if there were
selection into retirement age. Those who retire at an older age, and particularly
those who wait until after the “normal” retirement age of 65, may have system-
atically better health than those who retire early. Even absent the Notch Social
Security benefits are reduced by early retirement, suggesting that those who
retire early are penalizing themselves. However, health likely plays a role in
retirement, and in fact may play a stronger role than financial decisions (Dwyer
and Mitchell, 1999; McGarry, 2004). If those who retire early are in worse health,
then it is unsurprising their health expenditures are more elastic than their peer
low-educated households who retire later.
My results are broadly consistent with those found by Tsai (2018) and Moran
and Simon (2006). Tsai (2018) also examined health expenditure outcomes and
found an elasticity of 0.89 for the equivalent full sample, slightly smaller than
the elasticity of 1.1 I find for this group. The Notch is similarly a borderline
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strong instrument for Tsai’s overall sample. She does not report elasticities for
the high-education sample but does for the sample of low-education house-
holds. She finds an elasticity of health care expenditures of 2.4 for these house-
holds overall and 1.91 when she similarly excludes previously married women.
My estimate is smaller for the low-education sample overall and larger when
excluding previously married women, but both estimate’s confidence intervals
include Tsai’s estimates. Moran and Simon (2006) do not examine expenditures,
but look at prescription taking behavior which should be similar if the elderly
incur significant out-of-pocket costs for prescriptions. They find a that the num-
ber of prescriptions taken by households is also highly elastic, albeit slightly less
so than overall expenditures, with a primary estimate of 1.32.9
2.5.2 Health Insurance
Out-of-pocket expenditures are highly elastic to additional income among low-
education households. However, the high elasticity among low-education
households who have much lower income, combined with evidence that the
elderly face substantial financial risk despite the availability of public health in-
surance (Goldman and Zissimopoulos, 2003; Marshall et al., 2010), suggests that
there may similarly be demand for additional health insurance coverage. The
AHEAD/HRS ask about sources of insurance coverage and premiums paid. Ta-
ble 2.2 displays summary statistics for the number of households with different
sources of insurance. Not all respondents report values for questions related to
insurance, further reducing the size of my analysis sample than for health care
expenditures.
9Neither Tsai (2018) nor Moran and Simon (2006) examine households based on retirement
age.
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Table 2.4 shows the estimated effects of Social Security income on both the
number of insurance policies held and total premiums paid. Panel A repeats
the first stage estimation on the subsample for which there is outcome data on
insurance coverage and premiums. These estimates are quite similar to those in
Table 2.3 with the Notch being the strongest instrument and causing the largest
increase in Social Security income among low-education households excluding
previously married women, and among those who retired later, while being a
weak instrument for high-education households. The magnitude of the benefit
from the Notch is similar to the analogous regressions from Table 2.3, although
in every case the point estimate is now smaller.
Panel B shows the effects on the number of health insurance policies held
by a household. Columns 3 and 4 indicate that the additional income from the
Notch cohorts increases the amount of health insurance held by these house-
holds. From Column 4, a $1, 000 increase in Social Security income causes
households to acquire 0.08 more insurance policies, significant at the 0.05
level. Combined with the estimated effect on income from the first stage, low-
education households excluding previously married women have 0.152 more
insurance policies as a result of additional Social Security income, with an im-
plied elasticity of 0.94. The effects by retirement age are imprecisely estimated,
but positive. In addition, they display the same pattern as for health care ex-
penditures: the point estimate for insurance demand is much more elastic for
those who retire before 65 than those who retire 65 or older. Also similar to the
results for health care expenditures, the effect is statistically insignificant for the
sample overall and for high-education households, but both point estimates are
positive.
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Panel C shows the results for premiums paid for health insurance by the
household. In no case are the estimates statistically significant, but all point es-
timates are positive. For low-education households, every subsample predicts
that health insurance premiums are inelastic, with elasticities between 0.12 to
0.34. High-education households are the exception, but the Notch is a very
weak instrument for these households. Due to the imprecise estimates, how-
ever, I cannot rule out that premiums are relatively elastic. For instance, a 95-
percent confidence interval for Column 4, the low-education sample excluding
previously married women, includes an elasticity of up to 1.07. Due to sam-
ple restrictions and non-responses to some survey questions, note that for both
health insurance outcomes the sample sizes for estimates by retirement age rely
on particularly small analysis samples with only 200-300 treated observations
and around 30 observations in many control birth cohorts.10 However, the esti-
mated effects for premiums paid out-of-pocket are consistent with an increase
in insurance coverage, as well as an increase in health care expenditures.
These results corroborate the evidence on health care expenditures that the
low-income elderly have elastic demand for additional health care and consume
additional health care along multiple dimensions. Moreover, while Tsai (2018)
also studied out-of-pocket expenditures among the elderly, so far as I know
these are the first results studying the behavior of the elderly towards health in-
surance and the first to comprehensively study the different margins on which
demand for health care could respond. These findings are consistent with the
literature that finds that the elderly have high out-of-pocket costs for health care
despite public health insurance and are still exposed to high levels of financial
10The analysis sample is not uniformly distributed across cohorts. The 1913-1923 cohorts
generally have the most observations with far fewer for the cohorts at either end of the analysis
period, but especially cohorts born before 1910.
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risk (Goldman and Zissimopoulos, 2003; Marshall et al., 2010). Moreover, my
results contribute to the literature by demonstrating the heterogeneity of health
and financial risk among the elderly. This suggests that policy interventions
aiming to improve elderly welfare and assist those most exposed to financial
risks could focus in particular on the elderly who retire early, as these individ-
uals have worse health and more elastic demand for additional health care. In
the next section, I also provide evidence that the early-retirees not only gener-
ally demand more health care but do so in specific categories of services that
tend to have less or no coverage from publicly provided health insurance.
2.5.3 Robustness
I perform a variety of robustness checks to corroborate my results. Table 2.5
presents these checks for four specifications: health care expenditures and the
number of insurance policies outcomes for both the low-education and exclud-
ing previously married women subsamples.11 One concern is that the birth co-
horts from the early 1900s, late 1920s, and early 1930s may not be good controls
for cohorts born between 1915-1917. Real average lifetime incomes rise for these
cohorts, meaning that those born near 1900 are poorer throughout their lives
than the treatment cohorts, while those born nearer 1930 are richer. Similarly,
there is a trend towards increasing educational attainment. In Column 1 of Ta-
ble 2.5 I restrict the analysis sample to the birth cohorts born between 1910-1925
to limit the comparison to more similar birth cohorts. The estimated coefficients
are similar in direction and magnitude to those estimated in Table 2.3. However,
these estimates are not statistically significant even when using conventional
11I do not include robustness checks for specifications using retirement age due to small sam-
ple sizes.
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thresholds, much less when using the modified, larger critical values proposed
by Cameron et al. (2008) to account for the small number of clusters.
Table 2.5: The Effect of Social Security Income Excluding Specific Birth Cohorts and Using an Alternative In-
strument Definition
(1) (2) (3)
Sample Restricted Alternative Notch Excluding the
to 1910-1925 Using 1911-1917 1918-1919
Birth Cohorts Birth Cohorts Flu Birth Cohorts
Health expenditures, low-education sample (2017
$s)
0.052 0.051 0.078
(0.08) (0.06) (0.08)
Health expenditures, low-education excluding
widows and divorcees (2017 $s)
0.21 0.14** 0.16**
(0.16) (0.06) (0.07)
Insurance, low-education sample (1000s of 2017 $s) -0.011 -0.012 0.093
(0.021) (0.019) (0.012)
Insurance, low-education excluding widows and
divorcees (1000s of 2017 $s)
0.030 0.034 0.064
(0.023) (0.021) (0.040)
Source: Author’s calculations using the 1993, 1995, 1998, and 2000 AHEAD/HRS surveys. Each column modifies
the sample or instrument of my base specification. Each cell is the coefficient on predicted Social Security income
from an IV estimate of Equation 2.2. Rows differ by the outcome considered (health care expenditures or number of
insurance policies) and which subsample was used (either low-education households overall or those households
excluding previously married women). All regressions include the race-ethnicity, years of education, and sex of the
household’s primary Social Security beneficiary as controls as well as a set of indicators for the type of household
(married couple, single man, divorced/widowed woman, or never-married woman), age of the primary beneficiary,
region in which the household is located, and the month and year in which the interview took place. Low education
is defined as households where the primary beneficiary has a high school education or less and high education are
all other households. Robust standard errors are clustered at the level of the birth cohort. *, **, and *** indicate
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
It is unclear whether the loss of significance results from the removal of bias
from using less similar control cohorts or from the reduction in sample size.
The largest subsample is Row 1 with 8,317 observations, while Row 4 has only
4,017. The point estimates remain consistent with those from Tsai (2018). The
Notch does create within birth cohort variation by retirement age, with those
who retire at an older age benefitting more from the Notch. With a sufficiently
larger dataset, one theoretical solution to the tradeoff between a sufficient num-
ber of clusters and a wide range of birth cohorts would be clustering by the
birth cohort and retirement year. However, due to non-responses on the ques-
tion regarding retirement year the AHEAD/HRS survey does not have a sample
of sufficient size to use within-cohort clusters while also further restricting the
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number of birth cohorts.12
Rather than defining Notch membership as the 1915-1917 birth cohorts, Tsai
(2015, 2018) uses the 1911-1917 birth cohorts. Column 2 uses this alternative
Notch definition and repeats the estimation of Equation 2.2 for the 1905-1935
birth cohorts. The effects do not depend on which Notch definition is used. The
estimated coefficient for Social Security income with health care expenditures
as the dependent variable and using the low-education sample excluding previ-
ously married women is similar at 0.14 versus 0.20 when the 1915-1917 cohorts
are used and remains significant at the 0.05 level. The effect on health insur-
ance is no longer significant and only about half the size (0.034 versus 0.082) but
remains positive.
Cohort effects are a major threat to identification and I next examine some
potential culprits. Column 3 of Table 2.3 re-estimates Equation 2.2 excluding the
1918-1919 birth cohorts that were affected by the influenza epidemic. The esti-
mated coefficients are mostly unchanged although the effect on health insurance
loses significance, suggesting that the 1918 flu is not driving my results. This is
consistent with the findings of prior work that has not found excluding the flu-
affected cohorts to be important (Moran and Simon, 2006; Tsai, 2018). Other
potential cohort effects would be varying rates of military service or retirement
ages across cohorts. In Table 2.6 Columns 1 and 2, I regress these outcomes on an
indicator for Notch membership. Panel A shows the effect for the low-education
sample and Panel B for the same sample excluding previously married women.
The estimate in Panel B for veterans suggests that there may be a marginally
statistically significant negative relationship between Notch membership and
12Another solution, albeit substantially more complex, would be using predicted Social Secu-
rity earnings which are a much stronger instrument as shown by Vere (2011).
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veteran status.
This is unsurprising as the fraction of men who are veterans rose rapidly
between 1915 and the mid-1920s (Bedard and Deschenes, 2003). Controlling for
veteran status and retirement age is less straightforward than outrightly exclud-
ing other candidates for cohort effects, however, because every cohort has some
veterans and variation in retirement age. Simply excluding veterans would be
problematic if there were selection into who is a veteran. For instance, if veter-
ans tended to be drawn from the more physically fit who would otherwise have
lower life-time expected health care costs, this would affect health care spending
across birth cohorts in a way that is potentially related to health expenditures. In
addition, veteran status may directly interact with out-of-pocket expenditures
if veterans are covered by additional health insurance or health care through
the Department of Veterans Affairs. In Column 2 I regress retirement age on
Notch membership. In both samples the estimated coefficient is negative and
indicate the Notch cohorts retired between 0.2 and 0.3 younger but are not sta-
tistically significant. This is unsurprising given the findings of Krueger and
Pischke (1992) that income from the Notch did not affect labor supply trends.13
Finally, the positive estimates on health care expenditures indicate that uti-
13Despite the potential endogeneity I have attempted to estimate regressions using veteran
status and retirement age as controls. However, both are problematic. Veteran status has a high
non-response rate in my analysis sample which cuts the number of men in my sample from 8,901
to 4,263. Moreover, sample size aside the reported proportion veteran have only roughly the
correct trend when compared to Bedard and Deschenes (2003). Appendix Figures B.2 and B.3
graph the fraction of veterans in my sample and estimated by Bedard and Deschenes (2003). The
fraction of veterans in my sample is approximately 20 percentage points too low in 1915, rises
abruptly between 1923 and 1925, and then maintains an approximately constant level around
10-15 percentage points too high for the remainder of the birth cohorts. Bedard and Deschenes
(2003) find a rapid but constant rise between 1915 and 1920, a brief plateau until around 1927,
and then a staggered decrease in the fraction veteran. Including retirement age as a control is
problematic because, while there are many observations overall in the retirement age bins when
dividing the sample by those who retired before and after 65, this is not true for individual age
bins. Many individual age bins are collinear with the combination of the indicator for the Notch,
education level, and marital status/household type.
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lization of health care services increases in response to income. In Columns 4-11
I estimate the effect of Social Security income on a variety of measures of uti-
lization. Column 4 is the effect on the probability of any utilization, Columns
5-10 are the change in probability for specific services in the last 12 months,
and Column 11 is the number of prescriptions the household reports taking per
month.14 Many of these estimates are statistically insignificant, and in fact the
estimated effect of income on the probability of seeing a doctor in the last 12
months is marginally significant and negative. However, there are statistically
significant, positive estimates for the probability of staying in a nursing home,
getting dental services, and taking any prescriptions. These results are reassur-
ing because these are the elective care services that many elderly may not have
insurance coverage for and face higher out-of-pocket costs. Medicare does not
typically cover dental services or prescription drugs. Nursing home stays are
covered under Medicare Part A, but with more limitations than other services
such as hospital visits.15 The fact that increases in utilization are concentrated
in services for which the elderly likely have the highest out-of-pocket costs cor-
roborates the effects found for health care expenditures overall.
2.6 Discussion
In this paper, I exploited changes to Social Security rules that conferred a large,
unanticipated increase in benefits to particular birth cohorts to estimate how
variation in income affects expenditures on health care. In addition, I provide
14The number of prescriptions taken is only reported in the 1993 AHEAD wave.
15For more information on services covered by Medicare, see:
https://www.cms.gov/Outreach-and-Education/Medicare-Learning-Network-
MLN/MLNProducts/Downloads/Items-Services-Not-Covered-Under-Medicare-Text-
Only.pdf
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the first-ever estimates of the effect of income on health insurance coverage
among the elderly. I find that not only are health care expenditures highly elas-
tic for elderly households with less than a high school education, with elasticity
estimates ranging from 0.98 to 3.76, but also that these households increase the
number of insurance policies that they hold and have a consistent positive, al-
though statistically insignificant, increase in insurance premiums. These results
are corroborated by an increase in health care utilization in categories of ser-
vices for which the elderly would be expected to bear large out-of-pocket costs
despite the widespread availability of publicly subsidized health insurance, par-
ticularly dental services and prescription drugs.
These findings are narrow in the sense that they do not help resolve the
broader question of the extent to which rising incomes have driven the increase
in health care expenditures as a share of GDP. However, they do demonstrate
that, at least for some subgroups of the population, health care expenditures
can be highly elastic. There is insufficient publicly available data to estimate
per-enrollee Medicare expenditures for the population with less than a high
school education. However, as a back of the envelope calculation, between
1975 and 2015 total Medicare expenditures per enrollee increased by nearly 330
percent from just over $2, 600 per enrollee to nearly $11, 200.16 Over the same
period median household income (including net taxes and cash transfers) for
elderly households with a high school education or less increased nearly 70 per-
cent.17 Combined with the preferred elasticity estimate of 2.56 for low-education
16Author’s calculations using expenditure data from the National Health Expenditure Ac-
count Tables. Note that Medicare expenditures include administrative expenditures as well, not
just spending on enrollees, and thus this is the total program cost per enrollee. 1975 dollars
adjusted to 2015 using the CPI.
17Author’s calculations using the March Current Population Survey. I adjusted median in-
comes using the CPI. Median income of these households was $27, 259 in 1975 and $45, 632 in
2015.
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households excluding previously married women and assuming the 330 percent
increase in expenditures per enrollee was constant across enrollee characteris-
tics, rising incomes would increase health care expenditures among this group
by 170 percent, explaining just over half of the total increase. While household-
level income-elasticities are too small to explain the rising expenditures in the
general population, at least in low-education households rising incomes could
play a major role.
If rising incomes are driving the increase in expenditures among low-
education households this suggests that rising expenditures are welfare increas-
ing. However, the pattern of utilization in response to an income shock indicates
that there may still be justification for a policy response. In particular, low-
income elderly households that likely have poor health appear to spend a signif-
icant amount of their additional Social Security benefits on nursing homes, den-
tal services, and prescription drugs. As Medicare Part D now covers prescrip-
tion drugs policy makers considering expansions to Medicare services could fo-
cus on the prior two categories of services that retain high levels of out-of-pocket
costs. Conversely, Medicare cuts may place significant additional financial bur-
den on low-income elderly households.
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CHAPTER 3
INCOME GROWTH AND ITS DISTRIBUTION FROM EISENHOWER TO
OBAMA: THE GROWING IMPORTANCE OF IN-KIND TRANSFERS
INCLUDING MEDICAID AND MEDICARE (1959-2012)
3.1 Introduction
President Eisenhower held the first White House Conference on Aging in Jan-
uary 1961, at which health insurance for Social Security beneficiaries was pro-
posed. Five years later, a central feature of President Johnson’s Great Society
legislation, the Social Security Act of 1965, launched Medicare and Medicaid.1
Expenditures on these two programs—see Figure 1—grew from zero in 1959
to $5.9 billion in 1966 to $728.5 billion in 2012 (in 2012 dollars), exceeding the
combined 2012 expenditures on Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance
(OASDI) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI). Yet traditional measures of
the importance of government taxes and transfers on the after-tax income of
Americans do not include a value for in-kind transfers such as Medicare and
Medicaid.
The U.S. Congressional Budget Office (CBO) (Congressional Budget Office
2013), in 2012, was the first government agency to include the market value
of both government- and employer-provided health insurance in their compre-
hensive measure of income.2 Most recently Larrimore, Burkhauser, and Ar-
1See Andersen, Lion and Anderson (1976) and Moon (1993) for early histories of Medicare,
and Blumenthal, Davis, and Guterman (2015) for the most recent overview of this program. See
Gruber (2003) for a history of Medicaid.
2A small academic literature has begun to include the market value of health insurance in
its measures of income. See Burtless and Svaton, 2010; Burkhauser, Larrimore and Simon,
2013; Burtless and Milusheva, 2013; CBO, 2013; Sommers and Oellerich, 2013; and Armour,
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Figure 3.1: Yearly Aggregate Spending on Medi-
care/Medicaid and OASDI/SSI (in 2012 dollars).
Sources: Authors’ calculations using March CPS,
NHEA (CMS 2018), SSA 2011, and Social Se-
curity Administration Trust Fund Data (2014).
Notes: Public health insurance is the estimated total ex-
penditures of Medicare and Medicaid. These are calculated
from CPS-reported market values post-1979, and using admin-
istrative data pre-1979. OASDI is the sum of total expenditures
of the Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance and
Supplemental Security Income programs as reported by the
Social Security Administration.
mour (2015) used this same fuller measure of income for the period 1979-2012 to
demonstrate the effects of these resources on trends of income and its distribu-
tion. Here we use it to measure after-tax income (including the market value of
Medicare and Medicaid and other in-kind transfers) and its distribution across
American households further back to 1959—just before the major expansions of
government tax and transfer programs associated with the New Frontier and
Burkhauser, and Larrimore, 2014). But because this literature has been dependent on U.S. Cen-
sus Bureau measures of the market value of health insurance, its analyses only go back to 1979.
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Great Society programs of the 1960s.3
Although the March Current Population Survey (CPS) has been conducted
annually since income year 1967, the U.S. Census Bureau has only estimated the
market value of Medicare and Medicaid and linked these values to the CPS data
since 1979. Furthermore, the CPS contains little information on government in-
kind transfers more generally before then, a period well after the start of the
New Frontier and Great Society programs of the 1960s.
To overcome these data limitations, we use March CPS data (income years
1967-2012) and decennial Census data (decennial income years 1959-1989) to
create common yearly source of income categories, including estimates of the
market value of in-kind transfers, back to 1959. Hence our first contribution
to the literature is related to data development. We extend and make avail-
able for public use a market value of Medicare/Medicaid series for the CPS
from 1967 through 1978 that is consistent with the values produced by the Cen-
sus Bureau thereafter. We do the same for the Census Bureau market values
of employer-provided health insurance, although data limitations make our
employer-provided health insurance series less exact. Our paper is the first to
estimate the value of Medicare, Medicaid, and employer-provided health insur-
ance and include them in measures of income for the years prior to 1979. We
also include estimates for food stamps, housing subsidies, and the school lunch
program, although we are not the first to estimate these transfers (Fox et al.,
3Fox et al. (2015) estimate poverty rates in the United States back to 1967 using income
concepts from the Supplemental Poverty Measure (SPM). Hence they also subtract taxes from
gross income and include the market value of some in-kind transfers as resources and in their
threshold measures. However, the SPM ignores the market value of government- and employer-
provided health insurance in its measures of household resources and thresholds. Although the
SPM provides a consistent relationship between the resources counted as income and included
in the poverty threshold, it will fail to capture the growing importance of Medicare and Med-
icaid to Americans. Instead of treating the market value of health insurance as a resource, it
instead subtracts medical out-of-pocket expenses from total household resources.
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2015)
For our second contribution we create analogous series using the decennial
Census for the years 1960, 1970, 1980, and 1990 (income years 1959, 1969, 1979,
and 1989), and show that they yield similar values to those found using CPS
data for those years. This allows us to couple our decennial Census-based 1959
values to our CPS values from 1967-2012 to create common yearly source of in-
come categories including estimates of the market value of in-kind transfers,
back to decennial Census income year 1959. Reassuringly, we find that our CPS
and decennial Census year income levels and distributions are similar for com-
mon years. Third, we show how iteratively more comprehensive measures of
income and sharing units, up to including the market value of Medicare and
Medicaid, contribute to income trends and the evolution of the income distribu-
tion back to the initial creation of the major Great Society programs.
Substantively, we use these data to provide a fresh look at the twenty-year
period 1959 (the last business cycle peak year of the 1950s) to 1979 (the business
cycle peak year starting point of the modern survey-based literature on trends in
U. S. income and income inequality) that encompasses the start of New Frontier
and Great Society programs. We establish that after increasing substantially
from 1959 to 1969, median market income (wages, interest, dividends, rents,
etc.) fell from 1969 to 1979 and market income inequality increased. But we also
show that concurrent increases in government taxes and transfers when more
fully measured to include the market value of Medicare and Medicaid and other
in-kind transfers resulted in increases in median income over the entire period
and a decline in income inequality.
Using all the years of our data from business cycle peak year 1959 to busi-
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ness cycle peak year 2007—and for completeness from 1959-2012—we show that
when fully measured, growth in government taxes and transfers has offset the
substantial decline in the growth of market income for those in the bottom half
of the income distribution since business cycle peak year 1969. We conclude
that conventional measures of median income and income inequality that ex-
clude the market value of in-kind transfers including Medicare and Medicaid
will substantially understate the success of government policies in offsetting
the stagnation of median market income growth and the rise in market income
inequality since 1969.4
3.2 Data and Methods
Drawing on previous work, we use the public-use March CPS data to construct
estimates of household income building on income series from Armour et al.
(2014), and supplemented with cell-means from Larrimore et al. (2008), to ad-
dress top-coding of high sources of income in households. With these data, we
extend the CPS household income series created in Larrimore et al. (2015) back
to 1959—the last business cycle peak year before major increases in government
transfers related to both the maturing of Social Security (OASDI) and the launch
of Great Society programs in the 1960s. Most especially, we capture, for the first
time, the importance of in-kind transfers including the market income of Medi-
care and Medicaid on measures of income and its distribution over this period.
4We define a business cycle peak year as the peak in our median market income of tax unit
series since it is capturing market income. These years usually correspond to the last full year of
macroeconomic growth as defined by the NBER and identified in our figures but are the second
to last full year of macroeconomic growth before the recessions of early 1990s and 2000s. This
measure is similar to that used by Armour, Burkhauser, and Larrimore (2014) and Daly and
Valletta (2006). Our findings are not sensitive to using the last full year before a recession in all
cases.
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As with previous work, we address the known break in CPS data between years
1992 and 1993 resulting from a change in Census Bureau data-collection meth-
ods using the same method: upwardly adjusting series for earlier years to gen-
erate a complete series with no change between 1992 and 1993 (see Atkinson,
Piketty, and Saez, 2011; Burkhauser et al., 2012a; and Armour et al., 2014).
The modern CPS series begins in 1968 (income year 1967). We use these
data to estimate market income of tax units back to 1967, utilizing methods that
are consistent with those in the tax-record-based inequality literature as well
as three alternative estimates of income using methods that are consistent with
those in the household-survey-based literature.5 Because many major Great So-
ciety programs began before 1967, most especially Medicare and Medicaid, this
is not an ideal year to begin a study of the importance of government taxes
and transfers on household income. Furthermore, to separate trends in income
growth from variations introduced by business cycles, previous studies have
compared peak years in the business cycle (Burkhauser et al., 2012a; DeNavas-
Walt et al., 2013; Armour et al., 2014). Since 1967 is not a peak year in the busi-
ness cycle, the earliest year in a series beginning in 1967 that we can consistently
compare with subsequent peak years is 1969.
For these reasons we create a second set of income series using the decen-
nial Census of 1960. This corresponds to income year 1959, which is a peak
year in the business cycle. Thus, we can make comparisons between peak years
1959 and 1969 and thereby capture the importance of Medicare, Medicaid, and
other in-kind transfers during the 1960s. To establish that the Census-based data
5We extend our CPS series back to 1967 rather than to 1965 or earlier even though CPS data
does exist for some of these years. We do so because sample sizes are smaller and because
income questions in these years are considerably less detailed. This makes it more difficult to
establish income categories consistent with those beginning in 1967.
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points in 1959 can reasonably be combined with those of our CPS income series,
we repeat the process for the 1970, 1980, and 1990 decennial Censuses that can
be directly compared to data for the same year in the CPS. Below we briefly
describe these four alternative measures of income. We more fully discuss the
details of our sources of income imputations in these series in the Appendix.6
3.2.1 Market Income of Tax Units
A major new international literature based on data from administrative tax
records of rich countries traces the share of income held by the very top part
of the income distribution of these countries back to the early part of the 20th
century. But, for the United States, this literature’s measure of income is lim-
ited to taxable market income (wages, interest, dividends, etc.) of tax units. See
Atkinson et al. (2011) for a review of this international literature and Piketty
and Saez (2003) for the first effort to measure top income shares in this way for
the United States.
We follow Piketty and Saez (2003) and define market income to include
gross income from wages and salaries, farm income, self-employment and busi-
ness income, retirement income from pensions, dividends, interest, rent, and
alimony. These sources of income are summed across individuals in a tax unit
within each CPS household, without adjusting for number of persons in a tax
unit. Our unit of analysis, therefore, is the tax unit.
6We also develop labor earnings of tax unit series. We use this measure as an additional check
on the comparability of our decennial Census and CPS series. We do this because the decennial
Census and CPS ask similar questions with respect to wage earnings of tax units. This is not
the case with respect to the market income of tax units, necessitating some imputation (see the
Appendix for details). Wage earnings include: income from wages and salaries, farm income,
and self-employment and business income.
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While some of these separate sources of income are combined in earlier CPS
years, each is included in some CPS question back to 1967. Some of these
sources of income are not specifically included as decennial Census questions.
In particular, in earlier years, retirement and pension income, dividends, in-
terest, rent, and alimony are grouped as “other” income, a category that also
includes some non-market sources of income such as OASDI. Some of these
sources are covered separately in later years while other sources continue to be
grouped as “other” income. As a result, imputation of these sources varies, both
across decennial Census and CPS surveys and over time within the decennial
Census. Tax units are not explicitly defined in the CPS or the decennial Census,
and so we assign tax units using the same assumptions from Piketty and Saez
(2003). Single individuals over 20, married couples, and divorced or widowed
individuals are assigned to separate tax units. Never-married children under 20
are assigned as dependents to their parent, guardian, or a households primary
family. See the Appendix for details.
3.2.2 Household Size-Adjusted Pre-Tax Post-Transfer Income
of Persons
Household size-adjusted pre-tax post-transfer income of persons expands the
sharing unit from the tax unit to the household and adds in-cash social insur-
ance and welfare income to the market income definition, but it does not include
income from tax-credits, in-kind transfers, or the value of health insurance. We
include OASDI, SSI, unemployment insurance/workers compensation, veter-
ans’ payments, and cash payments from programs such as AFDC/TANF. The
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Census Bureau in their annual report on income has used these sources of in-
come since the 1970s. (See: Fontenot et al., 2018, for the most recent version
of this report.) Consistent with the survey-based literature, our unit of analy-
sis is the person. We adjust this measure’s household income using the square
root of the number of people in the household and assume equal sharing across
household members. This size adjustment is common in U.S. and interna-
tional research studies of median income trends and inequality (for example,
see Ruggles, 1990; Gottschalk and Smeeding, 1997; Atkinson and Brandolini,
2001; d’Ercole and Fo¨rster, 2012).
As with market income, the income categories covering these income
sources are less granular in earlier CPS surveys. However, while aggregated,
the various categories are still covered by some questions in the CPS back to
1967. This is also the case with respect to the decennial Census. Therefore,
unlike our measure of market income, it is not necessary for us to impute any
decennial Census income sources to align them with the CPS for this measure
of income. The reason is that while the different income categories are grouped
by survey questions, the groups all align with the income sources included as
pre-tax post-transfer income. For example, retirement, investment, and public
assistance income are all grouped under a single question in the 1960 decennial
Census. This mixes market sources of income with government transfers, but
all three sources of income are included in a pre-tax post-transfer measure of
income. This is likely our most comparable income series since it requires no
income source or tax unit imputations.
120
3.2.3 Household Size-Adjusted Post-Tax Post-Transfer plus In-
Kind Transfer Income of Persons
Post-tax post-transfer plus in-kind transfer income includes changes in income
due to the tax system, and three sources of in-kind transfers: food stamps
(SNAP since 1996), school lunches, and housing subsidies. We calculate tax
credits and liabilities back to 1977 using NBER Taxsim 9.3. Estimates of the mar-
ket value of these major government in-kind transfers programs—food stamps,
school lunches, and housing subsidies—going to households are provided by
the Census Bureau in the CPS beginning in 1979. For food stamps, school
lunches, and housing subsidies we follow Fox et al. (2015) to impute receipt
and benefit amounts using the predicted probability of receipt and adminis-
trative data on the total number of recipients and program expenditures. We
discuss the details of how we extend these tax and in-kind series back to 1967
in the Appendix. We are not able to include a market value for these in-kind
transfers in our decennial Census series, because the Census Bureau provides
neither estimates of receipt nor the value of in-kind transfers for its decennial
Census.
3.2.4 Household Size-Adjusted Post-Tax Post-Transfer plus In-
Kind Transfer Income plus Health Insurance of Persons
In constructing this fourth measure, we note that in-kind benefits in the form
of health insurance, like all other in-kind benefits, have value to individuals—
otherwise employees would negotiate higher wages in exchange for foregoing
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health insurance and government actors would have a strong incentive to re-
place Medicaid and Medicare benefits with cash transfer programs or lower
taxes. Measures that exclude the value of health insurance as a resource under-
value its worth by effectively placing a zero value on access to this resource.
This exclusion understates not only the level of household resources but also
their trend, as the cost of health insurance purchased in the marketplace (its
market value) has increased in both absolute terms and as a share of wage com-
pensation; it has also increased as a share of all government transfers to house-
holds.
Following the approach of Burkhauser, Larrimore, and Simon (2012b) and
the CBO (2012, 2013), we include the market value of health insurance in this
measure of income back to 1979 based on the Census Bureau’s imputed value
of health insurance, although we use the full market value rather than just its
fungible value. The Census Bureau imputes the value of employer-sponsored
health insurance by first determining whether the individual is covered by an
employer-sponsored plan and whether the employer paid for all, part, or none
of the plan premium. Next, persons in the March CPS are statistically matched
to persons in the National Medical Care Expenditure Survey or Medical Expen-
diture Panel Survey (depending on survey year) based on several demographic
characteristics to impute the cash value of employer contributions. The Census
Bureau uses this imputed value as its measure of the market value of employer-
provided health insurance for covered workers. Individual expenditures on
employer-sponsored health insurance plan premiums or expenditures on small-
group/individual market health plans come from other income sources and are
not included as income.
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For government-subsidized health insurance (Medicare and Medicaid), the
Census Bureau determines, by state and risk class back to 1979, the average
government cost of providing Medicare and Medicaid to those persons report-
ing that they have this insurance. The two risk classes for Medicare are aged
and disabled. The four risk classes for Medicaid are aged, blind and disabled,
nondisabled children (less than 21), and nondisabled adults (21-64).7 Thus, the
imputed average cost of government-provided health insurance varies by state
and by the government insurance pool from which it is accessed by beneficia-
ries.
In determining the value of Medicaid and Medicare, for individuals who
qualify for both programs (dual eligible), we follow the Census Bureau’s ap-
proach and estimate the value of their health insurance as the combined cost
of insurance from each program. CBO (2012), Armour et al. (2014), and
Burkhauser et al. (2017b) do the same. This assumes that the total value of the
insurance dual-eligible individuals receive is not only greater to them than the
value for those insured under only one of these programs, but is greater by the
average cost of the other program. This may overstate this value to the degree
that there is overlap in coverage. But it might understate it to the degree that
dual-eligible individuals have higher than average medical expenses relative to
those who are only covered by one program. So this value still may be less than
the cost dual-eligible individuals incur if they purchase equivalent insurance in
7The Medicare and Medicaid risk classes reflect the channel through which benefits were
accessed. The Medicare risk class “aged” applies to all persons on Medicare aged 65 or older.
The Medicare risk class “disabled” applies to all persons accessing Medicare benefits through
the SSDI program. The Medicaid risk class “children” applies to children accessing Medicaid
benefits through either traditional Medicaid or a state’s Children’s Health Insurance Program
(CHIP). The Medicaid risk class “adults” applies to all adults under the age of 65 accessing Med-
icaid benefits. The Medicaid risk class “aged” applies to all persons accessing Medicaid aged
65 or older. Lastly, the Medicaid risk class “disable” applies to all persons accessing Medicaid
benefits due to their qualification for SSI benefits. (See Burkhauser, Larrimore and Lyons (2017)
for a more complete discussion of this issue.)
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the market.8
Prior to 1979, the CPS contains no information on the value of health insur-
ance benefits, and no direct information on coverage of health insurance from
any source. Thus, to calculate income under this definition we must impute
both receipt and market value of insurance from all three sources: Medicaid,
Medicare, and employer-provided health insurance. See the Appendix for de-
tails on this procedure.
By including health insurance as a source of income we implicitly assume
that recipients value these resources at their full market value. This is contro-
versial as health insurance is not a fungible resource and recipients may value
health insurance at much less than its market value (Finkelstein et al., 2018).
However, excluding the value of health insurance implicitly assumes that these
resources do not make recipients better off. Thus, our final two comprehensive
measures may be viewed as lower- and upper-bounds on income. Any inter-
mediate valuation of health insurance would lead to an estimate between these
two measures.
8With the implementation of the Affordable Care Act of 2010, this may no longer be the case,
since insurance companies, beginning January 1, 2014, are no longer permitted to adjust their
premiums based on pre-existing conditions. However, for the years included in this study insur-
ers could deny insurance to those with pre-existing conditions and/or charge such individuals
higher premiums. (See Burkhauser et al. (2017b) for a more complete discussion of this issue.)
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3.3 Results
3.3.1 Trends in Median Income
The earliest starting point for CPS-based income measures that include both in-
kind transfers and taxes is 1979, as this is the first year that the Census Bureau
provides measures of in-kind transfers. As can be seen in Figure 2, using our
estimates of in-kind transfers and taxes allows us to extend these income series
to 1967 using CPS data, and to 1959 using decennial Census data.
Using 1979 as a base year and adjusting for inflation, Figure 2 first repli-
cates the trends found by Armour et al. (2014) for 1979-2007 for the three most
studied measures of income: a Piketty and Saez measure of the market in-
come of tax units (series 1), a measure of household size-adjusted pre-tax post-
transfer income of persons found in most early studies of income inequality
using CPS data (series 2), and a measure of household size-adjusted post-tax
post-transfer income of persons including in-kind transfers (excluding health
insurance) found in more recent studies of income inequality (series 3). For the
post-tax post-transfer plus in-kind transfers series, we assume that there are no
in-kind transfers in 1959.9 Our gray bars indicate official NBER recession years.
9This is only approximately correct. While the Food Stamp Act of 1964 launched the food
stamps program, there was a pilot program from 1961-1964. Housing benefits began with the
Housing Act of 1937, but benefits were small prior to the Department of Housing and Urban
Development Act of 1965. For instance, total outlays were $77 million in 1959, rose to $313 mil-
lion in 1966, and to over $1 billion by 1970 in 2012 dollars (See OMB 2016). Likewise, the school
lunch program began in 1946 and was expanded and modified several times in the 1960s. The
National School Lunch Program (NSLP) is somewhat larger, with expenditures of $225.8 mil-
lion in 1960 and $565.5 million in 1970 (USDA 2013). The relatively small size of the benefits in
these programs suggests attempting to estimate their exact value in 1959 would only minimally
impact our estimates. For our primary programs of interest, a predecessor program to Medicaid
(Kerr-Mills) began in 1961, but there were otherwise no Medicaid or Medicare benefits in 1959.
By 1967, the first year for which we have CPS estimates, the programs’ combined expenditures
were over $8 billion in 2012 dollars.
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Figure 3.2: Alternative Measures of Median Income
Normalized to 1979 Levels (1959-2012).
Sources: Authors’ calculations using the March CPS,
NHEA, White House Budget Historical Tables, Statistical
Abstracts of the U.S., Census Bureau population estimates
and poverty thresholds, USDA Child Nutrition Tables,
and 1972-1973 CEX. Taxes calculated using NBER TaxSim.
Notes: Median income trends normalized to one in 1979 with
NBER recession dates in gray. In keeping with previous work
(Armour et al., 2014; Burkhauser et al., 2012b; Larrimore et
al., 2015), “1: Tax Unit Income” measures the size-unadjusted
income of tax units. Series 2-6 are size-adjusted using the
square-root of household size. To account for a change in
CPS survey methods, it is assumed that all change in income
between these years was due to the change in survey methods,
and prior years are adjusted accordingly. As we do not have
estimates for the value of employer-provided health insurance
in 1959, we begin the last measure in 1967. See Appendix
Figure 4 for series extended through 2016.
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Over the period 1979-2012 that previous survey-based studies have focused
on median market income of tax units is quite sensitive to the booms and busts
of business cycles. However, with the exception of the 1990s business cycle,
when it increased between peak years 1989 and 1999, median market income
of tax units trended downward and has fallen precipitously since 2007. In 2012
it was nearly 14 percent below its 1979 peak. See Appendix Figure 4 for series
extended through 2016.
In contrast, the median household size-adjusted pre-tax post-transfer in-
come of persons rose over the 1980s and 1990s business cycles and remained
at about the same level during the 2000s business cycle, which ended in 2007.
While it fell over the Great Recession and its aftermath, it was still more than 14
percent above peak year 1979 in 2012.
When government taxes and in-kind transfers are considered, the down-
ward trend in median market income is further offset. Median income increases
in all three business cycles and, while it also fell over the Great Recession and
its aftermath, it was still 20 percent above peak year 1979 in 2012.
When we add Census Bureau estimates of Medicare and Medicaid to this
measure of income, median income increases even more over the three com-
plete business cycles since 1979, and falls only slightly over the Great Recession
and its aftermath. When Medicare is added (series 4) median income is still 25
percent higher in 2012 than in 1979. When Medicaid is added (series 5) median
income is 28 percent higher in 2012 than in 1979.
When we add Census Bureau estimates of employer-provided health insur-
ance (series 6) there is little change in median income relative to our previous
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measure. Median income increases over all three business cycles and is 28 per-
cent higher in 2012 than in 1979. Note that in our comparison of trends in the
income of the median person using these alternative measures of income, that
median person will vary.
But how does our understanding of the start of this decline in median market
income and its offset via government taxes and transfers change when we use
our new estimates of taxes and in-kind transfers to extend our survey-based
measures of median income back to 1959?
Between business cycle peak years 1959 and 1969, median market income of
tax units rose from 78.6 to 102.9 percent of its 1979 business cycle level. But peak-
to-peak business cycle 1959-1969 would prove to be the last with substantial
secular growth in median market income. Business cycle peak year 1973 only
barely reached its 1969 counterpart (103.0) and median market income would
not exceed its 1969 level again until 1998 and has been below its 1969 level since
2002. Hence, the secular decline in median market income of tax units found
in studies beginning in 1979, and therefore first observed over the two peak
years of the 1980s business cycle, was in fact an extension of a secular decline
beginning in 1969.
Like market income, median household size-adjusted pre-tax post-transfer
income of persons also grew between business cycle peak years 1959 and 1969—
from 62.9 to 84.6 percent of its 1979 business cycle level. But unlike market in-
come of tax units, median household size-adjusted pre-tax post-transfer income
of persons continued to grow during the 1970s business cycle, reaching its then
all-time high in 1979 (100 percent, as this is our index year).
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Our disposable income measures that subtract government tax and add gov-
ernment in-kind transfers by assumption are all at the same level in 1959, since
we assume there were no in-kind transfers in 1959 and we only begin to record
them in 1967. But they will vary somewhat in Figure 2 since we are normalizing
all of their yearly levels to what they were in 1979 and the levels of these three
income measures did vary in 1979 but have been normalized to 100.0. Nonethe-
less, Figure 2 shows that they all grew faster than median market income since
they are all at a lower level in 1959 relative to 1979 than is median market in-
come. Like median pre-tax, post-transfer income, 1979 was also an all-time high
for each of these disposable income measures. This suggests that while the ma-
jority of growth in these measures of income between 1959 and 1969 was driven
by the large increase in median market income, the growth in the size of gov-
ernment taxes and transfers for the median American began to offset the secular
declines in median market income in the 1970s.10
Hence, a measure of income that focuses solely on market income of tax
units, as a measure of the resources available to the median American from 1959
to 2012, will dramatically understate how these resources have changed over
that period. The growth in the redistribution of market income via government
tax and transfer policies dating back to the Great Society has not only mitigated
the cyclical decline in median market income during recessions but has, more
importantly, mitigated the secular stagnation of median market income since
1969.
10Just as the market value of Medicare and Medicaid should be included in measures of in-
come, so too should the value of employer-provided health insurance. But we do not do so in
our analysis of income between 1959 and 1969. Unlike the case for Medicare and Medicaid in
which their value was zero in 1959, we suspect that the value of employer-provided health in-
surance was non-trivial. But we have not been able to find a plausible way to capture that value
in the aggregate and assign it to our 1959 population in the decennial Census. We have however
done so beginning in 1967 for our CPS population and will discuss those results in more detail
in the Appendix.
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3.3.2 Trends in Income Across the Distribution
The importance of taxes and transfers over this entire period can be seen in more
detail in Table 1. Row 1 (Panel A) reports cumulative median income growth,
controlling for inflation, for the entire period of our data from 1959 through 2012
for each of our income definitions based on values underlying Figure 2.
Table 3.1: Income Growth using Alternative Measures of Income by Quin-
tiles for Alternative Time Periods
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Table 1. Income Growth using Alternative Measures of Income by Quintiles for alternative 
time periods 
  
Market 
Income of 
Tax Unit  
Household 
Size-Adjusted 
Pre-tax  
Post-transfer 
income 
Household Size-Adjusted Post-tax Post-transfer 
Income plus 
in-kind income 
Income plus 
in-kind 
income and 
Medicare 
Income plus 
in-kind 
income and 
Medicare/ 
Medicaid 
 
Panel A: 
1959-2012      
Median 10.5% 81.8% 82.0% 97.9% 106.0% 
Q1 -45.7% 75.2% 116.2% 148.0% 195.4% 
Q2 3.4% 65.7% 75.1% 96.2% 112.5% 
Q3 12.4% 82.1% 82.5% 97.7% 105.6% 
Q4 40.5% 98.9% 90.8% 100.7% 104.3% 
Q5 93.8% 128.3% 105.4% 110.8% 111.9% 
Top 5% 116.0% 151.2% 123.6% 127.1% 127.6% 
 
Panel B: 
1959-2007      
Median 30.1% 96.7% 92.2% 100.1% 106.0% 
Q1 15.3% 100.3% 128.9% 156.0% 196.4% 
Q2 41.5% 83.3% 85.9% 100.0% 112.5% 
Q3 31.0% 96.3% 91.9% 100.2% 106.2% 
Q4 54.5% 109.3% 97.1% 101.9% 104.6% 
Q5 105.6% 133.1% 107.6% 110.4% 111.3% 
Top 5% 127.7% 150.5% 121.6% 123.5% 124.0% 
Sources: Authors’ calculations using the March CPS, NHEA, White House Budget Historical Tables, 
Statistical Abstracts of the United States, Census Bureau population estimates and poverty thresholds, 
USDA Child Nutrition Tables, and 1972-1973 CEX. Taxes calculated using NBER TaxSim. 
Notes: Series covers 1959-2012. 1959 and 2007 are earliest and latest business-cycle peak years, 
respectively.  
Sources: Authors’ calculations using the March CPS, NHEA, White House Budget Historical Tables, Statistical Abstracts
of he United States, Census Bureau population estimates and verty thresholds, USDA Child Nutrition Tables, and
1972-1973 CEX. Taxes calcul ted usi g NBER TaxSim.
Notes: Series covers 1959-2012. 1959 and 2007 are earliest and latest business-cycle peak years, respectively.
In the rest of the rows, it shows how cumulative income growth has varied
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over the entire income distribution. It does so by estimating cumulative mean
income growth for each quintile and the top 5%, for each of our income defi-
nitions. However, since 2012 is not a peak year in a business cycle, and thus
the interpretation for income growth ending in that non-peak year also con-
tains cyclical effects (the cyclical effects of the Great Recession and its aftermath
between 2007 and 2012), we will primarily focus on trends in income growth be-
tween business cycle peak years 1959 through 2007. Those values are reported
in Table 1 (Panel B). Note that the quintile composition is not constant across
measures—that is, persons may switch quintiles for different measures of in-
come.
As was the case in Figure 2, the first column in Table 1 presents the growth
in cash-market income of tax units and is not size-adjusted. The remaining four
columns use the household as the sharing unit and the person as the unit of
analysis. First-column results in Table 1 (Panel A) are consistent with those of
Piketty and Saez (2003) and Atkinson et al. (2011). When focusing solely on
market income in Panel A, the rich get richer, the poor get poorer, and median
income has been stagnant since 1959. Mean income increased among the top
5% of tax units by 116 percent between 1959 and 2012 while declining by 45.7
percent for those in the bottom quintile and increasing by only 12.4 percent for
those in the middle quintile (this value is close to the 10.5 percent growth found
in the first-column of Panel A that reports the median value from the entire
distribution rather than mean growth of the middle quintile based on values
reported in Figure 2).
Part of the slow growth captured between these years is the result of com-
paring a peak year, 1959, with 2012—a year median income had only begun
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to recover from the Great Recession and its aftermath, regardless of how it is
measured. Growth rates for all quintiles are higher when peak year 1959 is
compared with peak year 2007, as can be seen in Panel B. But the discrepancy
in growth is still dramatic across the distribution. While now even the lowest
quintile has positive growth in market income, it is quite small over this 48-year
period, as is the growth in the middle quintile.
But as we change our measure of income across the remaining columns in
Panels A and B to those used in the standard survey-based income and income
inequality literatures, the growth in median income and in the mean value of
all quintiles increases. Median value increases from 30.1 percent in Panel B to
96.7 percent (the next column) when other cash income including government
transfers are added to market income and the sharing unit is expanded to the
household from the tax unit, and the unit of analysis is the person rather than
the tax unit, and income is adjusted to account for the number of people in the
household. When taxes are subtracted from income and in-kind transfers (but
not the value of Medicare and Medicaid) are included, the growth in median in-
come is approximately the same (92.2 percent). But when the value of Medicare
and then both Medicare and Medicare are considered (the next two columns),
median income increases to 100.1 and 106.0 percent.
The pattern of increased growth as government taxes and transfers are
added to market income is the same for all quintiles but to different degrees.
For the bottom quintile income growth increases from 15.3 percent to 100.3 per-
cent when looking at pre-tax post-transfer income—an increase greater than that
found in the next two higher quintiles. When taxes and in-kind transfers (but
not Medicare or Medicaid) are included, income growth in the bottom quin-
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tile increases to 128.9 percent—an increase greater than that found in all other
quintiles and the top 5%. The growth rate rises to 156.0 percent when the mar-
ket value of Medicare (which was zero in 1959) is included and 196.4 percent
when the market value of Medicaid is included. Hence, standard measures of
disposable income that exclude the market value of Medicare and Medicaid, as
reported in column 3, substantially understate the growth in real income across
the entire distribution but especially in the bottom quintile. While public insur-
ance had little effect on median income as shown in Figure 2, it is much more
important for the bottom of the income distribution as this is where most recip-
ients are concentrated, particularly for Medicaid.
3.3.3 A Closer Look at Income Growth from 1959 to 1979
In Table 2, rather than focusing on 1959 through 2007, we now, for the first time,
use the methods developed for Table 1 to focus on how alternative measure of
income affect measured growth from 1959 to 1969 and from 1959 to 1979.
As can be seen in Panel A, cumulative secular market income growth be-
tween business cycle peak years 1959 and 1969 is dramatically different from all
subsequent business cycles. Not only does cumulative median market income
of tax units increase by 30.9 percent but mean growth in the bottom quintile is
higher than in all other quintiles as well as in the top 5%.11 Although growth
in median income increases from 30.9 to 42.8 percent as we add government
transfers (including Medicare and Medicaid) and subtract taxes, growth in the
bottom quintile rises even more, from 47.3 percent to 113.7 percent. And while
11Median market income fell or was stagnant over all subsequent business cycles with the
exception of 1989-1999. However cumulative growth over that 10-year period was only 7.9
percent—less than 1/3 of cumulative growth between 1959-1969.
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Table 3.2: Income Growth using Alternative Measures of Income by Quin-
tiles for Alternative Time Periods
38	
	
Table 2. Income Growth using Alternative Measures of Income by Quintiles for alternative 
time periods 
  
Market Income 
of Tax Unit  
Household 
Size-Adjusted 
Pre-tax  
post-transfer 
income 
Household Size-Adjusted Post-tax Post-transfer 
Income plus 
in-kind income 
Income plus 
in-kind 
income and 
Medicare 
Income plus 
in-kind 
income and 
Medicare/ 
Medicaid 
Panel A: 
1959-1969      
Median 30.9% 34.6% 38.6% 41.6% 42.8% 
Q1 47.3% 66.9% 80.8% 98.4% 113.7% 
Q2 38.7% 38.6% 45.2% 50.5% 54.3% 
Q3 31.8% 34.8% 38.2% 41.3% 42.7% 
Q4 34.5% 34.0% 34.1% 36.6% 37.3% 
Q5 39.2% 35.3% 29.7% 31.3% 31.6% 
Top 5% 44.3% 39.5% 30.1% 31.2% 31.3% 
Panel B: 
1959-1979      
Median 27.2% 59.1% 51.7% 54.5% 55.4% 
Q1 50.2% 82.2% 98.8% 109.8% 126.1% 
Q2 39.3% 58.5% 54.9% 59.6% 63.3% 
Q3 28.0% 59.8% 51.1% 53.6% 54.9% 
Q4 41.0% 62.0% 47.5% 49.0% 49.7% 
Q5 57.3% 64.1% 37.9% 38.7% 38.9% 
Top 5% 66.6% 68.4% 33.7% 34.1% 34.2% 
Panel C: 
GINI      
1959 0.516 0.387 0.360 0.360 0.360 
1969 0.498 0.370 0.321 0.312 0.304 
1973 0.511 0.370 0.317 0.308 0.298 
1979 0.530 0.384 0.316 0.310 0.302 
2007 0.557 0.430 0.370 0.356 0.338 
2012 0.580 0.439 0.371 0.354 0.334 
Sources: Authors’ calculations using the March CPS, NHEA, White House Budget Historical Tables, 
Statistical Abstracts of the United States, Census Bureau population estimates and poverty thresholds, 
USDA Child Nutrition Tables, and 1972-1973 CEX. Taxes calculated using NBER TaxSim. 
Notes: We break up growth across periods by intervals for business cycle peaks in 1959-1969, as well as 
growth over the entire early period 1959-1979. Gini values are for all business cycle peaks. 
Sources: Authors’ cal ulations using the March CPS, NHEA, White Hous Budg t Historical Tables, Statistical Abstracts
of the United States, Census Bureau population estimates and poverty thresholds, USDA Child Nutrition Tables, and
1972-1973 CEX. Taxes calculated using NBER TaxSim.
Notes: We break up growth across periods by intervals for business cycle peaks in 1959-1969, as well as growth over the
entire early period 1959-1979. Gini values are for all business cycle peaks.
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market income growth among the top 5% is next highest when only the market
income of tax units is considered, once taxes and transfers are considered top
5% growth is the lowest of all groups.
Subsequent growth over the two business cycles of the 1970s was much
lower across all measures of income and across the entire income distribution.
Table 2 Panel B reports cumulative growth from business cycle year peak 1959
to business cycle peak year 1979. Except for median market income (and mean
market income growth in the middle quintile) cumulative growth between 1959
and 1979 is greater than between 1959 and 1969 across all five of our income
measures.
But the great majority of that growth occurred between 1959 and 1969. The
dramatic 47.3 percent increase in the market income of the bottom quintile be-
tween 1959 and 1969 only increases to 50.2 percent over the total period 1959 to
1979. Market income growth is similarly anemic in the second quintile and is
lower in 1979 than in 1969 in the middle quintile. In contrast, the top 5% now
registers the highest growth in market income between 1959 and 1979, and the
top quintile’s market income growth rates is also now greater than the bottom
quintile’s growth rates over that period. Because the importance of govern-
ment taxes and transfers continues to increase in the 1970s, overall cumulative
growth rates in the other income categories are uniformly higher—but again,
most of that growth occurs in the 1960s rather than the 1970s.12
12As discussed in the Appendix, between 1959 and 1979 our most precisely measured con-
cept of income is post-tax post-transfer income since the CPS and the decennial Census were
designed to capture this measure of income. All our other income measures require some esti-
mation on our part. Hence we were faced with a trade-off between more precisely measuring a
poorer concept of income or accepting a more imprecise measure of a better concept of income.
But this trade-off of greater imprecision for a better conceptual measure of income especially
shows up in our measure of the income of the bottom quintile. This is the case because in 1959
household size-adjusted post-tax post-transfer income for persons in the bottom quintile was
only $4,642 (in 2012 dollars). Such a low base means moderate changes can lead to substan-
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This pattern of differential income growth across the distribution is captured
in Table 2 (Panel C), which shows how Gini values change over each of the four
business cycle peak years from 1959 to 1979 for each of our income measures,
and then for business cycle peak year 2007 and for 2012. For all five business
cycle peak years and for 2012, Gini values are highest (most unequal) for market
income of tax units and fall as we increasingly take into account government
taxes and transfers. This is reassuring since one of the goals of government tax
and transfer policy is to transfer market income from higher income household
to lower income households, and this occurred in all years. But what our new
data now show is how Gini value trends have changed across each of these
income measures since 1959. The Gini value for the market income of tax units
was 0.516 in 1959 and fell in 1969 to 0.498. But the decline in median market
income between 1969 and 1979 (seen in Figure 2) together with the growth in
market income at the top of the distribution resulted in a substantial increase
in the Gini value in 1979 to 0.530—a value in excess of its value in 1959. Gini
values subsequently increased to 0.557 in 2007 and to 0.580 in 2012.
The Gini pattern for pre-tax post transfer income is similar but the growth in
government in-cash programs during the 1970s offset to some degree the rise in
market income inequality observed for tax units. Gini values decline between
1959 and 1969 and rise over the 1970s. But the Gini value in 1979 is still below
its 1959 value—0.384 vs. 0.387. However, by 2007 it had risen to 0.430 and by
2012 to 0.439.
But this comparison of how government in-cash programs offset rising in-
equality in market income misses the importance of tax policy (disposable in-
tial growth. Furthermore, in measuring the cumulative effect of all the Great Society programs
and in-kind transfers we assume that these program values were zero in 1959 (see footnote 10
above).
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come) and the increasing importance of in-kind transfers in further reducing
income inequality. When we include these two sources of income in column 3,
the rise in market income inequality over the 1970s is now shown to be com-
pletely offset by tax and transfer policies. In 1959 the Gini value of this measure
of income was 0.360—a value not much different from the 0.387 for pre-tax post-
transfer income. But unlike our pre-tax post-transfer measure, the Gini value for
our disposable income plus in-kind transfer measure of income not only falls to
0.321 in 1969 but continues to fall to 0.316 in 1979, despite the rise in market
income inequality. Nonetheless, the Gini value of this measure of income has
subsequently increased to 0.370 in 2007 and to 0.371 in 2012. Hence while this
more appropriate measure of the after-tax resources available to Americans is
substantially more equal than is a Gini value based on post-tax post-transfer in-
come and that difference has grown dramatically since 1959, it still suggests that
government tax and transfer policies have not been able to offset the substantial
increase in market income inequality since 1959.
We now turn to the importance of including the market value of Medicare
and Medicaid in measures of median income and income inequality, because,
as illustrated in Figure 1, expenditures on these two programs have been grow-
ing over time and now exceed OASDI and SSI expenditures. In 1959 neither
Medicare nor Medicaid existed so income inequality including their market in-
come value was the same as in our previous disposable income measure—a
Gini value of 0.360. Adding the market value of Medicare (column 4) and then
Medicaid (column 5) further offsets the rise in market income inequality in the
1970s. Despite the increase in market income inequality between 1969 and 1979,
the income inequality of Americans not only fell between 1959 and 1969 (from
0.360 to 0.304) but also continued to fall between 1969 and 1979—from 0.304
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to 0.302—once Medicare and Medicaid are included. More importantly, while
inequality using this measure of income has also risen as market income in-
equality has risen, its Gini value was 0.338 in 2007 and 0.334 in 2012, still well
below 1959 levels.13
Our combined results are largely consistent with the findings of Moffitt
(2015) who focuses on government spending on welfare programs. He found
significant growth in the early 1970s, slow growth in the late 1970s to the mid-
1980s, and higher growth from the late 1980s onward. Our findings show that
these are roughly the periods during which in-kind transfers including Medi-
care and Medicaid (which he does include in his analysis), largely mitigated
income inequality in market income.
3.3.4 The Relationship between Mean and Median Income
since 1959
A new literature has developed that has attempted to capture the long term
relationship between aggregate measures of growth using National Accounts
data—e.g., per capita Gross Domestic Product—and the real income of the me-
dian person (median real GDP) since it is argued to be a more appropriate mea-
sure of the resources available to the average person than is a measure of mean
income like per capita GDP that can rise even when most of the income growth
13We are first able to estimate the market value of employer-provided health insurance in
1969. When we add this source of income to column 5 the Gini value is 0.290 in 1969 and then
falls to 0.285 in 1973 before rising to 0.301 in 1979. They then rise to 0.338 in 2007 and to 0.334
in 2012. Because we are unable to measure the value of employer provided health insurance in
1959 we cannot make comparison of from 1959 to subsequent years as we do for our other five
measures of income. But it is unlikely that its presence would offset the patterns we show in
column 5. See the Appendix for a discussion.
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is at the top end of the distribution. While this may be conceptually appropri-
ate, operationally it is not possible to directly capture median real GDP using
National Accounts data alone. To solve this problem, researchers have turned to
either survey or administrative tax record data or some combination of the two
to capture trends in median income. But it is critical that the sources of income
used in the National Accounts match those used in the survey or administra-
tive tax record data or “like is not compared to like”.14 (See Nolan, Roser and
Thewissen, 2016 for a review of this literature)
Gordon (2016 Table 18.4) uses such a measure of median income derived
from survey data in his estimates of median real GDP from 1975 to 2012. It
is based on CBO estimates using CPS data statistically matched to income tax
record data. But while the CBO has been including the market value of Medicare
and Medicaid in its measures of income since 2012, these values are not included
in previous years. More problematic, for earlier years Gordon estimates median
real GDP using top income data from the World Top Income Database (Alvaredo
et al., n.d.). However, these data contain information on the taxable market
income of tax units as it comes from the series developed by Piketty and Saez
(2003).
In Figures 3 and 4 we use our new data set to show the problem of compar-
ing levels and trends in real GDP per capita to levels and trends in real market
income of the median tax unit. In Figure 3 we compare GDP per capita in-
come from 1959 to 2012 taken from the Bureau of Economic Analysis to the real
market income of the median tax unit based on the same CPS/decennial Cen-
14Atkinson et al. (2015) use data from EU-SILC country surveys from 2004 to 2011 to demon-
strate the problems of replicating National Accounts measures of mean income with survey
data. To the degree that the survey data captures mean income based on National Accounts
concepts of income, it allows researchers to compare such a measure with a median income
measure, which can be captured in survey data.
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sus data that underlies the values reported for this income measure in Figure
2. Using such a measure shows that between 1959 and 1969 real GDP increased
from $18,312 to $24,874 (35.8 percent) while the real median market income of
tax units rose from $14,977 to $20,044 (33.8 percent). But since then the increase
in real mean GDP has substantially outpaced the growth in median market in-
come.
Figure 3.3: Comparison of Real GDP per Capita and Real Median
Taxable Market Income of Tax Units (in 2012 dollars).
Sources: Median market tax unit income from au-
thors’ calculations using March CPS and the 1960
decennial Census. Income per-capita from the
Bureau of Economic Analysis NIPA Table 7.1.
Notes: The series showing the share of income going to
the top 1% of income earners is adjusted for the years 1986-
1988 to account for large tax changes, in a similar fashion as
our CPS series is for the 1992-1993 survey redesign. The series
for median tax unit income includes CPS data for 1967-2012
and Census data for 1959. Series are converted to 2012 dollars.
NBER recessions are shown by gray bars.
Their relative levels of growth can best be seen in Figure 4 where we use
the same data but normalized to 1.00 in 1979 to show differences in growth.
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Between 1959 and 1969 median market income increased at approximately the
same rate as real GDP. But since then GDP per capita has increased substantially
while median market income has trended downward.
Figure 3.4: Real GDP per Capita, Real Median Taxable Market In-
come of Tax Units and Real Median Disposable In-
come including Medicare and Medicaid of Household
Size-Adjusted Income of Persons Normalized to 1979.
Sources: Median market tax unit income from au-
thors’ calculations using March CPS and the 1960
decennial Census. Income per-capita from the
Bureau of Economic Analysis NIPA Table 7.1.
Notes: Same series as in Figure 2 with values normalized
to income year 1979.
But this picture changes when we compare it to our fullest measure of in-
come in Figure 2 — household size-adjusted disposable income including the
market value of Medicare and Medicaid of persons, a measure more in line with
GDP than market income alone. While growth in real GDP especially since 1973
has outpaced even this fuller measure of household size adjusted disposable in-
come, the difference is much less than compared to median market income of
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tax units especially since 1973.
3.4 Summery and Conclusion
Although still controversial, a growing CPS-based literature beginning in 1979
demonstrates that excluding the market value of in-kind transfers including
Medicare and Medicaid from measures of income substantially understates the
importance that government tax and transfer policies have increasingly played
in offsetting market income inequality and in disproportionately providing re-
sources to those in the bottom half of the income distribution. But data limita-
tions have prevented such analyses for earlier years. To overcome these data
limitations, we use March CPS data (income years 1967-2012) and decennial
Census data (decennial income years 1959-1989) to create common yearly source
of income categories, including estimates of the market value of in-kind trans-
fers, back to 1959.
Using these data we provide a fresh look at the twenty-year period 1959 to
1979. We find that over the business cycle of 1959-1969 cumulative real median
market income rose substantially (30.9 percent) and the market income of the
bottom quintile rose faster (47.3 percent) than that of the top 5% (44.3 percent)
resulting in a decline in market income inequality as a growing economy “lifted
all boats.”
Furthermore, the launch of New Frontier and Great Society programs, which
were heavily tilted toward the bottom part of the income distribution over
this decade, as well as the maturing of OASDI led to cumulative increase in
mean growth for the bottom quintile of 66.9 percent using standard pre-tax
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post-transfer measures of income, 80.8 percent when taxes and some in-kind
transfers are considered and 113.7 percent when Medicare and Medicaid are
included.
But we then find that median market income fell between 1969-1979. Thus
we show that the stagnation in median market income captured in the survey-
based literature since 1979 effectively began after peak business cycle year 1969.
However, this drag on resources was offset by government tax and transfer poli-
cies which resulted in a cumulative increase in median income between 1969
and 1979 regardless of how it was measured.
Using 1959 as the starting point for studies of median income and income in-
equality reinforces the importance of distinguishing questions about how mar-
ket income is distributed across tax units (the measure of income in the tax
record-based top income literature) and how resources (market income plus
the net of government taxes and transfers) are distributed across people liv-
ing in households. While we demonstrate that the stagnation of median mar-
ket income effectively began after 1969, we also show that government tax and
transfer policies have transformed a 10.5 percent cumulative increase in mar-
ket income between 1959 and 2012 into a 106.0 percent increase when taxes and
transfers are more fully accounted for.
Conventional measures of median income and income inequality that ex-
clude the market value of in-kind transfers including Medicare and Medicaid
will substantially understate the success of government policies in offsetting the
stagnation in median market income and the rise in market income inequality
since 1969.
143
APPENDIX A
CHAPTER 1 APPENDIX
A.1 Medicaid and CHIP Expansions
The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Acts (OBRA) of 1986 and 1987 were both
state optional. OBRA 1986 permitted states to grant eligibility to children under
age two in families with incomes below 100 percent of the FPL. OBRA 1987
allowed states to immediately cover children under age 5 (born after September
1983) and extend eligibility for infants up to 185 percent of the FPL. However,
OBRA 1987 required children born after September 1983 be eligible regardless
of family structure if their family met AFDC income standards. The Medicare
Catastrophic Coverage Act (MCCA) of 1988 required expanded coverage for
infants to be phased in by July 1990. OBRA 1989 required extension of coverage
of children under age six to 133 percent of the FPL, and OBRA 1990 extended
coverage to children under 19 born after September 1983 to 100 percent of the
FPL. These expansions create sharp increases in eligibility within age groups as
children born after the September 1983 cutoff age, resulting in a gradual increase
in the fraction of children covered by federal expansions throughout the 1990s.
In addition to the Federally mandated expansions, my eligibility measures also
include variation due to state-level expansions beyond the federally required
minimum coverage thresholds.
CHIP was created in 1997 to further expand health insurance coverage for
children, and by July 2000 all 50 states and Washington D.C. had implemented
CHIP programs. States had the option to create a CHIP program separate from
Medicaid, combine the two programs, or expand their existing Medicaid pro-
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gram. CHIP differs from Medicaid to some degree for several reasons. Fund-
ing for CHIP was through block grants, thus capping the funding available.
However, Federal match rates were higher than under Medicaid. States also
had more flexibility in the design of CHIP programs from federal guidelines.1
The programs are otherwise similar and in my analysis I treat CHIP expansions
as Medicaid, as has other recent work using both programs (Gross and No-
towidigdo, 2011; Cohodes et al., 2016). However, I treat CHIP as state-optional
Medicaid expansions. While all states created CHIP programs, the timing and
eligibility thresholds were largely left to the discretion of the states. CHIP pro-
grams expanded eligibility further up the income distribution to families with
incomes up to of 200 or 300 percent of the FPL, and in many states expanded
coverage levels for older children. For more details on these expansions, see
Shore-Sheppard (2003) and Buchmueller et al. (2016).
A.2 Income and Medicaid Eligibility
As shown in Figure 1.4, beginning around 1996 measured actual and simulated
Medicaid eligibility diverge. Their contemporaneous passage makes PROWRA
and SCHIP prime suspects for driving the divergence, but in fact rapid income
growth in the late 1990s drives this divergence. Figure A.1 shows trends in av-
erage nominal income in the samples used to calculate actual and simulated eli-
gibility. Similar to the series in Figure 1.4, the average incomes in the actual and
simulated series are similar in levels and trends from 1980 until 1996, diverge be-
tween 1996-2000, and maintain different levels but similar trends thereafter. For
1There are other differences between Medicaid and CHIP. For instance, CHIP contained anti-
crowd-out measures such as denying eligibility to children with another source of insurance
while Medicaid does not. For more details on Medicaid expansions, see Shore-Sheppard (2003).
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instance, the average difference between simulated and actual income is 2.8%
prior to 2000, but is 13.2% from 2000 on. The large increases in actual income
observed in the late 1990s lead to lower eligibility levels, as families have higher
incomes and thus a smaller fraction fall below the income eligibility thresholds.
Moreover, the explanation of income growth driving the divergence in eligibil-
ity measures is appealing because the direction of the differences in income map
predictably onto the direction of the difference in eligibility. Between 1980 and
1996, income is slightly higher in the simulated sample than the actual sample
(with the exception of 1990 when they are identical), and in these years actual
eligibility is slightly higher than simulated eligibility, which is expected if the
actual sample has lower income. The direction reverses after 1996 when actual
income surpasses income of the simulated sample, and eligibility of the simu-
lated sample rises above eligibility in the actual sample.
The degree of similarity between the actual and simulated income series be-
tween 1979 and 1996 may be surprising, given that real GDP growth was rela-
tively strong over this period. For instance, between 1979 and 1990 (both busi-
ness cycle peak years), average annual GDP growth was 3%, and between 1980-
1996 average annual GDP growth was 2.9% (U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis,
2018).2 If this income growth were spread evenly across the income distribu-
tion, then income in the actual and simulated samples would diverge, as by
construction real income in the simulated sample is constant.
In reality, growth over the 1979-1989 business cycle was highly unequal.
Burkhauser et al. (2012b) show that average pre-tax pre-transfer income of the
2Technically 1981 is also a peak year because there were NBER defined recessions from Jan-
uary 1980-July 1980 and July 1981-November 1982. However, because this expansion period
was brief and the March CPS is conducted only once annually, prior research using the CPS to
analyze business cycles has combined these two cycles into a single cycle from 1979-1990. For
example, see (Burkhauser et al., 2012b).
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bottom three quintiles (where eligibility for Medicaid is concentrated) of the
distribution grew −0.2%, −5.0%, and 0.0% respectively over this period for tax
units, and post-tax post-transfer income grew 5.0%, 0.2%, and 6.3% for house-
holds (they do not consider families, which would be an intermediate unit of
analysis between tax units and households).3 In contrast, from 1989-2000 the
same three quintiles had growth rates of 17.8%, 10.8%, and 7.5% respectively
for tax unit income and 10.6%, 8.3%, and 10.7% respectively for household in-
come. Considering income growth of the top quintile (where few families are
eligible for Medicaid), tax unit incomes grew 17.6% and 14.7% over the two
business cycles. Household incomes of the top quintile grew 19.7% and 14.0%
over the two cycles respectively. The benefits of economic growth were more
evenly distributed during the 1989-2000 business cycle, particularly over the fi-
nal years of the cycle. While there was substantial economic growth over the
1979-1989 business cycle, these gains were concentrated at the top of the income
distribution, and as a result average incomes of the actual and simulated series
are similar during this period.
To further test the degree to which income drives the divergence of the two
Medicaid eligibility measures, I apply an adjustment to the incomes in the sam-
ple measuring actual Medicaid eligibility. Specifically, for each year I calculate
the ratio of the average income in the simulated and actual samples.4 I then
adjust the incomes of every family in every year in the sample used to calculate
actual eligibility down by this ratio. In doing so, the income distributions of
3Pre-tax pre-transfer income includes labor earnings and non-labor market income such as
interest, dividend, or rents. Post-tax post-transfer income includes the same sources as well
as cash transfers from both government and non-government sources. Post-tax post-transfer
income is similar to the income measure that would be used to calculate a family’s Medicaid
eligibility, although the included sources of income do not match exactly. Burkhauser et al.
(2012b) do not report other intermediate income definitions.
4I use the Unicon variable “faminc”, which includes all family income from both earned and
unearned sources. Using earned income, Unicon variable “incwag”, yields similar results.
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the two samples are made roughly equivalent, as this “removes” real income
growth from the sample used to calculate actual eligibility. By construction,
there is no adjustment for 1990 which is the same in both samples. I then graph
this adjusted actual Medicaid eligibility series with my original simulated eli-
gibility series in Appendix Figure A.2 for overall Medicaid eligibility and Ap-
pendix Figure A.3 for federal eligibility. Even with this relatively rudimentary
adjustment, the two series are even more similar, and the gap in eligibility that
occurred in the late 1990s essentially disappears.5
A.3 Other Safety Net Programs
I consider four additional safety net programs that are included in the CPS.
The National School Lunch Program (NSLP) provides free and reduced price
school lunches to children from low-income families. In 2017 the NSLP had
total expenditures of $18 billion. The lesser known Low-Income Home Energy
Assistance Program provides in-kind benefits to purchase heating, cooling, or
weatherization of homes, and is a smaller program with total funding of only
$3 billion in 2017. It is the only program I consider that is not exist in the CPS
for all years of my analysis. It was created in 1980, but was not added to the
CPS questionnaire until 1982.6
I examine the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and Social Security Dis-
ability Income (SSDI) programs as well, although these programs are qualita-
5I obtain similar results when using median rather than mean income. A more complex ad-
justment could take into account factors such as race or position in the overall income distribu-
tion, but is unlikely to substantially improve over this simple adjustment in terms of explaining
the gap between actual and simulated eligibility.
6The CPS also asks about Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) recipiency. However, this
question is not included in the CPS until 2000, and so I exclude it from my analysis.
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tively different from the other six. Both SSI and SSDI have complex additional
eligibility criterion because they target primarily individuals with disabilities,
and neither target children in low-income families specifically. Although SSI
does cover children in some cases, SSDI requires a work history and could only
be received by an older adult within a family, and never directly by children.
These two programs serve different intended purposes than the other programs
I consider, but also provide a substantial source of income to many low-income
families, and particularly due to their disability criterion they may be expected
to interact with Medicaid eligibility. SSI and SSDI had total expenditures of $59
billion and $149 billion in 2017, respectively.
A.4 Simulations of Other Safety Net Programs
One threat to identification would be the rules for other transfer programs be-
ing changed concurrently with expansions to Medicaid, or alternatively if there
were underlying secular trends in characteristics related to eligibility, correlated
with Medicaid, that affect program participation, and are omitted from my em-
pirical specifications. Because of the potential underlying secular trends, simply
documenting changes to policies regarding other programs is insufficient, even
if those changes are not contemporaneous with Medicaid expansions.
To address this issue, I simulate program eligibility for my outcome pro-
grams in addition to simulated Medicaid eligibility. That is, I use the same fixed
national sample (the national 1990 CPS sample), and apply eligibility criteria for
each state and year to that sample for each transfer program. Just as with Med-
icaid eligibility, the variation in this measure is due only to statutory changes in
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program rules, and not to family level characteristics or secular trends in demo-
graphics or economic conditions. Then, regressing these simulated eligibility
measures on Medicaid eligibility provides a test as to whether Medicaid expan-
sions are exogenous with respect to policy changes in other transfer programs,
and should the results be significant allow me to control for eligibility in these
programs by including their simulated eligibility in my controls as a robustness
check.
As with my simulations of Medicaid eligibility, I am constrained to simulate
eligibility based only on the characteristics observable in the CPS, and as a re-
sult must ignore some eligibility criteria such as programs requiring asset tests.7
I only simulate eligibility for five of the transfer programs: AFDC/TANF, EITC,
SNAP, NSLP, and LIHEAP.8 Estimating eligibility for housing subsidies is prob-
lematic with the CPS because, among other criteria, eligibility depends on a
percentage of median income which is determined by the local public housing
agency (PHA). These cover geographic areas that are smaller than a state, and
the CPS lacks sufficient sample size and geographic information to calculate in-
comes within each PHA.9 Even with external information on the median income
of each PHA, simulated eligibility could be calculated by using the national
sample, but no meaningful information on actual outcomes at this geographic
level could be measured using the CPS.
I do not simulate SSI and SSDI because both use disability status as a pri-
7There are a variety of other criteria that cannot be accounted for that apply to some or all
programs, for instance disability status, criminal history, housing history, cumulative amount of
time receiving benefits, or income not covered by the CPS, for instance capital gains. Of course
previous literature using simulated eligibility has faced the same constraints.
8I am thankful to Michiel Paris, as my SNAP eligibility simulations are based on code from
Paris (2018). I would additionally thank Jason Cook, who provided me with code that assisted
with my AFDC/TANF simulations.
9For instance, the state of New York has over 150 separate PHAs.
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mary determinant of eligibility, for which there is limited information in the
CPS. SSDI also depends on earnings history, which is also not measured in the
CPS. However, for both programs the recipients are likely other family mem-
bers, not children themselves, and they are relatively uncommon in my sample.
Thus, simulating them is less important than other programs for which receipt
is concentrated in families with children. Both would be interesting avenues of
future work.
A.5 Program Participation Results for Other Safety Net Pro-
grams
In Appendix Tables A.2-A.4, Columns 8-11 present the effects of Medicaid ex-
pansions on participation in the NSLP, LIHEAP, SSI, and SSDI. I consider the
NSLP and LIHEAP separate from my main results because these programs are
smaller, particularly for LIHEAP. In additional, LIHEAP is not an entitlement
program and has relatively limited funding. SSI and SSDI are both large pro-
grams, but differ from the primary safety net programs I consider because they
do not specifically target low-income families with children, and have substan-
tively different eligibility criteria because both programs depend on some dis-
ability criteria, and as a result may be expected to be less sensitive to Medicaid
expansions.
Of the four programs, the only program affected by Medicaid expansions is
the NSLP. A 10 percentage point expansion in children’s overall Medicaid eli-
gibility reduces participation in the NSLP by 0.44 percentage points, or around
one percent. The effect of a similar expansion in federal Medicaid eligibility
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is only marginally significant, but indicates a 10 percentage point expansion in
federal eligibility reduced participation in the NSLP by 0.2 percentage points,
or 0.4 percent. This reduction in NSLP participation is consistent given the pat-
tern of results for other programs and labor supply. Relative to other programs
eligibility for NSLP is quite generous. Children receive reduced-price school
lunches in families with incomes up to 185 percent of the FPL, almost identical
to the EITC program which phases out at 182 percent of the FPL as discussed
in Section 1.6.1. Like the EITC, the NSLP program has relatively high take-up
rates as shown in Appendix Table A.1. Thus, there is less scope for Medicaid ex-
pansions to increase take-up of the NSLP, but expansions may still reduce NSLP
participation by reducing eligibility.
I find no effect of Medicaid expansions on LIHEAP, SSI SSDI, participation.
The results for SSI participation are consistent with the findings of Levere et al.
(2018) and Shore-Sheppard (2008) who found similar, tightly estimated null ef-
fects on SSI. The null results for SSDI in particular are reassuring, as few fami-
lies with children receive benefits from this program and the beneficiaries could
never be children themselves, as individuals must have a substantial work his-
tory to be eligible for SSDI benefits in addition to having a disability.
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Figure A.1: Author’s calculations using the 1979-2011 March CPS and
Medicaid eligibility rules for each state and year. Each line
shows average eligibility for children ages 0-17, by race. Sim-
ulated eligibility uses a fixed sample of the 1990 CPS. Incomes
for the fixed sample are adjusted to each year using the CPI-U.
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Figure A.2: Author’s calculations using the 1979-2011 March CPS and
Medicaid eligibility rules for each state and year. Each line
shows average eligibility for children ages 0-17, by race. Sim-
ulated eligibility uses a fixed sample of the 1990 CPS. Incomes
for the fixed sample are adjusted to each year using the CPI-U.
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Figure A.3: Author’s calculations using the 1979-2011 March CPS and
Medicaid eligibility rules for each state and year. Each line
shows average eligibility for children ages 0-17, by race. Sim-
ulated eligibility uses a fixed sample of the 1990 CPS. Incomes
for the fixed sample are adjusted to each year using the CPI-U.
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Figure A.4: Author’s calculations using the 1979-2011 March CPS and
Medicaid eligibility rules for each state and year. Each line
shows average eligibility for children ages 0-17, by race. Sim-
ulated eligibility uses a fixed sample of the 1990 CPS. Incomes
for the fixed sample are adjusted to each year using the CPI-U.
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Figure A.5: Author’s calculations using the 1979-2011 March CPS and
Medicaid eligibility rules for each state and year. Each line
shows average actual eligibility for children of a specific age.
Only six ages are graphed to reduce clutter, but the omitted
ages follow similar patterns.
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Figure A.6: Author’s calculations using the 1979-2011 March CPS and
Medicaid eligibility rules for each state and year. Each line
shows average actual eligibility for children of a specific state
and race.
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APPENDIX B
CHAPTER 2 APPENDIX
Some questions in the AHEAD/HRS are not consistent between years, partic-
ularly the questions asked regarding health expenditures. The questions for
each of the years in my sample are listed below for the various years of the sur-
vey. The 1993 survey had a single question asking broadly about health care
expenses over the last 12 months:
• Not counting costs covered by insurance, about how much did you [and
your (husband/wife/partner)] end up paying for any part of hospital and
doctor bills and any other medical or dental expenses in the last 12 months,
since MONTH of (1992/1993)?
Beginning in 1995, that single question is split into four separate questions
regarding different categories of medical expenses over a period of two years
rather than the last 12 months. Three ask for the total spending out-of-pocket
for a category over that time period, while a single asks for the out-of-pocket
amount per month over that time period:
• About how much did you pay out-of-pocket for (nursing home/hospital)
bills (since (W1 Interview Month-Year)/in the last two years)?
• About how much did you pay out-of-pocket for (doctor/outpatient
surgery/dental) bills (since (W1 Interview Month-Year)/in the last two
years)?
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• On the average, about how much have you paid out-of-pocket per month
for these prescriptions (since (W1 Interview Month-Year)/in the last two
years)?
• About how much did you pay out-of-pocket for (in-home medical
care/special facilities or services) (since (W1 Interview Month-year)/in
the last two years)?
The questions for 1998 and 2000 are nearly identical to those from 1995:
• About how much did you pay out-of-pocket for (nursing home/hospital/
nursing home and hospital/...) bills (since Q218-PREV WAVE IW
MONTH / Q219-PREV WAV IW YEAR/in the last two year)?
• About how much did you pay out-of-pocket for (doctor/outpatient/surgery
/dental/doctor and outpatient surgery/doctor and dental/outpatient
surgery and dental/doctor, outpatient surgery, and dental/...) bills (since
Q218-PREV WAVE IW MONTH / Q219-PREV WAVE IW YEAR/in the
last two years)?
• On the average, about how much have you paid out-of-pocket per month
for these prescriptions (since Q218-PREV WAVE IW MONTH / Q219-
PREV WAVE IW YEAR/in the last two years)?
• About how much did you pay out-of-pocket for (in-home medical
care/special facilities or services/in-home medical care, special facilities
or services/...) (since Q218-PREV WAVE IW MONTH / Q219-PREV
WAVE IW YEAR/in the last two years)?
I combine these questions into a single aggregate out-of-pocket spending
variable for each household for the last 12 months. Thus, the answers to the
170
question for 1993 are unchanged. For answers from the 1995, 1998, and 2000
surveys I multiply the answer for the prescriptions question by 12 to obtain a
yearly value, divide the answers to the other questions by two, and then sum
the four to obtain a single variable, as with 1993.
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Figure B.1: Figure is reprinted from Krueger and Pischke (1992), and
shows variation in Social Security benefits by birth and retire-
ment years for selected retirement ages. Within a birth cohort
those who retire later receive higher benefits. This is substan-
tially amplified by the Notch as shown by individuals who re-
tire at age 68 for whom a retiree born in 1916 receives approxi-
mately $150 more per month than a similar retiree born in 1917
in 1987 dollars.
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Figure B.2: Author’s calculations using the 1993, 1995, 1998, and 2000
AHEAD/HRS surveys. The figure shows the fraction of men
in each birth cohort that are veterans.
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Figure B.3: Figure is reprinted from Bedard and Deschenes (2003). The
solid blue line shows the fraction of veterans from each birth
cohort. from the 1970-1990 Census.
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APPENDIX C
CHAPTER 3 APPENDIX
Below we discuss the construction of our decennial Census and CPS series, and
each of the components of our various income measures that we have imputed
in some way.
C.1 Comparing Decennial Census-based and CPS-based In-
come Measures
Because the CPS asks more granular questions regarding sources of income, we
must make some imputations to construct a IPMUS Census data series-based
equivalent to the four income series we use in the body of this paper: (1) Market
Income of Tax Units; (2) Household Size-Adjusted Pre-Tax Post-Transfer of Per-
sons; (3) Household Size-Adjusted Post-Tax Post-Transfer Income of Persons;
and (4) Household Size-Adjusted Post-Tax Post-Transfer Income plus Medicare
and Medicaid of Persons for decennial Census years 1960, 1970, 1980, and 1990.
For instance, it is straightforward to measure (1) with the 1967 CPS since it con-
tains separate questions for: a) Wage and self-employment income, b) business
income, c) farm income, d) Social Security, e) Dividends, interest, and rent, f)
Welfare or public assistance, g) Unemployment and workmen’s compensation,
h) Alimony, i) private pensions, and j) anything else. While the 1960 decennial
Census contains separate questions for a, b, and c, it lumps all other income into
a single “all other income” question. Hence it combines all these other sources
of income into a single category.
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We add categories (a, b, c, e, h, and i) in the 1967 CPS to estimate market
income. This is not possible in the 1960 decennial Census, however, since (e, h,
and i) are grouped with (d, f, g, and j). Both the decennial Census and CPS ask
increasingly granular questions in later years, but the decennial Census ques-
tions are always relatively less granular, and even in the 1990 decennial Census
some sources of market income, specifically alimony, are still grouped in the
“other income” category. Therefore it is necessary to impute the proportion of
“other income” in the Census that should be included in market income for
individuals in each decennial Census year.
To do so, we construct a separate definition of income in the CPS that in-
cludes all of the income sources in the “other income” category for the decen-
nial Census in the same year (using the 1967 CPS for the 1960 Census). We
then follow a procedure similar to that in Burkhauser et al. (2017), specifically
their HBAI-SPI2 adjustment. We start by ordering individuals in the CPS for the
relevant year by earned income (the sum of wage, farm, and self-employment
and business income). We then assign them to percentiles, and within each
percentile in the CPS calculate the fraction of the “other income” category that
comes from the CPS categories that should count as market income. We match
these percentiles to the individuals in the equivalent percentiles in the Census,
and use the estimated fractions to assign individuals in the Census an appropri-
ate amount of their “other income” when estimating market income.
This imputation performs well for the higher income quintiles, but less so
in lower-income quintiles, and especially the lowest quintile. This problem re-
sults from substantial heterogeneity in the composition of low-income tax units
and households relative to those in higher income quintiles. Specifically, low-
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income units have large shares of those who have low market income because
they are relatively young, and those who have low market income because they
are past retirement age. However, these groups have rather different amounts
and sources of other income, and so estimates assigning the same fraction of
other income to both groups perform less well when we compare our decennial
Census series to the CPS.
To address this issue, we take the imputation one step further. In addition to
estimating the fraction of other income by earned-income percentiles, we split
this imputation into three separate groups: young (<20 years), middle (>19 and
<65 years), and old (>65 years). In doing so, the relevant fraction of other in-
come is estimated from a population that has more consistently similar sources
of other income. While the decennial Census estimates of mean incomes for the
first quintile are still less accurate than those for higher income quintiles, the es-
timates are significantly more accurate than those estimated using only earned
income percentiles.
To evaluate our efforts to recreate our CPS income series using the decennial
Census, we compare the overlapping years of the two data sets (1969, 1979, and
1989) in Appendix Table C.1. We use five different income measures to compare
the series: (1) size-adjusted earned income of tax units, (2) size-adjusted market
income of tax units, (3) size-adjusted market income of households, (4) size-
adjusted pre-tax post-transfer income of households, and (5) size-adjusted post-
tax post-transfer income of households. We compare both the median and mean
of each measure for each year.
While there are necessarily random differences due to sampling, some of
the measures can be expected to be more similar than others. In particular, we
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would expect measure (4): size-adjusted pre-tax post-transfer income of house-
holds to be the most similar across data sets, as it is the only series for which no
imputations are necessary. Both the decennial Census and the CPS are house-
hold surveys, so there is no estimation of analysis units. Furthermore, all of the
questions in both surveys regarding income sources counted in pre-tax post-
transfer income are grouped such that no estimation is necessary. Thus, we
expect measure (4) to be the closest. Measures (1), (2), and (5) all require impu-
tation of tax units, and measures (2) and (3) require imputing sources of market
income in the decennial Census.
Panel A compares the medians of the five measures across the two data sets.
For each year the estimates of each data set are shown, followed by the percent-
age difference between the decennial Census estimate and the CPS. As expected,
measure (4) is the most similar of the series overall, with the decennial Census
estimates slightly overestimating the CPS estimates, but by a difference of less
than 2 percent in all three years. The other measures have larger differences
between the CPS and the decennial Census measures, but the differences are
smaller than 4 percent, with the exception of measure (5): post-tax post-transfer
income in 1969, for which the decennial Census estimate is 5 percent smaller
than the CPS estimate.
Panel B compares the means of each measure. While the deviations are
slightly larger, size-adjusted pre-tax post-transfer income of households is still
overall the closest measure, with the largest deviation being a 3.3 percent un-
derestimate of the CPS measure in 1979. Measure (3), the market income of
households, now has the largest difference of 6.7 percent in 1979, but otherwise
the results are largely similar to those of Panel A. Overall, it is encouraging that
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our Census series is relatively accurately replicating the measures of our CPS
series, thereby supporting our use of the 1960 Census to create an initial point
for the series.
C.2 Estimating Taxes
Similar to Armour et al. (2014), we impute tax liabilities using NBER Taxsim 9.3
based on the year and state of residence for each tax unit within a household.
These tax units are assigned using the procedure from Armour et al. (2014), as
described in Burkhauser et al. (2012b) and Piketty and Saez (2003). Married
couples, divorced or widowed individuals, and single individuals over the age
of 20 are all considered their own tax unit, as are never-married children under
20 who live alone.
This process is straightforward for 1979-2007, the years considered by Ar-
mour et al. (2014), but poses additional problems for the earlier years of the
series. Specifically, NBER Taxsim does not estimate state taxes prior to 1977.
Additionally, earlier years of CPS data lack the level of detail for demographic
data on households that is contained in later years. As a result, additional as-
sumptions on tax units must be imposed for earlier years. Specifically, prior to
1976 not all states are uniquely identified in the CPS, and are instead grouped
as several states or larger regions.
To address this, we use a procedure similar to Fox et al. (2015). We first
compute each tax unit’s state tax liability for the year 1977 for all households
surveyed prior to 1977, regardless of the year the tax unit appeared in the CPS.
Tax units for which a unique state is not identifiable are assigned to the state in
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the region with the median tax rate in 1977. These state tax liabilities are then
deflated using the CPI-R-US, and multiplied by the ratio of state tax revenue in
the assigned state for the year the tax unit appears in the CPS relative to 1977,
after controlling for population growth. Determining tax unit status of filers
versus non-filers is also a difficulty. We follow Burkhauser et al. (2012b) and
include all tax units regardless of filing status as it is not possible to differentiate
between filers and non-filers prior to 1993. For a discussion of median income
analyzing only filers after 1993, see Burkhauser et al. (2012b). As with previous
issues, this simple tax model is a first approximation and subject to greater noise
than the NBER model used for more recent years.
C.3 Estimating Food Stamps/SNAP
The CPS data contain estimates beginning in 1979 for the market value of the
food stamps that families receive. Our imputation procedures for earlier years
follow the method in Fox et al. (2015). We describe their method below with
particular focus on the few minor differences between our method and their
method. We first impute any receipt of food stamps. Conditional on receipt,
we then impute the size of the family’s food stamp benefit. While the shar-
ing unit in this paper is the household, our imputations are at the family level
since that is the administrative sharing unit for food stamps. We then aggregate
these benefits up to the household level. To do this, we supplement the CPS
data with data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX), which we down-
loaded from ICPSR (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1987). The continuous CEX se-
ries does not begin until 1980. However, there were earlier surveys in the years
1960/1961 and 1972/1973. We make use of the 1972/1973 CEX survey, which
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contains data on family receipt of food stamps.
To impute receipt, the process is similar to that in Fox et al. (2015). We pre-
dict receipt with a logistic model (rather than a linear probability model) using
the 1972/1973 CEX to predict family receipt of food stamps based on receipt
of public assistance, number of children in the family, unemployment status of
the family head, dummies for having one adult or three or more adults in the
family, age, education, and race categories for the family head, family size, a
dummy for marital status of the family head, and interaction terms for the race
and education of the family head. All of these demographic variables are also
available in the CPS. Thus, using the values predicted by the logit model in
the CEX, we predict the probability of food stamp receipt for family heads in
the CPS. We assign food stamp receipt to the household head with the highest
predicted probability.
The next issue is to constrain the percentage of families imputed to receive
food stamps. We begin by calculating the percentage of family heads receiv-
ing food stamps in the 1980 CPS. The USDA published administrative data on
caseloads annually back to 1969 (USDA, 2014). We use Statistical Abstracts of
the United States to extend this series of caseloads back to 1967 (U.S. Census Bu-
reau, 1973). We then use this series of caseloads for the entire period 1967-1978
together with yearly population estimates (using data from the U.S. Census Bu-
reau, 2000) to calculate the growth in caseloads per capita between years. Using
the percentage of families on food stamps in 1980 and projecting back provides
us a percentage of the population participating in food stamps for every year.
The final imputation of receipt then results from simply constraining the per-
centage of recipients to those families with the highest computed probability in
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each year.
The final step is to assign values of food stamp benefits to those families
we imputed to receive them. We begin with the same “hot deck” procedure
described by Fox et al. (2015). We divide the sample into mutually exclusive
cells based on receipt of public assistance, poverty status, number of children,
and number of adults in the family. Poverty status is not recorded in the CEX
data, so we assign it using poverty cutoffs from the U.S. Census Bureau (1972),
and compare the assigned cutoff to reported family income.
At this point we deviate from Fox et al. (2015) with respect to the method
for creating bins and the corresponding cell sizes. They split the CEX sample
into 36 cells, and then divided each cell into deciles based on the value of the
family’s food stamp benefits. They also split the CPS data into the same 36 cells,
and then randomly assigned ten deciles within each cell. The cells and deciles
were then matched between the CPS and CEX, and the families in the CPS were
assigned food stamp benefits equal to the value of their corresponding cell in
the CEX.
Our concern relates to the number of separate bins for children and adults, in
addition to poverty status and welfare receipt, that were used to generate the 36
mutually exclusive cells in Fox et al. (2015). Assuming, for instance, cells for 0, 1,
or 2 or more children, and 1, 2, or 3 or more adults yield 36 cells. However, only
1,238 families in the 1972/1973 CEX reported receiving any food stamp benefits.
Divided evenly this would give an average of under 35 observations per cell,
and only 3.5 observations per decile. However, as the 1,238 observations are not
uniformly distributed across cells, many cells have far fewer observations, in
several cases fewer than 10. This prevents the calculation of food stamp benefit
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values for deciles within some cells. Other choices for bin size yield similar
difficulties.
To resolve this issue, we select only 16 cells using bins for 0 or 1 or more
children in the family, and either 1 or 2 or more adults in the family. This yields
somewhat more satisfactory cell sizes, with the smallest cell containing suffi-
cient observations to compute deciles of food stamp benefits, albeit still with a
relatively small number of observations.
We then inflate the monetary value of these predicted food stamp benefits
to the relevant year using the CPI-R-US (Fox et al. use the CPI-U). We then
further adjust the benefit level using the ratio of the average benefit of the year
in question to the average benefit level in 1972/1973 that we compute from the
USDA series. As described above we then follow the Fox et al. (2015) procedure
to match across cells and deciles between the CPS and CEX.
C.4 Estimating the National School Lunch Program
As with Fox et al. (2015), the procedure for computing receipt and benefit
value for school lunches is quite similar to the procedure for food stamps. The
1972/1973 CEX survey does not ask questions regarding school lunch receipt.
So like Fox et al. we use the family values for school lunches in the 1980 CPS.
The percentage of families receiving benefits each year is similarly predicted
and constrained using changes in administrative caseload.
Fox et al. (2015) use administrative data from the USDA compiled by Robert
Moffitt and his colleagues that goes back to 1969, and, as before, supplement
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this series using Statistical Abstracts of the United States. Since we did not have
Moffitt’s series, we consulted the original sources and used a combination of
data from the USDA and the Statistical Abstracts of the United States. We com-
pute monetary values from the 1980 CPS, and deflate them using the CPI-R-US
after controlling for population growth.
C.5 Estimating Housing Benefits
Our procedure for housing benefits is similar to our imputation for food stamps,
but it is limited to the subsample of families renting their dwelling. Again, with-
out Moffitt’s series we referred to the original data sources mentioned by Fox et
al. (2015), in this case historical White House Budget Tables for discretionary
programs which extend back to 1962 (OMB 2015). This is a series of total pro-
gram expenditures rather than a series of rental costs per household since it does
not contain data on participation. Fox et al. observe that the trend in expendi-
tures per household is roughly linear from 1977 to 2009. Therefore, they assume
this trend backwards to 1967 to estimate the number of households participat-
ing in housing subsidies. We do the same using a similar series for 1977 to 1997
from Olsen (2003). As with food stamps and school lunches, we then use this
series to constrain households receiving subsidies after imputing probability of
receipt using the linear probability model.
We deviate from Fox et al. in our computation of the value of housing
assistance by again using the matching procedure discussed above for school
lunches using the 1980 CPS. Fox et al. attempt to replicate the Census method
of taking the lesser of “the shelter portion of the threshold minus estimated
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rental payments” and “the market value of the housing unit minus estimated
rental payments” (pg 32). Lacking the relevant data to estimate rental payments
or market values back to 1967, Fox et al. assume that people spend 30 percent
of household income on rent, and estimate the value of the housing assistance
benefit as “the shelter portion of the threshold minus the estimated rental pay-
ments” (p. 32). They find this procedure overestimates the value of housing
assistance on poverty rates, and use a correction factor of 0.89 of the estimated
housing value to correct the series.
C.6 Estimating Medicare
Our primary contribution in this paper is that we provide the first estimates of
the value of government- and employer-provided health insurance at the house-
hold level for 1959-1978. As with other in-kind transfers, this process consists
of two steps: first imputing whether or not a household receives health insur-
ance, and second imputing the (ex-ante) value of health insurance, conditional
on source and receipt.
Our imputations of Medicare receipt are inexact but relatively straightfor-
ward. We first assign Medicare receipt to all individuals over the age of 65
since Medicare was almost universal at this age even in the early years of the
program. Medicare eligibility was extended to nearly 2 million additional indi-
viduals in 1972 that were under age 65 but had been receiving Social Security
Disability Insurance (DI) for at least two years. The CPS data report only receipt
of Social Security benefits and do not distinguish between Old-Age Insurance
(OAI), Survivors Insurance (SI), and DI and do not provide information on how
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long benefits have been received. Since OAI cannot be received before age 62,
we assume that those under the age of 62 who report receiving Social Secu-
rity benefits for the years 1972-1978 are also receiving Medicare. Because we
cannot distinguish those receiving OAI and DI who are age 62-64, and because
questions related to a person’s disability were not asked in the CPS until 1980,
we assume no one in this age group is receiving DI. In 1965, the age at which
widows could collect SI was reduced to 60 (Achenbaum, 1986). We are able to
identify widows and we assume that they are not receiving DI. Our imputation
will overstate the number of Medicare recipients to the extent that individuals
age 65 or older have not enrolled in the Medicare program primarily because
they are still working and have private health insurance and hence do not ben-
efit greatly from Medicare and they are not penalized for not taking it. We will
understate Medicare participation for those aged 62-64 whose Social Security
benefits are from DI and for widows age 60-61 who are also receiving DI.
C.7 Estimating Medicaid
Our imputations of Medicaid receipt are also inexact but relatively straightfor-
ward. Early survey years include a specific income source for “Welfare or pub-
lic assistance” which does not identify separate programs but can include pay-
ments from state old-age assistance programs and aid to the blind or disabled
before the implementation of Supplemental Security Income (SSI) in 1974, as
well as AFDC receipt. Beginning with the 1976 CPS (for income year 1975),
additional income questions added to the CPS allow for more granular identifi-
cation of family resources. The survey continues the question regarding public
assistance, but additionally includes income from SSI as a separate question.
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Title XIX of the Social Security Act created Medicaid in 1965. Medicaid ex-
pansions were optional and run at the state level, but states were incentivized
by matching federal funds to create Medicaid programs. Expanding states were
required to cover children in low-income families with single parents on wel-
fare, and also to those receiving aid from state programs for the elderly, blind,
and disabled (many states had programs to cover these individuals prior to the
federal create of SSI in 1974). As states choosing to expand were required to
cover both of these groups, enrollment in AFDC or SSI automatically made in-
dividuals eligible for Medicaid in states that expanded (CMS 2005, Rowland
2005).
These are exactly the income categories covered by the CPS question regard-
ing public assistance, and so it may reasonably be inferred that individuals re-
porting receipt of these sources of income are automatically eligible for Medi-
caid. Thus we impute Medicaid receipt to any individual reporting income from
either source. In addition, we assign receipt to children in a family with a parent
reporting income from these sources.
However, Medicaid eligibility and enrollment are not necessarily the same.
This is particularly so in later years, after Medicaid eligibility was largely de-
coupled from enrollment in AFDC or SSI. However, this should pose less of a
problem in the early years of the Medicaid program, as eligibility is closely tied
to these programs in its early years, and there are few alternative ways to qual-
ify based on federal regulations. Thus we treat eligibility as enrollment for the
years 1967-1978. States did have the option to independently expand coverage
further, but received no matching federal funds and so we do not consider such
extensions.
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States choosing to participate in Medicaid were required to provide cover-
age to families receiving any of these sources of public assistance. Therefore,
prior to 1974 we can assume anyone reporting income from these pre-SSI public
assistance programs was also eligible for Medicaid. When we combine this with
basic information on family structure (i.e., ages and number of children) we can
then assign actual receipt.
C.8 Estimating Employer-Provided Health Insurance
Imputing coverage of private health insurance is more difficult than it is for
Medicare and Medicaid because private coverage is neither universal nor based
on uniform eligibility criteria, and no questions were asked about it on the CPS
prior to 1980. Additionally, it is known that Medicaid coverage “crowds out”
employer-provided health insurance (Cutler and Gruber, 1996). Nonetheless,
our basic imputation strategy is similar to that we have discussed above for food
stamps and housing subsidies. We use the 1980 CPS with a linear probability
model to predict employer-provided health insurance coverage for employed
individuals in the CPS, and extend coverage to their immediate family members
as well.
As with housing subsidies, the lack of administrative data provides a chal-
lenge, both to constrain the percentage of individuals covered by employer-
provided health insurance and to determine the market value of the benefits.
The NHEA data provide estimates of the yearly total expenditures on private
health insurance, but there is a lack of data on number of covered individuals.
To resolve this, we use the average market value of benefits in the 1980 CPS and
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project it back using the CPI for medical care. In doing so, we will underes-
timate the value of employer-provided health insurance to income growth, as
this effectively holds the real value of such coverage constant. It is likely that
the market value of employer-provided health insurance grew in real terms over
the period 1967-1978, as there is significant growth in other income sources over
this period.
Dividing yearly total expenditures from the NHEA by our estimates of the
average market value of coverage from private health insurance provides an es-
timate of the number of recipients of employer-provided health insurance. As
with other in-kind benefits, we combine this estimate with U.S. population data
from the Census to obtain a yearly estimate of the proportion of the popula-
tion receiving employer-provided health insurance. This estimate is then used
to constrain our receipt imputation using the predicted values from the linear
probability model, and recipients are assigned the estimated market value of
employer-provided health insurance.
Our method for estimating the market value of employer-provided health
insurance is more inexact than our method for estimating Medicare or Medicaid.
In addition to understating the real growth in market value, it also does not
account for crowd-out of private insurance by Medicaid. The CPS does not
contain any information to address these issues.1
We do not do extend our analysis of the market value of employer-provided
health insurance to 1959. Unlike the case for Medicare and Medicaid in which
their value was zero in 1959, we suspect that the value of employer-provided
1It may be possible to use information from the 1977 National Medical Expenditure Survey
or the 1960/1961 and 1972/1973 CEX, all of which contain information on the receipt of private
health insurance benefits, to supplement the information we are using here.
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health insurance was non-trivial. But we have not been able to find a plausible
way to capture that value in the aggregate and assign it to our 1959 population
in the decennial Census.
C.9 Imputation Results
Medicare Imputations. Appendix Figure C.1 shows the proportion of individ-
uals we impute to receive Medicare. Here “Official Participation” is the total
number of enrollees based on aggregate administrative data divided by the total
U.S. population. “CPS Participation” is the percentage of individuals reporting
participation in the CPS. The participating proportion in the CPS is expected
to be somewhat lower than that of the general population since the CPS sam-
ples the non-institutionalized population of the U.S., whereas some Medicare
enrollees are institutionalized. The “Over 65” series shows the proportion we
impute to be participating, using only those who are over the age of 65. The
“Over 65 plus Disability” series includes those who report receiving Social Se-
curity and are under the age of 62.
Our preferred series, which includes those reporting Social Security benefits
under the age of 62 for the first time, tracks the 1972 increase in aggregate per
capita Medicare eligibility in that year when an additional 2 million individu-
als on the DI program increased total enrollment by around 10 percent. Our
imputation successfully captures this expansion of Medicare receipt, although
the increase in enrollment of 1.6 percentage points slightly overstates the size
of the increase. This may be in part due to Medicare enrollment requiring 24
continuous months of SSDI receipt to receive coverage. However, as we only
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observe Social Security receipt in one year, those who are receiving Social Se-
curity through DI but have been receiving it for less than 24 months will be
imputed to receive Medicare even though they are not yet eligible.
The second historical event observed in Appendix Figure C.1 is that the CPS
first began including questions relating to health insurance in 1979. While we
use this series in income calculations from 1979 to present, we extend our im-
putations of receipt to these years for the sake of comparison. It appears that,
if anything, the accuracy of our imputation improves in more recent years, at
least relative to receipt as measured in the CPS.2
Medicaid Imputations. Appendix Figure C.2 shows the proportion of indi-
viduals we impute to receive Medicaid. Here “Official Participation” is the total
number of enrollees based on aggregate administrative data from each state di-
vided by the total U.S. population.3 “CPS Participation” is the participation rate
as reported through the CPS, which as with Medicare begins in 1979, the first
year the CPS asks questions regarding health insurance. Our “Imputed Partic-
ipation” series is based on CPS questions between 1967 and 1979 regarding the
receipt of public assistance. While its level is lower than the one based on aggre-
gate administrative data its trend is similar. It is known that Medicaid receipt is
2In future work we will try to improve our imputation for the early period of the series by
identifying sub-groups of the under-62 Social Security recipients that would not be eligible for
Medicaid. For instance, widows are able to receive Social Security benefits for the deceased
spouse, and in 1965 the age at which widows were eligible to receive this benefit was reduced
to 60 (Achenbaum, 1986). Thus widows age 60-61 receiving Social Security may be receiving it
through SSDI and thus are eligible for Medicare, or may receive Social Security as a survivor
and thus are not eligible for Medicare until they reach 65. We cannot distinguish between the
two cases, and thus drop widows age 60-61 but retain widows under 60, who cannot receive
Survivor’s benefits and thus are likely reporting SSDI income.
3As Medicaid is a state-level program, aggregate administrative data is less readily available
than the federally run Medicare program. This series was collected as part of the actual impu-
tation process, and ongoing work will collect the relevant data for future years for the purpose
of comparison to our imputation and the CPS series. We cannot compare to CPS participation
rates during this early period as the CPS has no data on participation.
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underreported in the CPS (Davern et al. 2009), and thus it is not surprising that
the CPS and official series do not quite match.
Although the imputed series approximately follows the trend of the official
series, there are some inconsistencies, particularly in the early years. Some of
this inconsistency is to be expected mechanically due to data constraints for
state of residence combined with states implementing Medicaid programs in
different years. Early years of the CPS do not uniquely identify all states, and
in many cases states are grouped together with the same code. For example,
for the 1968-1971 surveys, 30 codes are used to identify the 50 states and the
District of Columbia. Only 26 states had implemented Medicaid programs as of
January 1967. Eleven more implemented programs at some point during 1967,
two in 1968, three in 1969, and seven during 1970. The final two, Alaska and
Arizona, implemented their programs in 1972 and 1982 respectively (Advisory
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 1968; Gruber, 2003).
Thus, many states implemented their programs during our sample period,
but in our imputation will be assigned receipt in the wrong year depending on
the other states using the same state code. If multiple states with the same code
created programs in different years, we assign receipt based on the year of the
most populous state(s) in the group. Therefore our trend must mechanically
differ from the official trend, as some families will erroneously be imputed to be
covered by Medicaid when their state had not yet expanded, or not be imputed
when their state had already expanded.
For example, North and South Carolina share the state code 57, but North
Carolina expanded in January 1970 whereas South Carolina expanded in July
1968. As North Carolina has a larger population, all families with this state code
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are assigned no Medicaid coverage until 1970, even though many would be
covered if South Carolina could be identified. A second example: North Dakota,
Nebraska, Kansas, and South Dakota all receive the state code 49. However,
North Dakota and Nebraska both implemented Medicaid programs in 1966, and
thus individuals are covered throughout our entire sample. Kansas and South
Dakota both expanded in mid- or late-1967, and thus families should not be
imputed to receive Medicaid until 1968. As South Dakota and Kansas have a
larger population in 1967 than North Dakota and Nebraska, all families from
these states are coded as not receiving Medicaid in 1967. Overall, nine state
groupings for the creation of Medicaid have one or more states with incorrect
imputations for Medicaid receipt, for a total of 12 miscoded states.4
After 1974 the imputed series appears to match the trend more accurately—
although not the level—and it maintains the same trend as the official and CPS
participation series until the late 1980s. This is not surprising; because of the
substantial changes made to Medicaid eligibility in the late 1980s, our imputa-
tion method should not be expected to maintain the same trend after this period.
In 1986 Medicaid was expanded to allow states to (optionally) cover pregnant
women and infants living in families with income up to 100 percent of the FPL.
In 1988 the coverage to pregnant woman and infants in families with income up
to 100 percent of the FPL was converted to a mandatory part of state Medicaid
programs, in addition to coverage changes for individuals with institutionalized
spouses and the implementation of the qualified Medicare Beneficiary program
under which low-income elderly could get Medicaid assistance in paying for
their Medicare premiums. In 1989, Medicaid coverage was expanded to preg-
nant women and children under age 6 with family income less than 133 percent
4The miscoded states are New Hampshire, North Dakota, Nebraska, Iowa, South Carolina,
Delaware, Arkansas, Arizona, New Mexico, Idaho, Utah, and Alaska.
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of the FPL (CMS, 2005).
These changes all increased the options for low-income families to obtain
Medicaid coverage independent of receipt of AFDC or SSI. Thus it is reassur-
ing that imputed receipt no longer appears to follow the same trend as receipt
as measured in the CPS, as none of the changes are accounted for in our im-
putation. Finally, in 1996 Welfare was reformed and AFDC was replaced with
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) (CMS, 2005). The link be-
tween Medicaid and Welfare was completely severed, and thus our imputed
series diverges even further from the CPS series.
As mentioned above, it is known that Medicaid receipt is under-reported
in the CPS. However, our imputation reports roughly 1 percent lower popula-
tion coverage during the period for which it overlaps with the CPS measure
and is expected to be similar (1979-1986). There are several reasons our impu-
tation may under-measure actual receipt. In early years, states with Medicaid
coverage may be miscoded due to state groups. Additionally, there are sev-
eral different groups eligible for Medicaid, and it is likely that our imputation
strategy does not capture all of them. States with Medicaid programs are re-
quired to provide coverage to the recipients of any public assistance program
(the categorically needy), to anyone who would be eligible for public assistance
but does not meet a state-imposed eligibility requirement (categorically related
needy), anyone under 21 who would be eligible for AFDC except for a state age
or school-attendance requirement (also categorically related needy) (Advisory
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 1968). These latter two categories
cannot be identified by our simple imputation using receipt of public assistance,
and would require a much more arduous procedure of coding up state rules re-
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lated directly to these two groups.
States can choose to cover some additional populations that receive federal
funding contributions. These include individuals who meet federal require-
ments for public assistance programs but not the state requirements if their state
of residence has stricter rules; individuals who are ineligible for public assis-
tance due to being a patient in a medical facility; individuals who are aged, dis-
abled, blind, or in families with dependent children that have sufficient income
to cover living expenses but not cannot afford their medical care; and, finally,
anyone who is medically needy and under the age of 21 but not eligible for assis-
tance from other federal public assistance programs (Advisory Commission on
Intergovernmental Relations, 1968). To the extent that these populations exist,
our imputation measure will underestimate Medicaid recipients. As a result of
our under-imputation of receipt, our results for Medicaid’s effect on household
income are likely lower bounds for the importance of Medicaid.
Employer-Provided Health Insurance Imputations. Appendix Figure C.3
shows the proportion of individuals we impute to receive employer-provided
health insurance. There is no “official” series due to a lack of data regarding
employer-provided health insurance during this time period. The series for
CPS receipt indicates a roughly 10 percent drop in the population receiving
employer-provided health insurance coverage during the period from 1979 to
2013. In this case, the imputation for private insurance coverage is significantly
more difficult than for Medicare or Medicaid, as there is a lack of defined rules
for receipt. Therefore, our preliminary strategy adopts the method used for
other in-kind transfers.
The NHEA contain a series for expenditures on “Private Health Insurance.”
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There are two primary issues with the use of this series for our purposes. Firstly,
private health insurance and employer-provided health insurance are not syn-
onymous, and private health insurance may include things such as plans pur-
chased directly on the market. Secondly, this series does not distinguish be-
tween employer contributions to health insurance plans, and the premium con-
tributions of employees. The imputation in Appendix Figure C.3 ignores both of
these issues, and assumes all the spending on private health insurance reported
in the NHEA is from employers on employer-provided health insurance. Both
of these differences will lead to overestimates of the value of employer-provided
health insurance.
Similar to our estimates of housing subsidies, our data suffers from a lack
of information on participation, both in administrative data and in the CPS.
Participation data is necessary to constrain the number of individuals imputed
to receive employer-provided health insurance. The 1979 CPS contains data
on the value of employer contributions to health insurance premiums in that
year. We begin by projecting the average value of employer contributions back
to 1967 using the CPI for medical care. This holds the value of health insurance
constant in real terms, and thus almost certainly understates the extent to which
growth in employer contributions to health insurance contributed to growth in
household income over this period, given that other sources of income grew
rapidly, with the exception of the recession in the early 1970s.
To obtain estimates of the percentage of the population receiving employer-
provided health insurance, we divide total expenditures on private health in-
surance measured in the NHEA by our estimates of the yearly average value
of such coverage. This will mechanically underestimate the percentage receiv-
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ing coverage to the extent that real growth occurred in the average value of
employer-provided health insurance, as the denominator (our yearly estimate
of the average value of coverage) is too large. Indeed, Appendix Figure 3 shows
a dramatic rise in the covered population between 1967-1979. While it is pos-
sible private coverage was expanding during this period, this would be some-
what surprising given the creation of Medicaid and its potential for crowding
out private coverage. Thus the extent of the rise is almost certainly overstated.
However, the fact that the estimates of receipt for 1978 and 1979 are very similar
is reassuring that this strategy is not without merit.
The final step is imputing the probability of receipt using a linear probability
model and constraining recipients to those with the highest probability of cov-
erage. Receipt is imputed only for individuals who report income from wages,
and is assumed to cover all immediate family members.5
Appendix Table C.2 shows the administrative expenditures for each of the
three primary insurance sources, as well as the expenditures predicted by the
CPS series and the ratio of the two. This gives us a measure of how well the
predicted series captures the total expenditures on each insurance source and
shows the accuracy of the series we extend to the early years as compared to the
Census estimates beginning in 1979. Note first that the Census estimated val-
ues for 1979 onward do not match the aggregate expenditure number for either
Medicare or Medicaid. This is primarily because the CPS excludes institution-
alized individuals from its survey population and this population requires far
more expensive medical services than does the non-institutionalized popula-
5Improving the estimates of the value and receipt of employer-provided health insurance is
the primary focus of continuing work on this paper. In particular, we aim to utilize the early
CEX surveys and the 1960 Census, both of which have some information on health insurance,
although still less than ideal administrative data.
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tion.
The Medicare series captures approximately the same proportion of aggre-
gate spending in 1967 as in 1979, the first year for which the estimates are
based on values estimated by the Census Bureau. However, the proportion of
captured spending rises over time between 1967 and 1978, and in fact closely
matches the level of total expenditure in the last few years. However, this means
the series is overstating the spending in these years, as our estimates are derived
from market values based on total program spending, and not spending on our
sample population, which excludes institutionalized individuals. We do not
have series of total Medicare or Medicaid spending split between institutional-
ized and non-institutionalized individuals. Future work can refine these esti-
mates by using market value estimates specific to various eligible groups (for
example retirees versus the disabled). Overall, the series seems largely plausi-
ble.
The story is reversed for our Medicaid series, which captures nearly all of
the total Medicaid spending in the early years, and steadily less in later years.
The final year of our estimates, 1978, captures roughly the same proportion of
program spending as do the years 1979 and after, for which we have the Cen-
sus estimates, albeit at a slightly higher proportion in 1978. Overall, this series
also seems plausible, although similar refinements as mentioned for Medicare
would improve the accuracy of our Medicaid estimates as well. While the ris-
ing proportion of Medicare spending captured may lead to an overestimate of
income growth due to Medicare, the opposite is true for Medicaid, and so the
direction of any bias is unclear.
The series for private health insurance is similar to Medicaid. It captures a
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large proportion of total spending in 1967 and declines to approximately 60 per-
cent in 1978, a value slightly less than that the Census captures in 1979. Thus,
overall, our series estimating values for the three major sources of health insur-
ance seem largely plausible, although future refinements to the estimates may
improve them somewhat.
C.10 Extended Income Measures
Appendix Figure C.4 extends a subset of income measures to include the most
recent CPS data for income year 2016. Additionally, this figure includes other
measures not included in the body of the paper. These new measures are: the
labor earnings of tax units; the household size-adjusted labor earnings of per-
sons; and the household size-adjusted market income of persons. The addi-
tional series require imputations for more sources of income. As a result, only
the household size-adjusted pre-tax, post transfer income of persons and the
household size-adjusted post-tax, post-transfer plus in-kind transfer income of
persons series extend for the entire time period of 1959-2016. Future drafts will
extend these other series to earlier years as well.
The extension of the series to the most recent CPS years also requires an ad-
justment of the entire series due to the CPS redesign for the 2014 survey year.
Our adjustment is effectively the same as the adjustment used for the 1992-1993
survey break, with the exception that the 2014 redesign included a redesigned
and traditional CPS sample in the same year, whereas the earlier redesign has
the traditional survey for the entire 1992 sample, and the redesigned survey for
the entire 1993 sample. Thus, we use the two samples in the 2014 survey to
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calculate an adjustment factor such that the measures are the same between the
traditional and redesigned surveys, and apply this factor to the income mea-
sures in all previous years. While the more recent numbers should be compara-
ble with the estimates from earlier survey years, we indicate this “break” in our
income measure with a dashed vertical line, as we did with other breaks in the
surveys used.
200
Figure C.1: Measures of Imputed Medicare Eligibility: 1967-2013.
Sources: Authors’ calculations using the March CPS, Medi-
care & Medicaid Statistical Supplement (CMS 2001, 2013ab).
Notes: Official participation measured by CMS in Medicare
& Medicaid Statistical Supplements. CPS participation mea-
sured from 1979 on. Participation is imputed prior to 1979 to
those over 65 and under 62 reporting Social Security income
(disability recipients), but excluding widows age 60-61 who
may instead be receiving survivors’ benefits. Imputation ex-
tended to later years to compare to CPS and Official series.
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Figure C.2: Measures of Imputed Medicaid Eligibility: 1967-2013.
Sources: Authors’ calculations using the March CPS, In-
stitute for Medicaid Management (1979), Klemm (2000)..
Notes: Official participation collected from Health Care Financ-
ing Administration (HCFA) records. CPS participation mea-
sured from 1979 on. Participation is imputed prior to 1979 to
those reporting public assistance or SSI income. This excludes
some eligible groups, but includes those who were automat-
ically eligible for Medicaid. 49 states implemented Medicaid
by 1972, but not all states are individually identifiable in the
CPS, necessarily adding error to early imputation. Imputation
extended to later years to compare to CPS and Official series.
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Figure C.3: Imputed Employer-Provided Health Insurance: 1967-2013.
Sources: Authors’ calculations using the
March CPS and NHEA (CMS 2013b).
Notes: CPS participation measured from 1979 on. Pre-
1979 participation imputed using linear probability model
based on 1979 CPS following method used by Fox et al. (2015)
for other in-kind benefits. Recipient population constrained
by dividing total expenditures from NHEA by estimated
individual market value. Individual market value estimated
by deflating average 1979 benefit using CPI for medical care,
thus likely understating percentage of population receiving
employer-provided health insurance.
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Figure C.4: Extended Median Income Measures Including Recent
CPS Data, Normalized to 1979 Levels (1959-2016).
Sources: Authors calculations using the March CPS, NHEA,
White House Budget Historical Tables, Statistical Ab-
stracts of the U.S., Census Bureau population estimates
and poverty thresholds, USDA Child Nutrition Tables,
and 1972-1973 CEX. Taxes calculated using NBER TaxSim.
Notes: Median income trends normalized to one in 1979 with
NBER recession dates in gray. Series 1 includes the size-
unadjusted labor income of tax units. Series 2-6 are household
size-adjusted income of persons measures using the square-
root of household size, and sequentially adding additional
sources of income. Series 6 includes the market values of
Medicare and Medicaid, as well as employer contributions to
health insurance premiums. As we do not have estimates for
the value of employer-provided health insurance in 1959, we
begin the last measure in 1967. Changes between surveys or
major survey redesigns are indicated by dashed vertical lines.
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